Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known
work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction,
withdrawal, or removal notice.
The 18 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedAusten-Smith, D. (1993). An access model of campaign contributions. Mimeo. University of Rochester. March.
no DOI — not checkedAusten-Smith, D. and Wright, J.R. (1991). Competitive lobbying for legislators' votes. Mimeo. University of Rochester. January.
no DOI — not checkedBall, R. (1993). Political lobbying as welfare improving signaling. Mimeo. Haverford College. March.
no DOI — not checkedBaron, D.P. (1991). Spatial electoral competition and campaign contributions with informed and uninformed voters. Graduate School of Business Research Paper No. 1174. Stanford University. November.
no DOI — not checkedBirnbaum, J.H. (1992).The lobbyists: How influence peddlers get their way in Washington. New York: Times Books.
no DOI — not checkedFeddersen, T.J. and Pesendorfer, W. (1993). The swing voter's curse. Mimeo. Northwestern University. October.
no DOI — not checkedHeitshusen, V. (1993). Strategic lobbying by interest groups: The role of information and institutional change. Mimeo. Paper presented at the Midwest Political Science Association Meetings in Chicago. April.
no DOI — not checkedKrueger, A.O. (1974). The political economy of the rent-seeking society.American Economic Review 64: 291?303.
no DOI — not checkedLohmann, S. (1993a). A signaling model of competitive political pressures. University of California at Los Angeles. Revised December.
no DOI — not checkedLohmann, S. (1993c). A welfare analysis of political action. In William Barnett et al. (Eds.),Political economy: Institutions, information, competition and representation, 437?461. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
no DOI — not checkedLohmann, S. (1994). Information aggregation through costly political action.American Economic Review 84: 518?530.
no DOI — not checkedMagee, S., Brock, W. and Young, L. (1989).Black hole tariffs and endogenous policy theory. New York: Cambridge University Press.
no DOI — not checkedMcCarty, N. and Rothenberg, L. (1993). The strategic decisions of political action committees. Mimeo. University of Southern California and University of Rochester. September.
no DOI — not checkedRiezman, R. and Wilson, J.D. (1992). Politics and trade policy. Mimeo. University of Iowa and Indiana University. November.
no DOI — not checkedSmith, H. (1988).The power game: How Washington works. New York: Random House.
no DOI — not checkedSpence, M. (1973). Job market signaling.Quarterly Journal of Economics 87: 359?374.
no DOI — not checkedTullock, G. (1967). The welfare costs of tariffs, monopolies, and theft.Western Economic Journal 5: 224?232.
no DOI — not checkedTullock, G. (1980). Efficient rent-seeking. In J.M. Buchanan, R.D. Tollison and G. Tullock (Eds.),Toward a theory of the rent-seeking society, 97?112. College Station: Texas A&M University Press.
checked 2026-09-22 — re-checked daily as this page is visited;
titles and statuses come from Crossref and DataCite and are not part of the signed record
Both snippets point at the live badge image and link back to this page. The
badge re-renders from the daily check, so an embed never goes stale by more than a day of visits.