Reference health

The common law process: Efficiency or order?

https://doi.org/10.1007/bf02393228
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24/24 checkable references clean · checked 2026-09-03

Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.

23 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.

The 24 checked references that resolve
resolves10.1007/978-94-009-4442-8_4
Economic Efficiency and the Common Law: A Critical Survey
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A Reformulation of Certain Aspects of Welfare Economics
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Social Choice, Democracy, and Free Markets
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The Calculus of Consent
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Nineteenth-Century Jurisdictional Competition in the Granting of Corporate Privileges
resolves10.2307/1340059
Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral
resolves10.1086/466560
The Problem of Social Cost
resolves10.1086/466596
The Exchange and Enforcement of Property Rights
resolves10.1086/467639
The Static Conception of the Common Law
resolves10.2307/1340646
The Social Consequences of Common Law Rules
resolves10.1086/467600
An Economic Theory of the Evolution of Common Law
resolves10.1086/467812
Imperfect Decisions and the Law: On the Evolution of Legal Precedent and Rules
resolves10.1086/467646
Legal Change, Judicial Behavior, and the Diversity Jurisdiction: A Comment
resolves10.1086/467645
Legal Change, Judicial Behavior, and the Diversity Jurisdiction
resolves10.4159/harvard.9780674864030
The Economic Structure of Tort Law
resolves10.1016/0022-0531(78)90039-X
A multistage game representation of sophisticated voting for binary procedures
resolves10.2307/2228726
A Survey of Welfare Economics, 1939-59
resolves10.2307/1960784
Agendas and the Control of Political Outcomes
resolves10.1086/467563
The Common Law Process and the Selection of Efficient Rules
resolves10.1086/467562
Why Is the Common Law Efficient?
resolves10.1086/467698
Common Law and Statute Law
resolves10.2307/2967663
A Reconsideration of the Theory of Tariffs
resolves10.2307/1289242
Coase Defends Coase: Why Lawyers Listen and Economists Do Not
resolves10.4159/9780674043510
Economic Analysis of Accident Law
The 23 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedAranson, P.H. (1990) “Models of Judicial Choice as Allocation and Distribution in Constitutional Law.”Brigham Young Law Review (forthcoming).
no DOI — not checkedArrow, K.J. (1963)Social Choice and Individual Values. (2d ed.) New York: John Wiley & Sons.
no DOI — not checkedBailey, M.J. (1990) “Why Is the Common Law Inefficient?”Unpublished Manuscript. Department of Economics, Emory University.
no DOI — not checkedBator, F.M. (1957) “The Simple Analytics of Welfare Maximization.”American Economic Review 47: 22–59.
no DOI — not checkedBlack, D. (1958)The Theory of Committees and Elections. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
no DOI — not checkedBuchanan, J.M. (1969)Cost and Choice. Chicago: Markham.
no DOI — not checkedDe Alessi, L. (1980) “The Economics of Property Rights: A Review of the Evidence.”Research in Law and Economics 2: 1–47.
no DOI — not checkedDe Alessi, L. (1983) “Property Rights, Transaction Costs, and X-Efficiency: An Essay in Economic Theory.”American Economic Review 73: 64–81.
no DOI — not checkedDe Alessi, L. (1985) “Property Rights and the Judiciary.”Cato Journal 4: 805–811. Reprinted in J.A. Dorn and H.G. Manne (eds) (1987)Economic Liberties and the Judiciary. Washington, D.C.: Cato Institute: 175–181.
no DOI — not checkedDe Alessi, L. and R.P.H. Fishe (1987) “Why Do Corporations Distribute Assets? An Analysis of Dividend and Capital Structure.”Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 143: 34–51.
no DOI — not checkedDe Alessi, L. and R.J. Staaf (1989) “Subjective Value in Contract Law.”Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 145: 561–578.
no DOI — not checkedDemsetz, H. (1967) “Toward a Theory of Property Rights.”American Economic Review 57: 347–359.
no DOI — not checkedEmons, W. (1989) “Efficient Liability Rules for an Economy with Non-Identical Individuals.”Unpublished Manuscript. Institut für Volkswirtschaft: University of Basel, Switzerland.
no DOI — not checkedGraaff, J. de V. (1957)Theoretical Welfare Economics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
no DOI — not checkedLlewellyn, K.N. (1960)The Common Law Tradition. Boston: Little, Brown.
no DOI — not checkedPigou, A.C. (1932)The Economics of Welfare. (4th ed.) London: Macmillan.
no DOI — not checkedPosner, R.A. (1977)Economic Analysis of Law. (2d ed.) Boston: Little, Brown.
no DOI — not checkedSmith, A. (1776)An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. E. Cannan Edition (1937) New York: Random House.
no DOI — not checkedStake, J.N. (1991) “Status and Incentive Aspects of Judicial Decisions.”Law Review Journal 1991: 1–60.
no DOI — not checkedTullock, G. (1980)Trials on Trial. New York: Columbia University Press.
no DOI — not checkedAmtorg Trading Company v. Miehle Printing Press and Mfg. Co., 206 F 2d 103 (2d Cir, 1953).
no DOI — not checkedErie RR Co. v. Thomkins, 304 U.S. 64, 1938.
no DOI — not checkedGreenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc. 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d 897 (1962).
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