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Central Bank Independence and the Short-Run Output-Inflation Trade-off in the European Community

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-79817-7_2
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15/15 checkable references clean · checked 2026-07-24

Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.

22 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.

The 15 checked references that resolve
resolves10.2307/2077833
Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance: Some Comparative Evidence
resolves10.2307/1885114
Is Equilibrium Indexation Efficient?
resolves10.3386/w4306
What Determines the Sacrifice Ratio?
resolves10.2307/2534424
The New Keynesian Economics and the Output-Inflation Trade-Off
resolves10.1016/0304-3932(80)90029-X
Labor contracts and monetary policy
resolves10.1016/0161-8938(94)90021-3
A measure of federal reserve credibility
resolves10.1016/0167-2231(93)90005-H
Central bank independence, growth, investment, and real rates
resolves10.1093/wber/6.3.353
Measuring the Independence of Central Banks and Its Effect on Policy Outcomes
resolves10.1016/0304-3932(87)90007-9
The effect of monetary variability on welfare in a simple macroeconomic model
resolves10.1086/260644
On Indexation and Contract Length
resolves10.2307/1992760
Is Price Flexibility Stabilizing? A Broader Perspective
resolves10.1016/0304-3932(90)90053-7
Central banks' independence in historical perspective
resolves10.2307/1885679
The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target
resolves10.2307/2118396
Discretionary Monetary Policy and Socially Efficient Wage Indexation
resolves10.1016/0304-3932(93)90006-2
Central bank strategies, credibility, and independence
The 22 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedAlesina, A. “Macroeconomics and politics.” In Fischer, S. (ed.), NBER Macroeconomics Annual. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1988.
no DOI — not checkedBade, R., and Parkin, M. “Central bank laws and inflation — a comparative analysis.” University of Western Ontario, 1982.
no DOI — not checkedBanaian, K., Laney, L.O., and Willett, T.D. “Central bank independence: an international comparison.” Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas Economic Review 1983, 1–13.
no DOI — not checkedCapie, F.H., and Wood, G.E. “Central banks and inflation: an historical perspective — Part I.” Central Banking 1991, 2: 27–46.
no DOI — not checkedCapie, F.H. and Wood, G.E. “Central banks and inflation: an historical perspective — Part II.” Central Banking 1991, 2: 38–57.
no DOI — not checkedCargill, Thomas. “The statistical association between central bank independence and inflation.” Unpublished manuscript, University of Nevada, Reno, 1994.
no DOI — not checkedCukierman, Alex. Central Bank Strategy, Credibility and Independence. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992.
no DOI — not checkedDebelle, Guy, “The ends of three small inflations: Australia, New Zealand and Canada,” MIT, March 1994.
no DOI — not checkedDebelle, Guy, and Fischer, Stanley. “How independent should a central bank be?” Paper presented at the Center for Economic Policy Research and Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Conference on Monetary Policy in a Low Inflation Regime, March 1994.
no DOI — not checkedEgebo, Thomas, and Englander, A. Steven. “Institutional commitments and policy credibility: a critical survey and empirical evidence from the ERM.” OECD Economic Studies 1992, 18: 45–84.
no DOI — not checkedFratianni, Michele, and Huang, Haizhou. “Reputation, central bank independence and the EBC.” Indiana University Working Paper No. 92–031, December 1992.
no DOI — not checkedGoodhart, Charles. “Central bank independence.” Journal of International and Comparative Economics (forthcoming).
no DOI — not checkedGrilli, Vittorio, Masciandaro, Donato, and Tabellini, Guido. “Political and monetary institutions and public financial policies in the industrial countries.” Economic Policy 1991, 13: 342–392.
no DOI — not checkedJohnson, David R., and Siklos, Pierre L. “Political effects on central bank behavior: some international evidence.” Wilfrid Laurier University, March 1993.
no DOI — not checkedJudd, John P., and Beebe, Jack H. “The output-inflation trade-off in the United States: has it changed since the late 1970s?” Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Economic Review 1993, 3: 25–34.
no DOI — not checkedLucas, Robert E., Jr. “Some international evidence on output-inflation tradeoffs.” American Economic Review 1973, 63: 326–344.
no DOI — not checkedPollard, Patricia S. “Central bank independence and economic performance.” Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review 1993, 75: 21–36.
no DOI — not checkedPosen, Adam S. “Why central bank independence does not cause low inflation: there is no institutional fix for politics.” O’Brien, R. (ed.), Finance and the International Economy: 7 (The 1993 Amex Bank Review Prize Essays). Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 1993.
no DOI — not checkedSargent, Thomas. “The ends of four big inflations.” In Hall, R. (ed.), Inflation: Causes and Effects. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982, pp. 41–98.
no DOI — not checkedSchelde-Andersen, Palle. “OECD country experiences with disinflation.” In Blundell-Wignall, A. (ed.), Inflation, Disinflation and Monetary Policy. Sydney, Australia: Reserve Bank of Australia, 1992, pp. 104–173.
no DOI — not checkedSchultze, Charles L. “Cross-country and cross-temporal differences in inflation responsiveness.” American Economic Review 1984, 74: 160–165.
no DOI — not checkedWalsh, Carl E. “Is there a cost to central bank independence?” Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Weekly Letter, 94–05, February 4, 1994.
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