Reference health
Heterogeneity and the voluntary provision of public goods
18/18 checkable references clean · checked 2026-08-28
Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.
8 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.
The 18 checked references that resolve
resolves10.1111/j.1465-7295.1991.tb01276.x
VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTION GAMES: EFFICIENT PRIVATE PROVISION OF PUBLIC GOODS
resolves10.1007/BF01048198
Heterogenous demand for public goods: Behavior in the voluntary contributions mechanism
resolves10.2307/2095904
Collective Action and Group Heterogeneity: Voluntary Provision Versus Selective Incentives
resolves10.1177/0951692892004003005
Heterogeneity and the Provision of Governance for Common-Pool Resources
resolves10.1006/jeem.1994.1029
The Role of Communication in Resolving Commons Dilemmas: Experimental Evidence with Heterogeneous Appropriators
resolves10.1111/j.1465-7295.1988.tb01519.x
COMMUNICATION and FREE‐RIDING BEHAVIOR: THE VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTION MECHANISM
resolves10.1086/226937
Experiments on the Provision of Public Goods. I. Resources, Interest, Group Size, and the Free-Rider Problem
resolves10.1086/227094
Experiments on the Provision of Public Goods. II. Provision Points, Stakes, Experience, and the Free-Rider Problem
resolves10.1023/A:1009961917752
A Monte Carlo Analysis of the Fisher Randomization Technique: Reviving Randomization for Experimental Economists
resolves10.1086/228313
A Theory of the Critical Mass. I. Interdependence, Group Heterogeneity, and the Production of Collective Action
resolves10.1006/obhd.1993.1029
Incremental Contribution in Step-Level Public Goods Games with Asymmetric Players
resolves10.1016/0095-0696(90)90069-B
Rent dissipation in a limited-access common-pool resource: Experimental evidence
The 8 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedAndreoni, J. (1993). “An Experimental Test of the Public Goods Crowding-Out Hypothesis.”American Economic Review. 83, 1317–1327.
no DOI — not checkedBrookshire, D., Coursey, D., and Redington, D. (1993). “Special Interests and the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods.” Discussion Paper. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico.
no DOI — not checkedChan, K.S., Godby, R., Mestelman, S., and Muller, R.A. (1998). “Crowding Out Voluntary Contributions to Public Goods.” Working Paper 98-03, Hamilton, Canada: McMaster University.
no DOI — not checkedKanbur, R. (1992). “Heterogeneity, Distribution, and Cooperation in Common Property Resource Management.” Policy Research Working Paper WPS 844, Washington, D.C.: World Bank.
no DOI — not checkedMoir, R. (1996).The Analysis of Cooperation in Collective Action Games: Experimental Evidence. Ph.D. Thesis. Hamilton, Canada: McMaster University.
no DOI — not checkedMuller, R.A. and Vickers, M. (1996). “Communication in a Common Pool Resource Environment with Probabilistic Destruction.” Working Paper 96-06, Hamilton, Canada: McMaster University.
no DOI — not checkedOlson, M. (1983). “The Political Economy of Comparative Growth Rates.” In Dennis Mueller (ed.),The Political Economy of Growth. New Haven: Yale University Press, pp. 7–52.
no DOI — not checkedOstrom, E. (1992).Crafting Institutions for Self-Governing Irrigation Systems. San Francisco, California: ICS Press.
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