Reference health

Information, access, and contributions: A signaling model of lobbying

https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01048199
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14/14 checkable references clean · checked 2026-09-22

Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.

18 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.

The 14 checked references that resolve
resolves10.2307/2111513
Information Transmission in Debate
resolves10.2307/1886017
A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence
resolves10.2307/1912767
Sequential Equilibria
resolves10.2307/2939043
A Signaling Model of Informative and Manipulative Political Action
resolves10.1111/j.1468-0343.1992.tb00056.x
ELECTIONS AND THE THEORY OF CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS: A SURVEY AND CRITICAL ANALYSIS*
resolves10.2307/2111247
Endogenous Tariff Theory: A Critical Survey
resolves10.4159/9780674041660
The Logic of Collective Action
resolves10.1007/BF00149180
Lobbying and asymmetric information
resolves10.1007/BF01048001
Lobbying when the decisionmaker can acquire independent information
resolves10.1007/BF01047761
Cheap bribes and the corruption ban: A coordination game among rational legislators
resolves10.1007/BF01766400
Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
resolves10.1086/261731
Campaign Contributions as Investments: The U.S. House of Representatives, 1980-1986
resolves10.1111/j.1468-0343.1991.tb00041.x
ON BUYING LEGISLATURES*
resolves10.1111/j.1468-0343.1993.tb00076.x
THE MARKET FOR CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS: EVIDENCE FOR THE U.S. SENATE 1980–1986*
The 18 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedAusten-Smith, D. (1993). An access model of campaign contributions. Mimeo. University of Rochester. March.
no DOI — not checkedAusten-Smith, D. and Wright, J.R. (1991). Competitive lobbying for legislators' votes. Mimeo. University of Rochester. January.
no DOI — not checkedBall, R. (1993). Political lobbying as welfare improving signaling. Mimeo. Haverford College. March.
no DOI — not checkedBaron, D.P. (1991). Spatial electoral competition and campaign contributions with informed and uninformed voters. Graduate School of Business Research Paper No. 1174. Stanford University. November.
no DOI — not checkedBirnbaum, J.H. (1992).The lobbyists: How influence peddlers get their way in Washington. New York: Times Books.
no DOI — not checkedFeddersen, T.J. and Pesendorfer, W. (1993). The swing voter's curse. Mimeo. Northwestern University. October.
no DOI — not checkedHeitshusen, V. (1993). Strategic lobbying by interest groups: The role of information and institutional change. Mimeo. Paper presented at the Midwest Political Science Association Meetings in Chicago. April.
no DOI — not checkedKrueger, A.O. (1974). The political economy of the rent-seeking society.American Economic Review 64: 291?303.
no DOI — not checkedLohmann, S. (1993a). A signaling model of competitive political pressures. University of California at Los Angeles. Revised December.
no DOI — not checkedLohmann, S. (1993c). A welfare analysis of political action. In William Barnett et al. (Eds.),Political economy: Institutions, information, competition and representation, 437?461. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
no DOI — not checkedLohmann, S. (1994). Information aggregation through costly political action.American Economic Review 84: 518?530.
no DOI — not checkedMagee, S., Brock, W. and Young, L. (1989).Black hole tariffs and endogenous policy theory. New York: Cambridge University Press.
no DOI — not checkedMcCarty, N. and Rothenberg, L. (1993). The strategic decisions of political action committees. Mimeo. University of Southern California and University of Rochester. September.
no DOI — not checkedRiezman, R. and Wilson, J.D. (1992). Politics and trade policy. Mimeo. University of Iowa and Indiana University. November.
no DOI — not checkedSmith, H. (1988).The power game: How Washington works. New York: Random House.
no DOI — not checkedSpence, M. (1973). Job market signaling.Quarterly Journal of Economics 87: 359?374.
no DOI — not checkedTullock, G. (1967). The welfare costs of tariffs, monopolies, and theft.Western Economic Journal 5: 224?232.
no DOI — not checkedTullock, G. (1980). Efficient rent-seeking. In J.M. Buchanan, R.D. Tollison and G. Tullock (Eds.),Toward a theory of the rent-seeking society, 97?112. College Station: Texas A&M University Press.
What this badge says. CiteStamped means the CHECKABLE references of this work were clean at the dated check: each resolved to a known work in a public registry, and none carried a retraction notice at that time. It says nothing about the quality, findings, or importance of the work itself, and nothing about references deposited without a DOI.

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