On the public citation graph
Incentives for Process Innovation in a Collusive Duopoly
0 signed · 26 inferred · view as graph
Inferred edges come from two machine sources: sweeps of open repository metadata (mostly SSRN and Zenodo), and a bulk OpenAlex citation snapshot. Every row below is labelled with the one it came from. Neither is a complete citation index — absence here is not evidence of absence.
Is this your work? Sign in with ORCID and put your name on the
claims that are yours.
Reference health. See whether every reference in this work resolves to a
known work and none has been retracted — and get a dated CiteStamped
badge you can embed.
What this work says
Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1998.2454openalex-extracted
A Dynamic Model of Differentiated Oligopoly with Capital Accumulation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/0-306-48082-4_2openalex-extracted
Theorie der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01232420openalex-extracted
Optimal punishments in linear duopoly supergames with product differentiation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s001680050048openalex-extracted
Product differentiation and cartel stability: Chamberlin versus Hotelling
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-006-0009-9openalex-extracted
Workers’ enterprises are not perverse: differential oligopoly games with sticky price
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(83)90159-3openalex-extracted
Duopoly supergames with product differentiation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(88)90186-3openalex-extracted
Price vs. quantity competition in oligopoly supergames
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(89)90206-1openalex-extracted
Tacit collusion in differentiated cournot games
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(92)90241-popenalex-extracted
On the sustainability of collusion in differentiated duopolies
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0167-7187(92)90043-xopenalex-extracted
Cartel stability and product differentiation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2004.11.004openalex-extracted
Cooperative and noncooperative R&D in experimental duopoly markets
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-1765(98)00011-1openalex-extracted
Product homogeneity as a prisoner's dilemma in a duopoly with R&D
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-1889(01)00026-4openalex-extracted
A differential game approach to investment in product differentiation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0167-7187(00)00100-4openalex-extracted
Cartel stability with multiproduct firms
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1049/ip-a-1.1985.0044openalex-extracted
The economics of innovation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/oep/54.4.649openalex-extracted
Sequential innovation and the patent-antitrust conflict
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/0008-4085.00043openalex-extracted
Public policy and R&D when research joint ventures are costly
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8454.1996.tb00046.xopenalex-extracted
CHOOSING ROLES IN A DUOPOLY FOR ENDOGENOUSLY DIFFERENTIATED PRODUCTS*
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1142/9789811222610_0008openalex-extracted
Long-Term Competition — A Game-Theoretic Analysis
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400879762-024openalex-extracted
Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.22004/ag.econ.269307openalex-extracted
Cartel Stability and Product Di¤erentiation: How Much Do the Size of the Cartel and the Size of the Industry Matter?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1054428openalex-extracted
The Theory of Monopolistic Competition
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2534454openalex-extracted
Appropriating the Returns from Industrial Research and Development
What points at this work
Incoming claims: where this work appears in other papers’ reference lists and arguments.
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1024681openalex-extracted
The Aggregate and the Representation of its Parts
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1075046openalex-extracted
Giving the German Cartel Office the Power of Divestiture - The Conformity of the Reform with Constitutional Law
Editorial review for independent work. ICSAC — the Institute for Complexity
Science and Advanced Computing — runs a structured editorial panel for researchers
publishing outside journals, and publishes on CiteStamp rails. Submission is free
and goes through ORCID: icsacinstitute.org/submit.