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Institutional Investors and Executive Compensation

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What this work says

Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4090130103openalex-snapshot
Shark repellents and the role of institutional investors in corporate governance
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405x(87)90032-8openalex-snapshot
Shark repellents and stock prices
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405x(88)90047-5openalex-snapshot
Ownership structure and voting on antitakeover amendments
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405x(92)90029-wopenalex-snapshot
The investment opportunity set and corporate financing, dividend, and compensation policies
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405x(95)00829-4openalex-snapshot
Do corporations award CEO stock options effectively?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405x(95)00841-2openalex-snapshot
The distorting effect of the prudent-man laws on institutional equity investments
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2003.05.007openalex-snapshot
Why constrain your mutual fund manager?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-4101(99)00019-1openalex-snapshot
The use of equity grants to manage optimal equity incentive levels
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0304-405x(00)00058-1openalex-snapshot
Corporate governance proposals and shareholder activism: the role of institutional investors
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0929-1199(00)00005-5openalex-snapshot
Do institutional investors exacerbate managerial myopia?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/261385openalex-snapshot
Large Shareholders and Corporate Control
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/261677openalex-snapshot
Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/261893openalex-snapshot
Market Liquidity and Performance Monitoring
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/15.1.289openalex-snapshot
Investor Activism and Financial Market Structure
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhg040openalex-snapshot
Greener Pastures and the Impact of Dynamic Institutional Preferences
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/0022-1082.00188openalex-snapshot
Herding and Feedback Trading by Institutional and Individual Investors
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/0022-1082.00250openalex-snapshot
Taking Stock: Equity‐Based Compensation and the Evolution of Managerial Ownership
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/0022-1082.00298openalex-snapshot
A Theory of Dividends Based on Tax Clienteles
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/0022-1082.244195openalex-snapshot
Block Share Purchases and Corporate Performance
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/0022-1082.35053openalex-snapshot
Large Shareholders as Monitors: Is There a Trade‐Off between Liquidity and Control?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/0022-1082.45483openalex-snapshot
Ownership Structure, Speculation, and Shareholder Intervention
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-6803.2001.tb00827.xopenalex-snapshot
EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION STRUCTURE AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CHOICES
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1988.tb04593.xopenalex-snapshot
Compensation and Incentives: Practice vs. Theory
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1996.tb05204.xopenalex-snapshot
Preferences for Stock Characteristics As Revealed by Mutual Fund Portfolio Holdings
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1996.tb05208.xopenalex-snapshot
Shareholder Activism by Institutional Investors: Evidence from CalPERS
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb01120.xopenalex-snapshot
Institutions and Individuals at the Turn-of-the-Year
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1162/003355301556392openalex-snapshot
Institutional Investors and Equity Prices
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1162/003355397555325openalex-snapshot
Large Shareholders, Monitoring, and the Value of the Firm
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1162/003355398555702openalex-snapshot
Are CEOs Really Paid Like Bureaucrats?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.39.11.1407openalex-snapshot
The Effect of a Large Shareholder on Corporate Value
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.283779openalex-snapshot
The Price Impact of Institutional Trading
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.300579openalex-snapshot
Agency Problems are Ameliorated by Stock Market Liquidity: Monitoring, Information and the Use of Stock-Based Compensation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.47271openalex-snapshot
Do Institutional Investors Exacerbate Managerial Myopia?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1123064openalex-snapshot
Liquidity versus Control: The Institutional Investor as Corporate Monitor
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/135687openalex-snapshot
Handbook of Labor Economics
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/253449openalex-snapshot
Patterns of Institutional Investment, Prudence, and the Managerial "Safety-Net" Hypothesis
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2672914openalex-snapshot
Corporate Disclosure Practices, Institutional Investors, and Stock Return Volatility
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2676287openalex-snapshot
Managerial Ownership, Incentive Contracting, and the Use of Zero-Cost Collars and Equity Swaps by Corporate Insiders
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/3003319openalex-snapshot
Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principal and Agent Relationship
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/3003320openalex-snapshot
Moral Hazard and Observability
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/3003400openalex-snapshot
Takeover Bids, The Free-Rider Problem, and the Theory of the Corporation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2469/faj.v49.n5.53openalex-snapshot
Institutional Demand and Security Price Pressure: The Case of Corporate Spinoffs
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3386/w6213openalex-snapshot
Are CEOs Really Paid Like Bureaucrats?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3386/w6723openalex-snapshot
Institutional Investors and Equity Prices
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3386/w7123openalex-snapshot
Blockholder Identity, Equity Ownership Structures, and Hostile Takeovers
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.4324/9780080942841-11openalex-snapshot
Executive compensation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.5860/choice.34-1029openalex-snapshot
Investor capitalism: how money managers are changing the face of corporate America

What points at this work

Incoming claims: where this work appears in other papers’ reference lists and arguments.

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OWNERSHIP - MONITORING OR EXPROPRIATION: EVIDENCE FROM DIVESTED EUROPEAN FIRMS
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The Impact of Corporate Governance on the Disclosure of Manager-Adjusted Non-GAAP Earnings
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1019413openalex-extracted
The Transferability of CEO Skills
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Is There a Disposition Effect in Corporate Investment Decisions? Evidence from Real Estate Investment Trusts
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1070168openalex-extracted
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1085934openalex-extracted
Agency Costs and the Underlying Causes of Mispricing
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1086687openalex-extracted
Hedge Funds and Shareholder Wealth Gains in Leveraged Buyouts
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1092288openalex-extracted
Inside Agency: The Rise and Fall of Nortel
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1096998openalex-extracted
Will the Real Monitors Please Stand Up?: Institutional Investors and CEO Compensation
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1098852openalex-extracted
The Effect of CEO Pay on Firm Valuation in Closely Held Firms
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1100670openalex-extracted
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1102703openalex-extracted
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1104616openalex-extracted
Performance Surprises and Uncertain Managerial Ability: Evidence from CEO Turnovers
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1106096openalex-extracted
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1108390openalex-extracted
On the Relevance of Ownership Structure in Determining the Maturity of Debt
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1108497openalex-extracted
Corporate Governance and Firm Performance: Evidence from Large Governance Changes
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1108593openalex-extracted
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1108724openalex-extracted
Institutional Trading, Information and Executive Compensation
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1114106openalex-extracted
Corporate Governance and Executive Pay: Evidence from a Recent Reform
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1125683openalex-extracted
Institutional Holdings and Seasoned Equity Offerings
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1129240openalex-extracted
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1147118openalex-extracted
Dividend Signaling: Evidence from Bank IPOs
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1159061openalex-extracted
When Shareholders are Creditors: Effects of the Simultaneous Holding of Equity and Debt by Institutional Investors
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1195202openalex-extracted
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1265709openalex-extracted
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1267305openalex-extracted
Opacity and Executive Compensation
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1270826openalex-extracted
Income Smoothing and Idiosyncratic Volatility
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1287100openalex-extracted
Executive Directors' Pay and Networks: The Influence of Ownership Structure
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1287923openalex-extracted
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1293188openalex-extracted
Does Corporate Governance Matter? New Evidence from the United Kingdom
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1309786openalex-extracted
Restating Under the Radar? Determinants of Restatement Disclosure Choices and the Related Market Reactions
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1319596openalex-extracted
Investment, Idiosyncratic Risk, and Ownership
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1321350openalex-extracted
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1338695openalex-extracted
Blockholdings and Corporate Governance in the EU Banking Sector
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1341076openalex-extracted
Low Risk and High Return - Affective Attitudes and Stock Market Expectations
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1341515openalex-extracted
Institutional Holdings and Seasoned Equity Offerings
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1341692openalex-extracted
Sovereign Wealth Funds: Investment Choices and Implications Around the World
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1348672openalex-extracted
Evaluation Corporate Governance Risk: A Fuzzy Logic Approach
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1356364openalex-extracted
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1358572openalex-extracted
Public and Private Firm Compensation Compared: Evidence from Japanese Tax Returns
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1361143openalex-extracted
Does Governance Travel around the World? Evidence from Institutional Investors
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1361222openalex-extracted
Corporate Governance and the Hedging Premium Around the World
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1361327openalex-extracted
CEO Power and the Structure of CEO Pay
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1361814openalex-extracted
Beating the Target: A Closer Look at Annual Incentive Plans
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1364595openalex-extracted
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1364751openalex-extracted
Selection or Influence? Institutional Investors and Corporate Acquisitions
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1364912openalex-extracted
Effectiveness of CEO Compensation in Family Firms
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1370886openalex-extracted
Pension Reform, Insitutional Investors' Growth and Stock Market Development in the Developing Countries? Does it Function?
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1373206openalex-extracted
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1381242openalex-extracted
Mandatory IFRS Reporting and Stock Price Informativeness
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1397586openalex-extracted
Corporate Governance, External Market Discipline and Firm Productivity
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1438059openalex-extracted
Corporate Governance and Stock-Based Incentives – An Analysis of European Firms
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1439313openalex-extracted
Mandated Compensation Disclosures and CEO Pay
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1441460openalex-extracted
Equity Lending Markets and Ownership Structure
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1443420openalex-extracted
Say on Pay Votes and CEO Compensation: Evidence from the UK
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1443431openalex-extracted
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1444062openalex-extracted
Risk and CEO Turnover
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1455995openalex-extracted
Ownership Structure, Liquidity, and Firm Value: Effects of the Investment Horizon
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1501186openalex-extracted
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1501806openalex-extracted
Multiple Large Shareholders, Audit Committee Activity and Audit Fees
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1508146openalex-extracted
The State of Corporate Governance Research
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1508556openalex-extracted
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1514916openalex-extracted
Institutional Investors and Corporate Investment
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1515166openalex-extracted
Remuneration Committee, Ownership Structure and Pay-for-Performance: Evidence from Malaysia
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1539118openalex-extracted
Corporate Governance, External Market Discipline and Firm Productivity
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1542286openalex-extracted
CEO Incentives and Institutional Trader Monitoring are Substitutes: Theory and Evidence
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1557321openalex-extracted
CEO Compensation and Performance in Family Firms
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1569531openalex-extracted
Is Busy Really Busy? Board Governance Revisited
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1570704openalex-extracted
Power Game between the CEO and Labor: Evidence from Outsourcing
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1570977openalex-extracted
Institutional Investors and Foreign Exchange Risk
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1587055openalex-extracted
Innovation, R&D and Managerial Compensation
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1592163openalex-extracted
Managerial Compensation in the Financial Service Industry
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1605642openalex-extracted
The Association Between Research Output and Compensation for Accounting Professors
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1619927openalex-extracted
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1623467openalex-extracted
Implications of Estimation Error in Option Grants for Evaluating CEO Pay
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1635943openalex-extracted
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1644995openalex-extracted
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1645962openalex-extracted
Stock Return Synchronicity and Technical Trading Rules
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1652210openalex-extracted
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1659353openalex-extracted
CEO Pay-for-Complexity and the Risk of Managerial Diversion from Multinational Diversification
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1660207openalex-extracted
The Impact of Domestic Institutional Investors and Foreign Investors on CEO Compensation and Firm Performance in Family Firms
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1663653openalex-extracted
Internal Corporate Governance Mechanisms and Foreign Investors: Evidence from Japanese IPOs
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1686357openalex-extracted
The Arrow-Lind Theorem Revisited in Turmoil Times
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1688993openalex-extracted
The Role of Institutional Investors in Voting: Evidence from the Securities Lending Market
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1691241openalex-extracted
Director Networks, Firm Performance, and Shareholder Base
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1699272openalex-extracted
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The Determinants of CEO Inside Debt and its Components
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1723155openalex-extracted
Who is Asking the Shareholders? Voting on Management Compensation in German Listed Firms – Evidence from the Annual Meeting Season 2010 (Wer fragt die Aktionäre? - Abstimmung über das Vorstandsvergütungssystem: Erfahrungen aus der HV-Saison 2010)
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1730316openalex-extracted
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1736636openalex-extracted
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1742506openalex-extracted
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1744824openalex-extracted
Pension Reform, Institutional Investors’ Growth and Stock Market Development in the Developing Countries: Does it Function?
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1752423openalex-extracted
Does Equity-Based Compensation Really Have a 'Dark Side'? The Influence of Regulatory Discretion
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1762832openalex-extracted
Influence of French and Foreign Institutional Owners on Firms’ Financial Performance
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1777988openalex-extracted
Frog in the Pan: Continuous Information and Momentum
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1785943openalex-extracted
Generalists versus Specialists: Lifetime Work Experience and CEO Pay
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1786159openalex-extracted
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1786182openalex-extracted
Institutional Ownership and Firm Cash Holdings
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1786429openalex-extracted
Institutional Investors and Mutual Fund Governance
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1786668openalex-extracted
Why Do Some CEOS Work for a One-Dollar Salary?
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1787228openalex-extracted
To Delegate or Not to Delegate to Stock Markets? The Case of Boards with Related Industry Expertise
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1787291openalex-extracted
Ownership Structure , Limits to Arbitrage and Stock Returns: Evidence from Equity Lending Markets
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1787430openalex-extracted
Family Firms and Top Management Compensation Incentives
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1894569openalex-extracted
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1907505openalex-extracted
The Impact of Social Capital from Shareholders on Firm Performance: An Emerging Country Tests
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1909592openalex-extracted
The Substitute Effect of Monitoring Mechanisms and Performance-Based Executive Compensation in Family Firms: Evidence from an Emerging Market
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1910976openalex-extracted
A Test of the Free Cash Flow Hypothesis: The Impact of Increased Institutional Holdings on Firm Characteristics
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1910996openalex-extracted
Institutional Ownership and Executive Compensation: Evidence from U.S. Banks During the Financial Crisis
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1917426openalex-extracted
Corporate Governance of Chinese Fund Management Companies
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1919667openalex-extracted
Institutional Investors, Monitoring, and the Transformation of Underperforming Firms
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1922895openalex-extracted
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1929072openalex-extracted
Pay for Outsiders: Compensation Incentives for Nonfamily Executives in Family Firms
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1929230openalex-extracted
Asymmetric Information in the Market for IPOs
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1941825openalex-extracted
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1943507openalex-extracted
Institutional Investment Horizon and Corporate Financing Decisions
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1946605openalex-extracted
Institutional Investors and Information Content of Earnings Announcements Over Time
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1955488openalex-extracted
The Effect of Auditor Expertise on Executive Compensation
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1961567openalex-extracted
Corporate Governance and International Trade Shocks
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1975973openalex-extracted
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1980353openalex-extracted
Executive Compensation and Anglo-American Influence: European Evidence
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1982123openalex-extracted
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1991543openalex-extracted
Coordination Costs, Institutional Investors, and Firm Value
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1993364openalex-extracted
A New Look at Oligopoly: Implicit Collusion Through Portfolio Diversification
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2000226openalex-extracted
Investor Horizons and Corporate Cash Holdings
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2008877openalex-extracted
Pride and Prestige: Why Some Firms Pay Their CEOs Less
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2010095openalex-extracted
CEO Tournaments: A Cross-Country Analysis of Causes, Cultural Influences and Consequences
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2021059openalex-extracted
CEO Connectedness within Executive Suites and Corporate Frauds
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2022211openalex-extracted
Corporate Governance and International Trade Shocks
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2022605openalex-extracted
Testing Dynamic Agency Theory via Structural Estimation
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2022817openalex-extracted
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2023965openalex-extracted
Pay for outsiders: Incentive compensation for nonfamily executives in family firms
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2024129openalex-extracted
Is Disclosure an Effective Cleansing Mechanism? The Dynamics of Compensation Peer Benchmarking
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2024700openalex-extracted
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2025622openalex-extracted
Institutional Investors and Analyst Coverage in Malaysia
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2026121openalex-extracted
The Impact of Say-on-Pay on Executive Compensation
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2041679openalex-extracted
Executive Compensation: Where We are, and How We Got There
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2042476openalex-extracted
Institutional Investor Horizons, Information Environment, and Firm Financing Decisions
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2093674openalex-extracted
CEO Connectedness and Corporate Frauds
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2101366openalex-extracted
Short-Term Institutional Investors and Mispricing
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2102136openalex-extracted
Shareholder Influence on Board of Directors and CEO Remuneration: A Literature Review
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2103523openalex-extracted
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2109213openalex-extracted
Board Influence on Remuneration: A Literature Review
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2112880openalex-extracted
Does Board Voting Efficiency Affect Corporate Performance and Governance? Evidence from the Even-Odd Effects of Corporate Board
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2131660openalex-extracted
Political Motivation, Over-Investment, and Firm Performance
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2140668openalex-extracted
Wealth Shocks and Executive Compensation: Evidence from CEO Divorce
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2142208openalex-extracted
Lehman's and Lemons: A Study of Institutional Investment in U.S. Firms
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2151326openalex-extracted
Accounting-Based Performance Metrics and Executive Compensation in Nonprofit Organizations
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2169099openalex-extracted
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2176615openalex-extracted
Agency Problem II and Convergence in CEO Pay
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2177699openalex-extracted
Shareholder Monitoring Incentives and Corporate Policies
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2179036openalex-extracted
The Managerial Power Approach – A Tautology Revisited
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2198284openalex-extracted
Mutual Fund Ownership, Firm Specific Information, and Firm Performance: Evidence from China
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2209545openalex-extracted
Corporate Tradeoff Decisions between Social Goals and Shareholder Value Maximization: The Role of Local Institutional Investors
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2209936openalex-extracted
Should Shareholders Have a Say on Executive Compensation? Evidence from Say-on-Pay in the United States
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2220144openalex-extracted
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2234196openalex-extracted
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2247055openalex-extracted
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2258266openalex-extracted
Corporate Governance and Firm’s Cash Holdings: Evidence From India
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2261788openalex-extracted
CEO Tournaments: A Cross-Country Analysis of Causes, Cultural Influences and Consequences
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2263837openalex-extracted
Governance Through Trading on Acquisitions of Public Firms
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2275468openalex-extracted
Pay Gap among Executives and Firm Value
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2275635openalex-extracted
Creditor Governance Through Loan-to-Loan and Loan-to-Own
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2283134openalex-extracted
Institutional Investors and Corporate Environmental, Social, and Governance Policies: Evidence from Toxics Release Data
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2285638openalex-extracted
Managerial Ownership and Firm Performance: Evidence from the 2003 Dividend Tax Cut
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2285776openalex-extracted
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2311501openalex-extracted
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2312555openalex-extracted
Market Competition, Social Network and Firm Performance: An Emerging Economy Test
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2318366openalex-extracted
Monitoring, Contractual Incentive Pay, and the Structure of CEO Equity-Based Compensation
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2318657openalex-extracted
A Test of the Free Cash Flow Hypothesis: The Impact of Increased Institutional Holdings on Firm Characteristics
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2333062openalex-extracted
How (if any) Uniform Corporate Governance Measures Matter for Executive Compensation Practice at Closely-Held Banks
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2342075openalex-extracted
Libor Manipulation: Cui Bono?
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2356163openalex-extracted
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2370931openalex-extracted
Frog in the Pan: Continuous Information and Momentum
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2371051openalex-extracted
What is the Relation (If Any) between a Firm's Corporate Governance Arrangements and Its Financial Performance?
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2374463openalex-extracted
The Structural Elaboration of Board Independence: Executive Power, Institutional Logics, and the Adoption of CEO-Only Board Structures in U.S. Corporate Governance
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2378426openalex-extracted
The Information Content of REIT Credit Rating Actions and Transparency
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2380284openalex-extracted
Shareholder Coordination, Corporate Governance, and Firm Value
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2380426openalex-extracted
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2382278openalex-extracted
Free Riding and Ownership Structure: Evidence from a Natural Experiment
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2395774openalex-extracted
Do Capital Markets Punish Managerial Myopia? Evidence from Myopic R&D Cuts
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2396938openalex-extracted
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2400391openalex-extracted
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2401282openalex-extracted
Corporate Governance and Rent Extraction Through Executive Compensation in Argentina
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2407986openalex-extracted
Globalization and Top Income Shares
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2430465openalex-extracted
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2430781openalex-extracted
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2435923openalex-extracted
Agency Conflicts and Dividend Persistence
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2439040openalex-extracted
Strategic Disclosure Timing and Insider Trading
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2470393openalex-extracted
The Wages of Sin - Social Stigma Premium in Executive Compensation
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2470480openalex-extracted
Managerial Incentives, Moral Hazard and Risk Management
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2475150openalex-extracted
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2475347openalex-extracted
Teaming Up and Quiet Intervention: The Impact of Institutional Investors on Executive Compensation Policies
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2498960openalex-extracted
Revisiting Executive Pay in Family-Controlled Firms
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2500461openalex-extracted
Investor Activism Effects in Banking: Is Activism Beneficial for Bank Shareholders, Creditors, and the Public?
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2506170openalex-extracted
The Impact of Institutional Ownership on Dividends - An Agency Theory Based Analysis
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2517600openalex-extracted
Disagreement-Induced CEO Turnover
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2517833openalex-extracted
How do ‘busy’ and ‘overlap’ directors relate to CEO pay structure and incentives?
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2520942openalex-extracted
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2526799openalex-extracted
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2528891openalex-extracted
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