Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known
work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction,
withdrawal, or removal notice.
The 24 checked references that resolve
resolves10.2307/1881737A Reformulation of Certain Aspects of Welfare Economics
resolves10.1086/467768Nineteenth-Century Jurisdictional Competition in the Granting of Corporate Privileges
resolves10.2307/1340059Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral
resolves10.1086/467600An Economic Theory of the Evolution of Common Law
resolves10.1086/467812Imperfect Decisions and the Law: On the Evolution of Legal Precedent and Rules
resolves10.1086/467646Legal Change, Judicial Behavior, and the Diversity Jurisdiction: A Comment
resolves10.1086/467645Legal Change, Judicial Behavior, and the Diversity Jurisdiction
resolves10.1086/467563The Common Law Process and the Selection of Efficient Rules
resolves10.2307/1289242Coase Defends Coase: Why Lawyers Listen and Economists Do Not
The 23 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedAranson, P.H. (1990) “Models of Judicial Choice as Allocation and Distribution in Constitutional Law.”Brigham Young Law Review (forthcoming).
no DOI — not checkedArrow, K.J. (1963)Social Choice and Individual Values. (2d ed.) New York: John Wiley & Sons.
no DOI — not checkedBailey, M.J. (1990) “Why Is the Common Law Inefficient?”Unpublished Manuscript. Department of Economics, Emory University.
no DOI — not checkedBator, F.M. (1957) “The Simple Analytics of Welfare Maximization.”American Economic Review 47: 22–59.
no DOI — not checkedBlack, D. (1958)The Theory of Committees and Elections. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
no DOI — not checkedBuchanan, J.M. (1969)Cost and Choice. Chicago: Markham.
no DOI — not checkedDe Alessi, L. (1980) “The Economics of Property Rights: A Review of the Evidence.”Research in Law and Economics 2: 1–47.
no DOI — not checkedDe Alessi, L. (1983) “Property Rights, Transaction Costs, and X-Efficiency: An Essay in Economic Theory.”American Economic Review 73: 64–81.
no DOI — not checkedDe Alessi, L. (1985) “Property Rights and the Judiciary.”Cato Journal 4: 805–811. Reprinted in J.A. Dorn and H.G. Manne (eds) (1987)Economic Liberties and the Judiciary. Washington, D.C.: Cato Institute: 175–181.
no DOI — not checkedDe Alessi, L. and R.P.H. Fishe (1987) “Why Do Corporations Distribute Assets? An Analysis of Dividend and Capital Structure.”Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 143: 34–51.
no DOI — not checkedDe Alessi, L. and R.J. Staaf (1989) “Subjective Value in Contract Law.”Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 145: 561–578.
no DOI — not checkedDemsetz, H. (1967) “Toward a Theory of Property Rights.”American Economic Review 57: 347–359.
no DOI — not checkedEmons, W. (1989) “Efficient Liability Rules for an Economy with Non-Identical Individuals.”Unpublished Manuscript. Institut für Volkswirtschaft: University of Basel, Switzerland.
no DOI — not checkedGraaff, J. de V. (1957)Theoretical Welfare Economics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
no DOI — not checkedLlewellyn, K.N. (1960)The Common Law Tradition. Boston: Little, Brown.
no DOI — not checkedPigou, A.C. (1932)The Economics of Welfare. (4th ed.) London: Macmillan.
no DOI — not checkedPosner, R.A. (1977)Economic Analysis of Law. (2d ed.) Boston: Little, Brown.
no DOI — not checkedSmith, A. (1776)An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. E. Cannan Edition (1937) New York: Random House.
no DOI — not checkedStake, J.N. (1991) “Status and Incentive Aspects of Judicial Decisions.”Law Review Journal 1991: 1–60.
no DOI — not checkedTullock, G. (1980)Trials on Trial. New York: Columbia University Press.
no DOI — not checkedAmtorg Trading Company v. Miehle Printing Press and Mfg. Co., 206 F 2d 103 (2d Cir, 1953).
no DOI — not checkedErie RR Co. v. Thomkins, 304 U.S. 64, 1938.
no DOI — not checkedGreenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc. 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d 897 (1962).
checked 2026-09-03 — re-checked daily as this page is visited;
titles and statuses come from Crossref and DataCite and are not part of the signed record
Both snippets point at the live badge image and link back to this page. The
badge re-renders from the daily check, so an embed never goes stale by more than a day of visits.