Reference health
On the contributions of John C. Harsanyi, John F. Nash and Reinhard Selten
22/22 checkable references clean · checked 2026-08-09
Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.
17 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.
The 22 checked references that resolve
resolves10.1287/mnsc.14.3.159
Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model
resolves10.1007/BF01737554
Games with randomly disturbed payoffs: A new rationale for mixed-strategy equilibrium points
resolves10.1016/S0899-8256(05)80018-1
A new theory of equilibrium selection for games with complete information
resolves10.1007/BF01766400
Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
resolves10.1016/S0899-8256(05)80021-1
An axiomatic theory of a risk dominance measure for bipolar games with linear incentives
resolves10.2307/3440825
Equilibrium in Strategic Interaction: The Contributions of John C. Harsanyi, John F. Nash and Reinhard Selten
resolves10.1111/j.1540-6261.1961.tb02789.x
COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERS
The 17 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedAumann R, Brandenburger A (1991) Epistemic conditions for Nash equilibrium. Working paper 91-042. Harvard Business School
no DOI — not checkedBinmore K, Osborne MJ, Rubinstein A (1992) Noncooperative models of Bargaining 7:179?225. In: Aumann RJ, Hart S (eds) Handbook of Game Theory Vol 1. North-Holland Amsterdam
no DOI — not checkedDebreu G (1984) Economic theory in the mathematical mode. In: Les Prix Nobel 1983. Reprinted in American Economic Review 74:267?278
no DOI — not checkedGüth W (1994) On the scientific work of John C Harsanyi, John F Nash, and Reinhard Selten. Discussion Paper 35, Humboldt-University of Berlin
no DOI — not checkedHarsanyi JC, Selten R (1988) A general theory of equilibrium selection in games. MIT Press Cambridge MA
no DOI — not checkedKalisch GK, Milnor JW, Nash JF, Nering ED (1954) Some experimental n-person games. Chapter 21: 301?327 In: Thrall RM, Coombs CH, Davids RL (eds) Decision Processes. Wiley New York
no DOI — not checkedKreps D, Sobel J (1994) Signalling, chapter 25 In: Aumann RJ, Hart S (eds) Handbook of Game Theory 2. North-Holland Amsterdam
no DOI — not checkedKuhn HW (1953) Extensive games and the problem of information. Annals of Mathematics Studies 28:193?216
no DOI — not checkedLuce RD, Raiffa H (1957) Games and Decisions. Wiley New York
no DOI — not checkedNash JF (1950b) Non-cooperative Games. PhD Dissertation Princeton University
no DOI — not checkedNeumann J von, Morgenstern O (1944) Theory of games and economic behavior. Princeton University Press Princeton NJ (Page numbers refer to the third edition from 1953)
no DOI — not checkedSelten R (1965) Spieltheoretische Behandlung eines Oligopolmodels mit Nachfragetragheit. Zeitschrift für die Gesamte Staatswirtschaft 12:301?324 und 667?689
no DOI — not checkedSelten R (1993) In search of a better understanding of economic behavior. In: Heertje A (ed) The makers of modern economics I:115?139. Harvester Wheatsheaf Hertfordshire
no DOI — not checkedTirole J (1988) The theory of industrial organization. MIT Press Cambridge MA
no DOI — not checkedVan Damme E (1994) Strategic equilibrium. Forthcoming in: Aumann RJ, Hart S (eds) Handbook in Game Theory 3 (1995). North Holland Amsterdam
no DOI — not checkedWeibull J (1994) The ?Mass-Action? interpretation of Nash equilibrium. Paper presented at Nobel symposium in honor of John Nash.
no DOI — not checkedWilson R (1985) Reputations in games and markets. In: Roth AE (ed) Game Theoretic Models of Bargaining. Cambridge University Press UK
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