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A common value auction model with endogenous entry and information acquisition

https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01212920
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11/11 checkable references clean · checked 2026-09-03

Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.

8 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.

The 11 checked references that resolve
resolves10.2307/1928302
Auctions with Constrained Information: Blind Bidding for Motion Pictures
resolves10.1525/9780520322257
Auctions and Auctioneering
resolves10.1016/0377-2217(88)90124-5
The value of information in competitive bidding
resolves10.1086/296273
Sealed Bids, Sunk Costs, and the Process of Competition
resolves10.1086/261684
Alternative Common-Value Auction Procedures: Revenue Comparisons with Free Entry
resolves10.2307/2098586
Information, Returns, and Bidding Behavior in Ocs Auctions: 1954-1969
resolves10.1016/0165-1765(85)90166-1
Competition and information acquisition in first price auctions
resolves10.1287/mnsc.30.12.1490
Incomplete Information, High-Low Bidding and Public Information in First Price Auctions
resolves10.2307/1912511
Rational Expectations, Information Acquisition, and Competitive Bidding
resolves10.2307/1911865
A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
resolves10.1016/0165-1765(85)90126-0
Competitive bidding with entry costs
The 8 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedHausch, D., Li, L.: A common value auction model with endogenous entry and information acquisition. Manuscript (1991)
no DOI — not checkedHausch, D., Li, L.: Private values auctions with endogenous information: revenue equivalence and non-equivalence. Manuscript (1991)
no DOI — not checkedLevin, D., Smith, J. L.: Equilibrium in auctions with entry. Manuscript, University of Houston 1991)
no DOI — not checkedMatthews, S.: Information acquisition in discriminatory auctions. In: Boyer, M., Kihlstrom, R. (eds.) Bayesian models in economic theory. Amsterdam: North-Holland 1984
no DOI — not checkedMcAfee, R. P., McMillan, J.: Auctions and bidding. J. Econ. Lit.XXV, 699?738 (1987)
no DOI — not checkedMilgrom, P.: Auction theory. In: Bewley, T. (ed.) Advances in economic theory. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press 1986
no DOI — not checkedSmiley, A.: Competitive bidding under uncertainty: the case of offshore oil. Cambridge, MA: Ballinger Publishing Col. 1979
no DOI — not checkedWilson, R.: Strategic analysis of auctions. In: Aumann, R., Hart, S. (eds.) Handbook of game theory. Amsterdam: North-Holland, forthcoming
What this badge says. CiteStamped means the CHECKABLE references of this work were clean at the dated check: each resolved to a known work in a public registry, and none carried a retraction notice at that time. It says nothing about the quality, findings, or importance of the work itself, and nothing about references deposited without a DOI.

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