Reference health
The Logic of Currency Crises
20/20 checkable references clean · checked 2026-07-25
Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.
17 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.
The 20 checked references that resolve
resolves10.1017/CBO9780511628528.008
Public confidence and debt management: a model and a case study of Italy
resolves10.1111/j.1467-6419.1993.tb00162.x
SPECULATIVE CURRENCY ATTACKS AND BALANCE OF PAYMENTS CRISES
resolves10.1016/0022-1996(87)90053-5
Borrowing to defend the exchange rate and the timing and magnitude of speculative attacks
resolves10.1016/0304-3932(83)90049-1
Optimal fiscal and monetary policy in an economy without capital
resolves10.1017/CBO9780511628535.011
Competitiveness, realignment, and speculation: the role of financial markets
The 17 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedBensaid, Bernard, and Jeanne, Olivier. “The Instability of Fixed Exchange Rate Systems when Raising the Nominal Interest Rate Is Costly.” Paris: Banque de France and Ecole Nationale des Ponts et Chausées-CERAS, December 1993.
no DOI — not checkedCalvo, Guillermo A. “Servicing the Public Debt: The Role of Expectations.” American Economic Review 1988, 78: 647–661.
no DOI — not checkedCaplin, Andrew, and Leahy, John. “Business as Usual, Market Crashes and Wisdom After the Fact.” American Economic Review 1994, 84: 548–565.
no DOI — not checkedGale, Douglas. Money: in Equilibrium. Cambridge Economic Handbooks. Cambridge, England: Nisbet/Cambridge, 1982.
no DOI — not checkedGoodhart, Charles A.E. “Monetary Policy in the United Kingdom.” In Holbik, Karel (ed.), Monetary Policy in Twelve Industrial Countries. Boston, MA: Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, 1973, 465–524.
no DOI — not checkedGros, Daniel. “Capital Controls and Foreign Exchange Market Crises in the EMS.” European Economic Review 1992, 36: 1,533–1,544.
no DOI — not checkedGuidotti, Pablo, and Vegh, Carlos. “Losing Credibility: The Stabilization Blues.” Working Paper No. 92/73, International Monetary Fund, September 1992.
no DOI — not checkedHörngren, Lars, and Lindberg, Hans. “The Struggle to Turn the Swedish Krona into a Hard Currency.” Arbetsrapport No. 8, Sveriges Riksbank, April 1993.
no DOI — not checkedMilesi-Ferretti, Gian Maria. “Do Good or Do Well? Public Debt Management in a Two-Party Economy.” International Monetary Fund, August 1993.
no DOI — not checkedObstfeld, Maurice. “Rational and Self-Fulfilling Balance-of-Payments Crises.” American Economic Review 1986, 76: 72–81.
no DOI — not checkedObstfeld, Maurice. “Discussion.” In Dornbusch, Rudiger, and Draghi, Mario (eds.), Public Debt Management: Theory and History. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1990a: 146–152.
no DOI — not checkedObstfeld, Maurice. “The Effectiveness of Foreign-Exchange Intervention: Recent Experience, 1985–1988.” In Branson, William H., Frenkel, Jacob A., and Goldstein, Morris (eds.), International Policy Coordination and Exchange Rate Fluctuations. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990b: 197–237.
no DOI — not checkedOzkan, F. Gulcin, and Sutherland, Alan. “A Model of the ERM Crisis.” University of York, December 1993.
no DOI — not checkedPersson, Mats, Persson, Torsten, and Svensson, Lars E.O. “Time Consistency of Fiscal and Monetary Policy.” Econometrica 1987, 55: 1,419–1,431.
no DOI — not checkedPersson, Torsten, and Tabellini, Guido. “Strategic Aspects of International Macroeconomic Policy.” In Grossman, Gene M., and Rogoff, Kenneth S. (eds.), Handbook of International Economics, vol. 3. Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1995.
no DOI — not checkedStein, Ernesto, and Streb, Jorge. “Political Stabilization Cycles in High Inflation Economies.” University of California at Berkeley, November 1993.
no DOI — not checkedVelasco, Andrés. “Are Balance of Payments Crises Rational? A Dynamic Game Approach.” New York University, July 1993.
What this badge says. CiteStamped means the CHECKABLE references of this
work were clean at the dated check: each resolved to a known work in a public registry, and none
carried a retraction notice at that time. It says nothing about the quality, findings,
or importance of the work itself, and nothing about references deposited without a DOI.
checked 2026-07-25 — re-checked daily as this page is visited; titles and statuses come from Crossref and DataCite and are not part of the signed record
Embed this badge
Both snippets point at the live badge image and link back to this page. The badge re-renders from the daily check, so an embed never goes stale by more than a day of visits.
<a href="https://citestamp.com/citestamped/10.1007/978-3-642-79817-7_4"><img src="https://citestamp.com/citestamped/10.1007/978-3-642-79817-7_4/badge.svg" alt="CiteStamped reference-health badge" width="460" height="64"></a>
[](https://citestamp.com/citestamped/10.1007/978-3-642-79817-7_4)