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https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.303940
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What this work says
Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4101(95)00409-2openalex-extracted
Employee stock option exercises an empirical analysis
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405x(94)00803-9openalex-extracted
Incentives, downsizing, and value creation at general dynamics,
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0304-405x(00)00049-0openalex-extracted
The value and incentive effects of nontraditional executive stock option plans
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0304-405x(98)00006-3openalex-extracted
The exercise and valuation of executive stock options
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/209632openalex-extracted
Digital Contracts: Simple Tools for Pricing Complex Derivatives
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/260062openalex-extracted
The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/0022-1082.00288openalex-extracted
Does Option Compensation Increase Managerial Risk Appetite?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1162/003355398555702openalex-extracted
Are CEOs Really Paid Like Bureaucrats?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.21314/jcf.1998.019openalex-extracted
Approximating American options and other financial contracts using barrier derivatives
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2086openalex-extracted
Are CEOS Really Paid Like Bureaucrats?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.252805openalex-extracted
Stock Options for Undiversified Executives
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1926560openalex-extracted
Lifetime Portfolio Selection under Uncertainty: The Continuous-Time Case
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2330757openalex-extracted
The Determinants of Firms' Hedging Policies
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2491032openalex-extracted
Portfolio Considerations in Valuing Executive Compensation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2469/faj.v50.n6.46openalex-extracted
Valuing Employee Stock Options
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3386/w8052openalex-extracted
Stock Options for Undiversified Executives
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3905/jod.1995.407933openalex-extracted
On the Accounting Valuation of Employee Stock Options
What points at this work
Incoming claims: where this work appears in other papers’ reference lists and arguments.
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The Valuation of Executive Stock Options when Executives Can Influence the Payoffs
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The Early Exercise of Executive Stock Options and Firms’ Future Systematic and Idiosyncratic Risks
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Risk-Taking Incentives and Losses in the Financial Crisis
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Golden Parachutes, Takeover Incentive, and Risk-Taking
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Performance-Vesting Provisions in Executive Compensation
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Modeling Hedge Fund Seeding Innovation: Fees-for-Seed Swap and Fees-for-Guarantee Swap
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Equity-Based Compensation in the Presence of Ambiguity Aversion
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Leverage, CEO Risk-Taking Incentives and Bank Failure during the 2007-2010 Financial Crisis
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Optimal Contracting with Unobservable Managerial Hedging
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The Cost of Employee Stock Options
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Executive Compensation and Managerial Risk-Taking
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Employee Sentiment and Stock Option Compensation
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Expensing Executive Stock Options: Sorting Out the Issues
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Employee Stock Options: Much More Valuable than You Thought
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Analytic Pricing of Employee Stock Options
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inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.677438openalex-extracted
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inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.686110openalex-extracted
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Executive Stock Options as a Screening Mechanism
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.870479openalex-extracted
Effect of Personal Taxes on Managers' Decision to Sell Unrestricted Equity
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Managerial Risk-Shifting Incentives of Option-Based Compensation: Firm Risk, Leverage, and Moneyness
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.908591openalex-extracted
ESO Compensation: The Roles of Default Risk and Over-Confidence
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.924765openalex-extracted
Stockholder and Bondholder Wealth Effects of CEO Incentive Grants
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.931097openalex-extracted
Managerial Control, Compensation, and Derivative Pricing
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.954142openalex-extracted
Effects of the Agency Cost of Debt and Managerial Risk Aversion on Capital Structure: What Can We Learn from All-Equity Firms?
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.995013openalex-extracted
Optimal Exercise Patterns and Valuation of Employee Stock Options: An Approximate Dynamic Programming Approach
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s10614-012-9338-7openalex-snapshot
High-Water Marks and Hedge Fund Management Contracts with Partial Information
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11147-008-9023-0openalex-snapshot
Stock options and managers’ incentives to cheat
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11156-005-3177-8openalex-snapshot
Incentives of Stock Option Based Compensation
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11573-006-0044-6openalex-snapshot
Was kosten Aktienoptionsprogramme? Alternative Bewertungsansätze und Kosteneffekte bei Euro Stoxx 50-Unternehmen
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Optimal Capital Structure with an Equity-for-Guarantee Swap
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Entrepreneurial finance with equity-for-guarantee swap and idiosyncratic risk
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Employee stock options in compensation agreements: A financing explanation
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Exercise behavior, valuation, and the incentive effects of employee stock options
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Managerial incentives and risk-taking☆
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Too much of a good incentive? The case of executive stock options
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Executive Stock Options: Back to Basics
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Private Information in Executive Stock Option Trades: Evidence of Insider Trading in the UK
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2007.01208.xopenalex-snapshot
Lower Salaries and No Options? On the Optimal Structure of Executive Pay
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Pricing Employee Stock Options under Stochastic Volatility
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Valuation and Computing Algorithm for Bot Associated Business
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La vague des fusions-acquisitions des années 1990 aux États-Unis. Une lecture des résultats à l'aide de la théorie de l'agence
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Employee Sentiment and Stock Option Compensation
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Constrained viscosity solution to the HJB equation arising in perpetual American employee stock options pricing
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