Reference health
The lender of last resort function under a currency board: The case of Argentina
29/29 checkable references clean · checked 2026-08-09
Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.
25 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.
The 29 checked references that resolve
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Regulation and Bank Stability: Canada and the United States, 1870 - 1980
resolves10.1017/CBO9780511628504.003
Monetary policy, capital controls and seigniorage in an open economy
resolves10.1002/(SICI)1099-1158(199601)1:1<1::AID-IJFE1>3.0.CO;2-K
Liberalized Portfolio Capital Inflows in Emerging Markets: Sterilization, Expectations, and the Incompleteness of Interest Rate Convergence
resolves10.2307/2297859
Financial Capacity and Output Fluctuations in an Economy with Multi-Period Financial Relationships
resolves10.1086/261552
Distinguishing Panics and Information-based Bank Runs: Welfare and Policy Implications
resolves10.1016/0304-405X(84)90023-0
Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have
resolves10.2139/ssrn.1815949
Managing Banking Crises in Latin America: The Do's and Don'Ts of Successful Bank Restructuring Programs
resolves10.3386/w4485
Credit Channel or Credit Actions? An Interpretation of the Postwar Transmission Mechanism
resolves10.3386/w5217
An Adverse Selection Model of Bank Asset and Liability Management with Implications for the Transmission of Monetary Policy
The 25 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedBanco Central de la Republica Argentina, 1996. “Principales Caracteristicas Del Marco Normativo Del Sistema Financiero Argentino”, Area de Economia y Finanzas, Febrero.
no DOI — not checkedBentson, G., Comments on Fernandez and Schumacher,supra.
no DOI — not checkedBernanke, Ben S, 1983. “Nonmonetary Effects of the Financial Crisis in the Propagation of the Great Depression”,American Economic Review, 73 (June 1983), 257–276.
no DOI — not checkedBernanke, Ben S., and Alan S. Blinder, 1988. “Credit Money and Aggeregate Demand”American Economic Review, 78 (May 1988), 435–439.
no DOI — not checkedBernanke, Ben S., and Mark, Gertler, 1989. “Agency Cost, Net Worth, and Business Fluctuations”,American Economic Review, 79, (March 1989), 14–31.
no DOI — not checkedBernanke, Ben S., and Mark, Gertler, 1990. “Financial Fragility and Economic Performance”,Quarterly Journal of Economics (Feb. 1990), 87–114.
no DOI — not checkedCalomiris, Charles W. 1990. “Getting the Incetives Right in the Current Deposit Insurance System: Successes from the Pre-FDIC Era”, mimeo, Northwestern University and Research Department, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
no DOI — not checkedCalomiris Charles W., 1989. “Deposit Insurance: Lessons for the Record”,Economic Perspectives, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, May/June 1989, 10–30.
no DOI — not checkedCaprio, Gerard Jr. and Daniela Klingebiel, 1996, “Bank Insolvency: Bad Luck, Bad Policy, or Bad Banking?”, paper presented at the World Bank's Annual Bank Conference on Development Economics, and forthcoming in a conference volume.
no DOI — not checkedCarrizosa, Mauricio, Danny M. Leipziger, and Hemant Shah, 1996. “The Tequila Effect and Argentina's Banking Reform”, Finance and Development, Washington, DC, 22–25.
no DOI — not checkedChinn, Menzie, and Michaels Dooley, 1955, “Asia-Pacific Capital Markets: Integration and Implications for Economic Activity”, NBER Working Paper No. 5280 (September).
no DOI — not checkedChinn, 1955a. “Financial Repression and Capital Mobility: Why Capital Flows and Covered Interest Rate Differentials Fail to Measure Capital Market Integration”, NBER Working Paper 5347, (November).
no DOI — not checkedCorrigan, E. Gerald, “Building a Progressive and Profitable National Banking System in Argentina”, mimeo, 1996.
no DOI — not checkedFernandez, R. and Schumacher, “Does Argentina Provide a Case for Narrow Banking”, paper presented at the World Bank Conference on Preventing Banking Sector Crises, (April 1996), Washington, DC.
no DOI — not checkedFernandez, Roque, R., and Pablo Gidotti, 1994. “Regulating the Banking Industry in Transition Economies: Exploring Interactions between Capital and Reserve Requirements”, paper presented at Economic Reform: Latin America and the Transition Economies.
no DOI — not checkedFolkerts-Landau, David and Takatoshi Ito, Internationals Capital Markets: Development, Prospects, and Policy Issues, IMF, Aug. 1995.
no DOI — not checkedFreris, Andrew, F., 1991. The Financial Markets of Hong Kong, Routledge.
no DOI — not checkedGertler, Mark, “Financial Structure and Economic Activity”,Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, (Nov. 1988), 559–588.
no DOI — not checkedGoodfriend, Marvin, and Robert A. King “Financial Deregulation, Monetary Policy, and Central Banking”, in W.S. Haraf and R.M. Kushmeider (eds.),Restructuring Banking and Financial Services in America. American Enterprise Institute, Washington, D.C., 1989.
no DOI — not checkedGreenfield, Robert L. and Leland B. Yeager, “Can Monetary Disequeillibrium be Eliminated?”Cato Journal 9, Fall, 1989, 405–421.
no DOI — not checkedGrossman, Richard S., “Deposit Insurance, Regulation, and Moral Hazards in the Thrift Industry: Evidence for the 1930s”,American Economic Review 82, Sept. 1992, 800–821.
no DOI — not checkedKeeley, Michael C., Dec. 1980. “Deposit Insurance, Risk, and Market Power in Banking”,American Economic Review, 80, 1183–1200.
no DOI — not checkedPou, Pedro, “Liquidity: Some Ideas About Its Management”, mimeo, Central Bank of Argentina, July 1995.
no DOI — not checkedTsang, Shu-ki, 1996. “A Study of the Linked Exchange Rate Systems and Policy Options for Hong Kong,” mimeo (1996).
no DOI — not checkedWheelock, David C. and Subal C. Kumbhakar “Which Banks Choose Deposit Insurance? Evidence of Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard in a Voluntary Insurance System”,Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 27(1), Feb. 1995, 187–201.
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