Reference health
Adjustment patterns and equilibrium selection in experimental signaling games
7/7 checkable references clean · checked 2026-09-18
Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.
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The 7 checked references that resolve
resolves10.1016/0899-8256(91)90004-X
An “evolutionary” interpretation of Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil's experimental results on coordination
resolves10.1016/0167-2681(86)90021-1
End behavior in sequences of finite Prisoner's Dilemma supergames A learning theory approach
The 7 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedBanks JS, Camerer CF, Porter D (1990) Experimental tests of Nash refinements in signaling games. Unpublished manuscript, forthcoming in Games and Economic Behavior
no DOI — not checkedBrandts J, Holt CA (1992) An experimental test of equilibrium dominance in signaling games. American Economic Review 82:1350?1365
no DOI — not checkedCooper RW, DeJong DV, Forsythe R, Ross TW (1991) Cooperation without reputation. Working paper, University of Iowa
no DOI — not checkedFriedman D (1992) Evolutionary games: Some experimental results. Working paper, University of California at Santa Cruz
no DOI — not checkedHarrison GW, McCabe K (1992) Testing bargaining theory in experiments. In: Isaac M (ed) Research in experimental economics vol 5, Greenwich Conn JAI Press
no DOI — not checkedKalai E, Lehrer E (1991) Rational learning leads to Nash equilibrium. Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science Discussion Paper No 925, Northwestern University
no DOI — not checkedMarimon R, McGrattan E (1992) On adaptive learning in strategic games. Forthcoming in Kirman A, Salmon M (eds) Learning and Rationality in Economics, Basil Blackwell
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