Reference health
Resource Allocation Using Sequential Auctions
1 of 12 checkable references need attention · checked 2026-08-09
At the dated check, the references listed below either did not resolve in Crossref or DataCite, or carried a retraction notice. Each one is shown with the registry record that put it there.
9 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.
References needing attention
does not resolve to a known work10.2307/2977633
The 11 checked references that resolve
resolves10.1613/jair.575
Decision-Theoretic Planning: Structural Assumptions and Computational Leverage
resolves10.1111/j.2517-6161.1977.tb01600.x
Maximum Likelihood from Incomplete Data Via the
<i>EM</i>
Algorithm
The 9 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedBoutilier, C., Goldszmidt, M., Sabata, B.: Continuous value function approximation for sequential bidding policies. In: Proceedings of the Fifteenth Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence, Stockholm, pp. 81–89 (1999)
no DOI — not checkedBrown, G.W.: Iterative solution of games by fictitious play. In: Koopmans, T.C. (ed.) Activity Analysis of Production and Allocation. Wiley, New York (1951)
no DOI — not checkedClearwater, S. (ed.): Market-based Control: A Paradigm for Distributed Resource Allocation. World Scientific, San Mateo (1995)
no DOI — not checkedDegroot, M.H.: Probability and Statistics. Addison-Wesley, New York (1986)
no DOI — not checkedFujisima, Y., Leyton-Brown, K., Shoham, Y.: Taming the computational complexity of combinatorial auctions. In: Proceedings ofthe Sixteenth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, Stockholm, pp. 548–553 (1999)
no DOI — not checkedMcAfee, R.P., McMillan, J.: Auctions and bidding. Journal of Economic Literature 25, 699–738 (1987)
no DOI — not checkedMyerson, R.B.: Game Theory: Analysis of Conflict. Harvard University Press, Cambridge (1991)
no DOI — not checkedSandholm, T.: An algorithm for optimal winner determination in combinatorial auctions. In: Proceedings of the Sixteenth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, Stockholm, pp. 542–547 (1999)
no DOI — not checkedWellman, M.P., Walsh, W.E., Wurman, P.R., MacKie-Mason, J.K.: Auction protocols for decentralized scheduling (1998) (manuscript)
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