Reference health
Efficiency by trust in fairness? multiperiod ultimatum bargaining experiments with an increasing cake
13/13 checkable references clean · checked 2026-09-03
Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.
16 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.
The 13 checked references that resolve
resolves10.1016/0167-2681(86)90021-1
End behavior in sequences of finite Prisoner's Dilemma supergames A learning theory approach
resolves10.2307/1911925
The Prisoner's Dilemma and Dynamical Systems Associated to Non-Cooperative Games
The 16 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedBinmore Ken G, Shaked Avner, and Sutton John (1985): Testing Noncooperative Bargaining Theory: A Preliminary Study. American Economic Review 75, 1178?1180.
no DOI — not checkedBrandstätter H (1988): Sechzehn Persönlichkeits-Adjektivskalen (16PA) als Forschungsinstrument anstelle des 16PF. Zeitschrift für experimentelle und angewandte Psychologie 35, 370?391.
no DOI — not checkedGüth Werner and Tietz Reinhard (1988): Ultimatum Bargaining for a Shrinking Cake ? An Experimental Analysis, in: Tietz R/Albers W/Selten R (eds.): Bounded Rational Behavior in Experimental Games and Markets. Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, Vol. 314, Berlin-Heidelberg-New York-Tokyo, 111?128.
no DOI — not checkedGüth Werner and Yaari Menahem (1991): Explaining Reciprocal Behavior in Simple Strategic Games: An Evolutionary Approach, in: Explaining Process and Change: Approaches to Evolutionary Economics (ed. U. Witt). Michigan University Press.
no DOI — not checkedHarrison GW, McCabe KA (1991): Testing Non-Cooperative Bargaining Theory in Experiments. Working Paper B-91-03, College of Business Administration, University of South Carolina.
no DOI — not checkedKirchsteiger Georg (1991): The Role of Envy in Ultimatum Games. Working Paper. Vienna, Austria: Institute for Advanced Studies, Department of Economics.
no DOI — not checkedNeelin J, Sonnenschein H, and Spiegel M (1988): A Further Test of Noncooperative Bargaining Theory: Comment. American Economic Review 78, 824?836.
no DOI — not checkedOchs J and Roth Alvin E (1989): An Experimental Study of Sequential Bargaining. American Economic Review 79, 355?384.
no DOI — not checkedOppewal Harmen and Tougareva Elena (1991): Three-Person and Four-Person Ultimatum Bargaining Games. Lecture at the Joint 1991 Annual Conference of IAREP and SASE (International Conference on Interdisciplinary Approaches to the Study of Economic Problems), Stockholm, Sweden, June 16?19, 1991.
no DOI — not checkedPrasnikar Vesna and Roth Alvin E (1990): Perceptions of Fairness and Considerations of Strategy: Some Experimental Data. Working Paper, University of Pittsburgh.
no DOI — not checkedSelten Reinhard (1965): Spieltheoretische Behandlung eines Oligopolmodells mit Nachfrageträgheit ? Teil I: Bestimmung des dynamischen Preisgleichgewichts. Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft 121, 667?689.
no DOI — not checkedSelten Reinhard (1975): Reexamination of the Perfectness Concept for Equilibrium Points in Extensive Games. International Journal of Game Theory, Vol. 4, Issue 1, 25?55.
no DOI — not checkedSelten Reinhard (1979): Experimentelle Wirtschaftsforschung, in: Rheinisch-Westfälische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Vorträge N 287, 41?60.
no DOI — not checkedShogren Jason F (1990): An Experiment on Coasian Bargaining over Ex Ante Lotteries and Ex Post Rewards. CARD-Working Paper 90-WP63, Iowa State University.
no DOI — not checkedStocker Rolf (1978): Altruism and Performance in Bertrand-Duopoly-Experiments. Contributions to Experimental Economics, Vol. 7: Bargaining Behavior. Tübingen, 41?59.
no DOI — not checkedStöcker Rolf (1980): Experimentelle Untersuchung des Entscheidungsverhaltens im Bertrand-Oligopol. Pfeffer, Bielefeld.
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