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Executive Compensation: A Survey of Theory and Evidence

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Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4090130107openalex-extracted
Managerial compensation and the agency costs of debt finance
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Does a long‐term orientation create value? Evidence from a regression discontinuity
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The Structure of Performance-Vested Stock Option Grants
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s11142-006-9013-0openalex-extracted
Do firms understate stock option-based compensation expense disclosed under SFAS 123?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s11142-006-9024-xopenalex-extracted
Managerial discretion and the economic determinants of the disclosed volatility parameter for valuing ESOs
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s11142-012-9182-yopenalex-extracted
Corporate governance, compensation consultants, and CEO pay levels
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(90)90066-sopenalex-extracted
Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex-ante action choices
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4101(83)90003-4openalex-extracted
The association between performance plan adoption and corporate capital investment
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4101(85)90026-6openalex-extracted
Corporate performance and managerial remuneration
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4101(85)90027-8openalex-extracted
Executive compensation, management turnover, and firm performance
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4101(85)90029-1openalex-extracted
The effect of bonus schemes on accounting decisions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4101(93)90003-xopenalex-extracted
Accounting income, stock price, and managerial compensation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4101(93)90005-zopenalex-extracted
Accounting earnings and top executive compensation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4101(94)00376-gopenalex-extracted
Annual bonus schemes and the manipulation of earnings
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4101(95)00416-5openalex-extracted
CEO compensation: The role of individual performance evaluation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0278-4254(85)90011-0openalex-extracted
The market for public accounting services: Demand, supply and regulation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405x(76)90026-xopenalex-extracted
Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405x(88)90048-7openalex-extracted
Management ownership and market valuation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405x(88)90053-0openalex-extracted
Outside directors and CEO turnover
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405x(88)90054-2openalex-extracted
Stock prices and top management changes
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405x(90)90069-copenalex-extracted
Additional evidence on equity ownership and corporate value
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405x(92)90029-wopenalex-extracted
The investment opportunity set and corporate financing, dividend, and compensation policies
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405x(94)00803-9openalex-extracted
Incentives, downsizing, and value creation at general dynamics,
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405x(94)00809-fopenalex-extracted
Executive compensation structure, ownership, and firm performance
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405x(94)00816-jopenalex-extracted
Executive pay and performance Evidence from the U.S. banking industry
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405x(95)00844-5openalex-extracted
Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0889-1583(92)90017-xopenalex-extracted
Experiences, credentials, and compensation in the Japanese and U.S. managerial labor markets: Evidence from new micro data
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/b978-0-44-453594-8.00004-5openalex-extracted
Executive Compensation: Where We Are, and How We Got There
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/b978-0-44-453594-8.00005-7openalex-extracted
Behavioral Corporate Finance: An Updated Survey
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2003.06.002openalex-extracted
The effect of stock option repricing on employee turnover
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2006.01.001openalex-extracted
Golden handshakes: Separation pay for retired and dismissed CEOs
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2009.03.002openalex-extracted
The incentives of compensation consultants and CEO pay
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2009.04.001openalex-extracted
Peer firms in relative performance evaluation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2009.12.001openalex-extracted
Executive pay and “independent” compensation consultants
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2010.09.004openalex-extracted
Evidence on differences between recognition and disclosure: A comparison of inputs to estimate fair values of employee stock options
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2009.09.002openalex-extracted
Entrenchment, governance, and the stock price reaction to sudden executive deaths
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2013.03.003openalex-extracted
The determinants and effects of CEO–employee pay ratios
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2005.09.001openalex-extracted
Can the agency costs of debt and equity explain the changes in executive compensation during the 1990s?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2008.08.006openalex-extracted
You can't take it with you: Sunset provisions for equity compensation when managers retire, resign, or die
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2015.10.005openalex-extracted
A comparison of CEO pay–performance sensitivity in privately-held and public firms
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2020.101758openalex-extracted
Managerial incentives to take asset risk
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2015.04.004openalex-extracted
Dynamic managerial compensation: A variational approach
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2015.09.003openalex-extracted
Information space conditions for the first-order approach in agency problems
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2003.06.002openalex-extracted
CEO compensation and incentives: Evidence from M&A bonuses
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2004.01.006openalex-extracted
Asymmetric benchmarking in compensation: Executives are rewarded for good luck but not penalized for bad
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2004.03.004openalex-extracted
Why do some firms give stock options to all employees?: An empirical examination of alternative theories
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2004.05.006openalex-extracted
Exercise behavior, valuation, and the incentive effects of employee stock options
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2004.09.004openalex-extracted
Managerial incentives and risk-taking☆
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2005.05.002openalex-extracted
Flights of fancy: Corporate jets, CEO perquisites, and inferior shareholder returns
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2006.01.008openalex-extracted
Employee sentiment and stock option compensation☆
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2006.05.009openalex-extracted
Why do corporate managers misstate financial statements? The role of option compensation and other factors
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2007.05.001openalex-extracted
The power of the pen and executive compensation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2007.08.007openalex-extracted
Does the use of peer groups contribute to higher pay and less efficient compensation?☆
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2010.01.006openalex-extracted
Inside the black box: The role and composition of compensation peer groups☆
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2010.06.003openalex-extracted
Optimal exercise of executive stock options and implications for firm cost
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.02.007openalex-extracted
Are all CEOs above average? An empirical analysis of compensation peer groups and pay design
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.05.006openalex-extracted
The CEO pay slice
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.07.002openalex-extracted
CEO Ownership, External Governance, and Risk-taking
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2012.01.004openalex-extracted
Stock options and managerial incentives for risk taking: Evidence from FAS 123R
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2012.06.003openalex-extracted
Stock option vesting conditions, CEO turnover, and myopic investment
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2012.09.005openalex-extracted
CEO Compensation Contagion: Evidence from an Exogenous Shock
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2012.10.002openalex-extracted
Peer choice in CEO compensation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2012.11.008openalex-extracted
CEO wage dynamics: Estimates from a learning model
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2013.01.001openalex-extracted
Generalists versus specialists: Lifetime work experience and chief executive officer pay
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2013.01.013openalex-extracted
CEO contract design: How do strong principals do it?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2014.06.006openalex-extracted
CEO optimism and incentive compensation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2015.09.003openalex-extracted
Optimal inside debt compensation and the value of equity and debt
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2016.01.022openalex-extracted
Executive overconfidence and compensation structure
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2016.09.003openalex-extracted
Say on pay laws, executive compensation, pay slice, and firm valuation around the world
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2017.01.010openalex-extracted
Compensation goals and firm performance
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2017.10.006openalex-extracted
Pay me now (and later): Pension benefit manipulation before plan freezes and executive retirement
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jjie.2004.05.003openalex-extracted
CEO compensation and firm performance in Japan: Evidence from new panel data on individual CEO pay
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pacfin.2006.03.004openalex-extracted
Executive compensation, firm performance, and Chaebols in Korea: Evidence from new panel data
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0024-6301(00)00052-2openalex-extracted
Executive compensation: evidence from the UK and Germany
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0024-6301(00)00054-6openalex-extracted
The Structure of Executive Compensation Contracts: UK Evidence
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-4101(00)00014-8openalex-extracted
CEO stock option awards and the timing of corporate voluntary disclosures
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-4101(02)00042-3openalex-extracted
Empirical evidence on the relation between stock option compensation and risk taking
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-4101(03)00035-1openalex-extracted
Economic consequences of regulated changes in disclosure: the case of executive compensation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-4101(98)00037-8openalex-extracted
Earnings-based bonus plans and earnings management by business-unit managers
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-4101(99)00019-1openalex-extracted
The use of equity grants to manage optimal equity incentive levels
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0304-405x(00)00049-0openalex-extracted
The value and incentive effects of nontraditional executive stock option plans
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0304-405x(00)00053-2openalex-extracted
The `repricing’ of executive stock options
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0304-405x(01)00039-3openalex-extracted
Corporate payout policy and managerial stock incentives
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0304-405x(01)00060-5openalex-extracted
An examination of executive stock option repricing
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0304-405x(01)00083-6openalex-extracted
Pay for performance? Government regulation and the structure of compensation contracts
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0304-405x(01)00095-2openalex-extracted
When a buyback isn’t a buyback: open market repurchases and employee options
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0304-405x(02)00127-7openalex-extracted
Performance consequences of mandatory increases in executive stock ownership
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0304-405x(02)00150-2openalex-extracted
CEO compensation, diversification, and incentives
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0304-405x(97)00016-0openalex-extracted
Ownership structure and top executive turnover
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0304-405x(97)00028-7openalex-extracted
CEO turnover and outside succession A cross-sectional analysis
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0304-405x(99)00016-1openalex-extracted
The sensitivity of CEO wealth to equity risk: an analysis of the magnitude and determinants
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0304-405x(99)00025-2openalex-extracted
Understanding the determinants of managerial ownership and the link between ownership and performance
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0378-4266(02)00259-5openalex-extracted
An empirical examination of the role of the CEO and the compensation committee in structuring executive pay
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0929-1199(00)00019-5openalex-extracted
Stock price decreases prior to executive stock option grants
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0929-1199(01)00020-7openalex-extracted
Ownership structure and corporate performance
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s1573-4463(86)02005-9openalex-extracted
Chapter 15 Job search and labor market analysis
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s1573-4463(99)30024-9openalex-extracted
Chapter 38 Executive compensation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511609435.005openalex-extracted
Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1017/s0022109010000803openalex-extracted
Shareholders’ Say on Pay: Does It Create Value?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1017/s0022109013000380openalex-extracted
Probability Weighting and Employee Stock Options
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1046/j.1540-6261.2003.00608.xopenalex-extracted
Institutional Investors and Executive Compensation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1080/09638180.2014.959979openalex-extracted
The Role of Defined Benefit Pension Plans in Executive Compensation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/250051openalex-extracted
The Other Side of the Trade‐Off: The Impact of Risk on Executive Compensation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/260808openalex-extracted
Job Matching and the Theory of Turnover
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/260866openalex-extracted
Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/261153openalex-extracted
A Comparison of Tournaments and Contracts
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/261354openalex-extracted
The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/261826openalex-extracted
Optimal Incentive Contracts in the Presence of Career Concerns: Theory and Evidence
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/261944openalex-extracted
Top Executive Rewards and Firm Performance: A Comparison of Japan and the United States
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/261967openalex-extracted
Executive Compensation and Principal-Agent Theory
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/298026openalex-extracted
Search Intensity, Job Advertising, and Efficiency
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/298230openalex-extracted
Pay, Performance, and Turnover of Bank CEOs
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/341874openalex-extracted
The Tenuous Trade‐off between Risk and Incentives
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/423154openalex-extracted
CEO Incentives and Firm Size
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/467041openalex-extracted
The Structure of Ownership and the Theory of the Firm
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/497040openalex-extracted
Firm Value and Managerial Incentives: A Stochastic Frontier Approach*
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/599817openalex-extracted
Globalization and the Provision of Incentives inside the Firm: The Effect of Foreign Competition
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/668836openalex-extracted
Managerial Turnover in a Changing World
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/682910openalex-extracted
Outsourcing Shareholder Voting to Proxy Advisory Firms
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordjournals.jleo.a023372openalex-extracted
Long-Term Firm Performance and Chief Executive Turnover: An Empirical Study of the Dynamics
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordjournals.oep.a041437openalex-extracted
DIFFERENTIAL RENTS AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF EARNINGS 1
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/121.4.1383openalex-extracted
Organization and Inequality in a Knowledge Economy
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qju024openalex-extracted
A Sparsity-Based Model of Bounded Rationality *
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/5.3.471openalex-extracted
On the Efficiency of Stock-based Compensation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhg034openalex-extracted
What's In It for Me? CEOs Whose Firms Are Acquired
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhl004openalex-extracted
Agency and Optimal Investment Dynamics
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhm044openalex-extracted
The Dating Game: Do Managers Designate Option Grant Dates to Increase their Compensation?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhn117openalex-extracted
A Multiplicative Model of Optimal CEO Incentives in Market Equilibrium
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhp006openalex-extracted
Wall Street and Main Street: What Contributes to the Rise in the Highest Incomes?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhp120openalex-extracted
Executive Compensation: A New View from a Long-Term Perspective, 1936–2005
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhq018openalex-extracted
CEO Replacement Under Private Information
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhq060openalex-extracted
Stock and Option Grants with Performance-based Vesting Provisions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhq062openalex-extracted
Reward for Luck in a Dynamic Agency Model
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhq112openalex-extracted
Are U.S. CEOs Paid More Than U.K. CEOs? Inferences from Risk-adjusted Pay
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhr028openalex-extracted
Investor Reactions to CEOs' Inside Debt Incentives
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhr044openalex-extracted
Tractability in Incentive Contracting
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhr059openalex-extracted
The Economics of Super Managers
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhs055openalex-extracted
Executive Compensation and the Role for Corporate Governance Regulation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhs114openalex-extracted
The Price of a CEO's Rolodex
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhs115openalex-extracted
Is Disclosure an Effective Cleansing Mechanism? The Dynamics of Compensation Peer Benchmarking
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhs122openalex-extracted
Are U.S. CEOs Paid More? New International Evidence
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hht052openalex-extracted
Indexing Executive Compensation Contracts
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhv034openalex-extracted
Restraining Overconfident CEOs through Improved Governance: Evidence from the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhw011openalex-extracted
Executive Compensation Incentives Contingent on Long-Term Accounting Performance
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhw070openalex-extracted
The Role of Proxy Advisory Firms: Evidence from a Regression-Discontinuity Design
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhy017openalex-extracted
The Retention Effects of Unvested Equity: Evidence from Accelerated Option Vesting
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/rof/rfm022openalex-extracted
The Positive Effects of Biased Self-Perceptions in Firms
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/rof/rfn014openalex-extracted
Managerial Incentives and Corporate Fraud: The Sources of Incentives Matter
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/rof/rfp002openalex-extracted
Corporate Governance Externalities
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/rof/rfs003openalex-extracted
Say on Pay Votes and CEO Compensation: Evidence from the UK
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/rof/rft024openalex-extracted
Does the Market for CEO Talent Explain Controversial CEO Pay Practices?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/rof/rfv056openalex-extracted
Say Pays! Shareholder Voice and Firm Performance
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/0008-4085.00013openalex-extracted
CEO pay, firm size, and corporate performance: evidence from Canada
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/0022-1082.00288openalex-extracted
Does Option Compensation Increase Managerial Risk Appetite?
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Internal Monitoring Mechanisms and CEO Turnover: A Long‐Term Perspective
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/0022-1082.00406openalex-extracted
Executive Compensation and Corporate Acquisition Decisions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0297.00577openalex-extracted
The Prince and the Pauper? CEO Pay in the United States and United Kingdom
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-5957.05525openalex-extracted
Length of Board Tenure and Outside Director Independence
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Estimating the Value of Employee Stock Option Portfolios and Their Sensitivities to Price and Volatility
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Shareholder Votes and Proxy Advisors: Evidence from Say on Pay
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/1540-6261.00536openalex-extracted
Entrenchment and Severance Pay in Optimal Governance Structures
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/1540-6261.00577openalex-extracted
Incentive Compensation When Executives Can Hedge the Market: Evidence of Relative Performance Evaluation in the Cross Section
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/ecoj.12101openalex-extracted
Bankers and Their Bonuses
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Executive Compensation and Board Governance in US Firms
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/fima.12083openalex-extracted
Why Do Insiders Hedge Their Ownership? An Empirical Examination
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-937x.2006.00388.xopenalex-extracted
Executive Compensation and Short-Termist Behaviour in Speculative Markets
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-937x.2007.00425.xopenalex-extracted
Dynamic Security Design: Convergence to Continuous Time and Asset Pricing Implications
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A Continuous-Time Version of the Principal–Agent Problem
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Discrete-Time Approximations of the Holmstrom-Milgrom Brownian-Motion Model of Intertemporal Incentive Provision
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Is CEO Pay Really Inefficient? A Survey of New Optimal Contracting Theories
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How Has CEO Turnover Changed?
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Underwater Options and the Dynamics of Executive Pay‐to‐Performance Sensitivities
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Is There a Link between Executive Equity Incentives and Accounting Fraud?
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An Analysis of Insiders' Use of Prepaid Variable Forward Transactions
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Accelerated Vesting of Employee Stock Options in Anticipation of FAS 123‐R
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EXECUTIVE PAY AND THE DISCLOSURE ENVIRONMENT: CANADIAN EVIDENCE
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Optimal Managerial Contracts and Equilibrium Security Prices
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Compensation and Incentives: Practice vs. Theory
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The Effect of Executive Stock Option Plans on Stockholders and Bondholders
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Efficiency and Organizational Structure: A Study of Reverse LBOs
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Who Manages Risk? An Empirical Examination of Risk Management Practices in the Gold Mining Industry
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CEO Contracting and Antitakeover Amendments
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Compensation, Incentives, and the Duality of Risk Aversion and Riskiness
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Executive Option Repricing, Incentives, and Retention
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2004.00674.xopenalex-extracted
Why Do Firms Use Incentives That Have No Incentive Effects?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005.00814.xopenalex-extracted
CEO Compensation, Change, and Corporate Strategy
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2006.00839.xopenalex-extracted
Wealth and Executive Compensation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2006.01002.xopenalex-extracted
Optimal Security Design and Dynamic Capital Structure in a Continuous‐Time Agency Model
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2006.01064.xopenalex-extracted
Executive Stock Options: Early Exercise Provisions and Risk‐taking Incentives
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Lower Salaries and No Options? On the Optimal Structure of Executive Pay
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Decoupling CEO Wealth and Firm Performance: The Case of Acquiring CEOs
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Incentive Effects of Stock and Option Holdings of Target and Acquirer CEOs
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CEO Compensation and Board Structure
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2009.01470.xopenalex-extracted
Rank‐Order Tournaments and Incentive Alignment: The Effect on Firm Performance
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Explicit versus Implicit Contracts: Evidence from CEO Employment Agreements
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Sticks or Carrots? Optimal CEO Compensation when Managers Are Loss Averse
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Why Are CEOs Rarely Fired? Evidence from Structural Estimation
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Are Incentive Contracts Rigged by Powerful CEOs?
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Motivating Innovation
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Information Disclosure and Corporate Governance
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Incoming claims: where this work appears in other papers’ reference lists and arguments.

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Hidden Fallacies in the Agency Theory of the Corporation
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Cost of Political Divide: Evidence from the Impact of Political Polarization Exposure on CEO Equity Incentives
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Pay Versus Performance and Investor Voting Decisions
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The Invention of Corporate Governance
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Distributional differences in the time horizon of executive compensation
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Optimal contracting under mean-volatility joint ambiguity uncertainties
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Blockholders: A Survey of Theory and Evidence ✶ ✶This article was prepared for the Elsevier Handbook of the Economics of Corporate Governance. We thank the editors, Ben Hermalin and Mike Weisbach, for inviting us to write this chapter. We thank Bo Becker, Amil Dasgupta, Doron Levit, Song Ma, Devin…
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Boards, and the Directors Who Sit on Them ✶ ✶I thank Benjamin Hermalin and Michael Weisbach for their comments and for inviting me to write this chapter. I thank Ying Dou, Mandeep Singh, and Jing Xu for excellent research assistance.
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inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1080/07350015.2020.1740712openalex-snapshot
Threshold Regression With a Threshold Boundary
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1080/09638180.2021.1989317openalex-snapshot
Does Longer Duration of Executive Compensation Foster Investment Efficiency?
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1080/09638180.2023.2252022openalex-snapshot
The Spillover of U.S. Regulatory Oversight to Foreign Markets: Evidence from the Effect of PCAOB International Inspections on Executive Compensations
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1080/13504851.2023.2259588openalex-snapshot
Digital transformation and corporate Labor costs for ordinary employees
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1080/14413523.2023.2289686openalex-snapshot
Gender differences in lead executive compensation: evidence from intercollegiate athletics
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1080/14735970.2024.2350139openalex-snapshot
Regulatory and investor demands to use ESG performance metrics in executive compensation: right instrument, wrong method
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/rcfs/cfaa001openalex-snapshot
Tournament Incentives and Acquisition Performance
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhaa069openalex-snapshot
Performance-Induced CEO Turnover
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhac020openalex-snapshot
Import Penetration and Executive Compensation
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhaf028openalex-snapshot
Relative Performance Evaluation and Strategic Competition
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhz062openalex-snapshot
Career Risk and Market Discipline in Asset Management
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/rof/rfaa012openalex-snapshot
Corporate Governance in China: A Survey
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/ser/mwz048openalex-snapshot
How redistributive institutions affect pay inequality and heterogeneity among top managers
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1108/978-1-78973-417-120201024openalex-snapshot
Stock Option Manipulations
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1108/emjb-01-2022-0002openalex-snapshot
The influence of corporate governance and corporate social responsibility on corporate performance: an Iberian panel data evidence
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1108/ijmf-09-2021-0458openalex-snapshot
Do all CEO pay regulations hurt firm performance? Evidence from China
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1108/jpeo-05-2020-0014openalex-snapshot
Employee participation, job quality, and inequality
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1108/md-06-2023-0932openalex-snapshot
From profits to purpose: ESG practices, CEO compensation and institutional ownership
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1108/mf-04-2024-0313openalex-snapshot
CEO pay-performance sensitivity and pay for luck and asymmetry
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1108/mf-05-2020-0278openalex-snapshot
Corporate risk: CEO overconfidence and incentive compensation
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1108/raf-03-2023-0095openalex-snapshot
CEO compensation risk and pay for luck asymmetry
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679x.12458openalex-snapshot
Does Sensationalism Affect Executive Compensation? Evidence from Pay Ratio Disclosure Reform
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679x.12462openalex-snapshot
Renewable Governance: Good for the Environment?
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/acfi.13175openalex-snapshot
Executives' horizon and trade credit
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/acfi.70027openalex-snapshot
What Incentivises Managers to Engage in Financial Misreporting? An Analysis of Stock Delta, Option Delta, and Vega
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/ecin.12979openalex-snapshot
The Optimal Use of Management
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/eufm.12463openalex-snapshot
Non‐CEO executives' intraorganizational competition incentives and corporate labour investment efficiency
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/eufm.70066openalex-snapshot
Board Independence and Adjustment Speed of CEO Inside Debt
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/fire.12437openalex-snapshot
CEO bargaining power and compensation
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/irfi.12477openalex-snapshot
Optimal design of deferred compensation for bank executives under agency conflicts
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/jfir.70011openalex-snapshot
CEO social media activity and insider trading
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.13424openalex-snapshot
Worker Runs
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.13448openalex-snapshot
Are CEOs Rewarded for Luck? Evidence from Corporate Tax Windfalls
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1142/s2010139219500101openalex-snapshot
Blockholders on Boards and CEO Compensation, Turnover and Firm Valuation
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.4421openalex-snapshot
Technological Determinants of Financial Constraints
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.13106/jafeb.2019.vol6.no3.91openalex-snapshot
Executive Compensation in Korea: Evidence from a New Mandatory Disclosure
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0278030openalex-snapshot
The decentralization effects of entrepreneurial characteristics on corporate social responsibility
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.14393/ufu.di.2023.66openalex-snapshot
Governança corporativa, intangibilidade e regionalidade: evidências para empresas da B3
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.15496/publikation-39718openalex-snapshot
Executives' Short-Term and Long-Term Incentives - A Distributional Analysis
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1561/0500000056openalex-snapshot
Institutional Investors and Corporate Governance
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-4433479/v1openalex-snapshot
Nexus between Fair Pay and Say on Pay Votes
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.5162419openalex-snapshot
The Effect of Taxes on CEO Performance
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.5224214openalex-snapshot
The Invention of Corporate Governance
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.5279405openalex-snapshot
When the Tax Break Breaks: CEO Pay and Turnover Following TCJA
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2308/tar-2018-0284openalex-snapshot
Product Market Peers and Relative Performance Evaluation
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2308/tar-2019-0567openalex-snapshot
Do Corporate Taxes Affect Executive Compensation?
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.31039/jomeino.2021.5.3.2openalex-snapshot
CEO Salary, Personal Characteristics, and Firm Performance in Chinese-Listed Firms: A Cross-Sectional Econometric Modeling Approach
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.3386/w25391openalex-snapshot
Are Energy Executives Rewarded For Luck?
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.3386/w27296openalex-snapshot
Founder-CEO Compensation and Selection into Venture Capital-Backed Entrepreneurship
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.3386/w28441openalex-snapshot
Uncovering the Hidden Effort Problem
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.3386/w28767openalex-snapshot
Are Bigger Banks Better? Firm-Level Evidence from Germany
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.3386/w33710openalex-snapshot
The Invention of Corporate Governance
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