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The super-additive solution for the Nash bargaining game

https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01755963
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7/7 checkable references clean · checked 2026-08-27

Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.

9 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.

The 7 checked references that resolve
resolves10.1016/0022-247X(65)90049-1
Integrals of set-valued functions
resolves10.2307/1914280
Other Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem
resolves10.2307/1907266
The Bargaining Problem
resolves10.2307/1906951
Two-Person Cooperative Games
resolves10.1007/978-3-322-99574-2
Spieltheorie
resolves10.1007/978-3-642-51570-5
Axiomatic Models of Bargaining
resolves10.1007/BF01784795
Monotonicity and independence axioms
The 9 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedKihlstrom, R., A.E. Roth andD. Schmeidler: Risk Aversion and Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem. To appear in Game Theory and Mathematical Economics. Ed. by O. Moeschlin and P. Pallaschke. Amsterdam 1981.
no DOI — not checkedKohlberg, E., M. Maschler andM.A. Perles: An Extension of the Super-Additive Solution ton-Person Nash Games. To appear.
no DOI — not checkedLuce, R.D., andH. Raiffa: Games and Decisions. New York 1957.
no DOI — not checkedMaschler, M., andM.A. Perles: The Present Status of the Super-Additive Solution. Essays in Game Theory and Mathematical Economics in Honor of Oskar Morgenstern. Ed. by Aumann et al. Mannheim-Wien-Zürich 1981, 103–110.
no DOI — not checkedMyerson, R.B.: Interpersonal Comparison of Utility and the Timing Effect in Social Choice Problems. Discussion paper No. 321, Graduate School of Management, Northwestern University, Evanston, Ill., 1979.
no DOI — not checkedPerles, M.A.: Non-Existence of Super-Additive Solutions for 3-Person Games. To appear (a).
no DOI — not checked-: Non-Symmetric Super-Additive Solutions. To appear (b).
no DOI — not checked-: Super-Additive Solutions Without the Continuity Axiom. To appear (c).
no DOI — not checkedSchmitz, N.: Two Person Bargaining Without Threats — A Revue Note. Operations Research Verfahren29, 1978, 517–533.
What this badge says. CiteStamped means the CHECKABLE references of this work were clean at the dated check: each resolved to a known work in a public registry, and none carried a retraction notice at that time. It says nothing about the quality, findings, or importance of the work itself, and nothing about references deposited without a DOI.

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