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19/19 checkable references clean · checked 2026-09-02
Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.
11 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.
The 19 checked references that resolve
resolves10.2307/2648864
Collective Decision Mechanisms and Efficient Stock Market Allocations: Existence of a Participation Equilibrium
resolves10.1016/0304-4068(95)00720-2
The existence of equilibrium in incomplete markets and the objective function of the firm
resolves10.1016/0022-0531(80)90041-1
Perfect competition, the profit criterion, and the organization of economic activity
The 11 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedBlack, D. (1958):The Theory of Committees and Elections. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
no DOI — not checkedDierker, E., and Grodal, B. (1995): “Profit Maximization, Relative Prices, and the Maximization of Shareholders' Real Wealth.” Discussion Paper 95-07, Institute of Economics, University of Copenhagen, Copenhagen.
no DOI — not checked— (1996b): “The Price Normalization Problem in Imperfect Competition and the Objective of the Firm.” Discussion Paper 96-05, Institute of Economics, University of Copenhagen, Copenhagen.
no DOI — not checkedGevers, L. (1974): “Competitive Equilibrium of the Stock Exchange and Pareto Efficiency.” InAllocation under Uncertainty: Equilibrium and Optimality, edited by J. H. Drèze. London: Macmillan Press.
no DOI — not checkedGrodal, B. (1996): “Profit Maximization and Imperfect Competition.” InEconomics in a Changing World: Proceedings of the Tenth World Congress of the International Economic Association, Moscow, vol. 2,Microeconomics, edited by B. Allen. New York and London: St. Martin's Press and Macmillan Press.
no DOI — not checkedHaller, H. (1986): “Market Power, Objectives of the Firm, and Objectives of Shareholders.”Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 142: 716–726.
no DOI — not checkedKihlstrom, R., and Laffont, J.-J. (1982): “A Competitive Entrepreneurial Model of a Stock Market.” InThe Economics of Information and Uncertainty, edited by J. McCall. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
no DOI — not checkedLaux, H. (1971): “Expected Utility Maximization and Capital Budgeting Subgoals.”Unternehmungsforschung 15: 130–146.
no DOI — not checkedMiller, N. R. (1987): “Voting.” InThe New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, vol. 4, edited by J. Eatwell, M. Milgate, and P. Newman. London: Macmillan Press.
no DOI — not checkedPlott, C. R. (1967): “A Notion of Equilibrium and Its Possibility under Majority Rule.”American Economic Review 57: 787–806.
no DOI — not checkedRenstrom, T., and Yalcin, E. (1995): “Endogenous Firm Objective.” Draft, University of Birmingham, Birmingham.
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