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Equilibria and Pareto optima of markets with adverse selection
32/32 checkable references clean · checked 2026-07-25
Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.
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The 32 checked references that resolve
resolves10.1016/0022-0531(85)90098-5
Experts against adverse selection: A note on the existence of equilibrium with costly appropriable information
resolves10.1016/0014-2921(87)90046-8
Some recent developments in the theory of competition in markets with adverse selection ∗
resolves10.1007/BF01212914
Incentive compatibility and information superiority of the core of an economy with differential information
resolves10.1016/0022-0531(88)90012-9
On the behavior of separating equilibria of signaling games with a finite set of types as the set of types becomes dense in an interval
resolves10.2307/1911459
Pareto Optima and Competitive Equilibria with Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard
resolves10.2307/1885326
Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information
resolves10.1007/BF01766400
Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
The 7 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedAllen, B.: Market games with asymmetric information. Univerity of Pennsylvania, unpublished (1991).
no DOI — not checkedBester, H.: Screening vs rationing in credit markets with imperfect information. Am. Econ. Rev.75, 850–855 (1985)
no DOI — not checkedGale, D.: Equilibria and Pareto optima of markets with adverse selection, ISP Discussion Paper #46, Boston University, January 1994
no DOI — not checkedMalinvaud, E., Younès, Y.: In: Harcourt, G. (ed.) Microeconomic foundations of macroeconomics. London: Macmillan 1978
no DOI — not checkedMarimon, R.: The core of private information economies. University of Minnesota, unpublished (1988)
no DOI — not checkedStiglitz, J., Weiss, A.: Credit rationing in markets with imperfect information. Am. Econ. Rev.71, 393–410 (1981)
no DOI — not checkedYounès, Y.: General competitive equilibrium with asymmetric information between buyers and sellers and signaling. University of Pennsylvania, unpublished (1990).
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