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Ultimatums in two-person bargaining with one-sided uncertainty: Offer games

https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01803952
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9/9 checkable references clean · checked 2026-09-01

Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.

5 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.

The 9 checked references that resolve
resolves10.1016/0167-2681(82)90011-7
An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining
resolves10.1016/0167-4870(90)90021-Z
Ultimatum bargaining behavior
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Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model
resolves10.1006/game.1994.1056
Preferences, Property Rights, and Anonymity in Bargaining Games
resolves10.2307/1912767
Sequential Equilibria
resolves10.1007/BF01243649
Experimental results on ultimatum games with incomplete information
resolves10.2307/2118366
Considerations of Fairness and Strategy: Experimental Data from Sequential Games
resolves10.1006/jmps.1995.1019
Bidding Strategies in a Bilateral Monopoly with Two-Sided Incomplete Information
resolves10.1007/BF01262516
Order of play in strategically equivalent games in extensive form
The 5 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedBolton GE (1991) A comparative model of bargaining: Theory and evidence. American Economic Review 81: 1096–1136
no DOI — not checkedGüth W (1993) On ultimatum bargaining experiments — A personal review. Tilburg University, Center for economic research. Report
no DOI — not checkedHarrison GW, McCabe KA (1992) Expectations and fairness in a simple bargaining experiment. The University of South Carolina, College of Business Administration, Working Paper B-92-10
no DOI — not checkedRoth AE (1995) Bargaining experiments. In: Kagel J, Roth AE (Eds) Handbook of Experimental Economics. Princeton Princeton University Press
no DOI — not checkedSelten R (1967) Die strategiemethode zür erforschung des eingeschränkt rationalen verhaltens in rahmen einem oligopolexperiments. In: Sauermann H (Ed) Beiträge zür experimentellen wirtschaftsforschung. Tübingen: JCB Mohr, 136–168
What this badge says. CiteStamped means the CHECKABLE references of this work were clean at the dated check: each resolved to a known work in a public registry, and none carried a retraction notice at that time. It says nothing about the quality, findings, or importance of the work itself, and nothing about references deposited without a DOI.

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