Reference health
Rent-seeking contest when the prize increases with aggregate efforts
14/14 checkable references clean · checked 2026-09-03
Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.
11 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.
The 14 checked references that resolve
resolves10.1016/0165-1765(84)90158-7
Optimal R&D levels when firm j benefits from firm i's inventive activity
resolves10.1111/j.1468-0343.1990.tb00026.x
PUBLIC GOODS, RENT DISSIPATION, AND CANDIDATE COMPETITION*
The 11 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedBaye, M.R., Kovenock, D. and de Vries, C.G. (1993). The solution to the Tullock rent-seeking game when r > 2: Mixed-strategy equilibria and mean dissipation rates. Discussion paper 1039. Purdue University.
no DOI — not checkedBuchanan, J.M. (1980). Rent seeking and profit seeking. In J.M. Buchanan, R.D. Tollison and G. Tullock (Eds.), Toward a theory of the rent-seeking society. Texas A&M University Press: College Station.
no DOI — not checkedFrank, R.H. and Cook, P.J. (1993). Winner-takes-all markets. Mimeo. Cornell University.
no DOI — not checkedHillman, A.L. (1989). The political economy of protection. London: Harwood Academic Publishers.
no DOI — not checkedHillman, A.L. (1991). Protection, politics and market structure. In E. Helpman and A. Razin (Eds.), International trade and trade policy. Cambridge: MIT Press.
no DOI — not checkedKrueger, A.O. (1974). The political economy of the rent-seeking society. American Economic Review 64(June): 291?303.
no DOI — not checkedPosner, R.A. (1992). Economic analysis of law. 4th ed. Boston: Little, Brown.
no DOI — not checkedRiaz, K., Shogren, J.F. and Johnson, S.R. (1991). Contests with endogenously valued prizes: The case of pure public goods. Mimeo. Iowa State University.
no DOI — not checkedTirole, J. (1988). The theory of industrial organization. Cambridge: The MIT Press.
no DOI — not checkedTullock, G. (1967). The welfare cost of tariffs, monopolies, and theft. Western Economic Journal 5(June): 224?232.
no DOI — not checkedTullock, G. (1980). Efficient rent seeking. In J.M. Buchanan, R.D. Tollison and G. Tullock (Eds.), Toward a theory of the rent-seeking society. Texas A&M University Press: College Station.
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