Reference health

Two versions of the tragedy of the commons

https://doi.org/10.1007/bf02499143
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15/15 checkable references clean · checked 2026-09-03

Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.

7 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.

The 15 checked references that resolve
resolves10.1017/CBO9780511552069.005
Judgments of distributive justice
resolves10.1287/moor.7.1.32
Allocation of Shared Costs: A Set of Axioms Yielding A Unique Procedure
resolves10.2307/1911271
The Paradox of Thrift, Liquidity Preference and Animal Spirits
resolves10.1126/science.162.3859.1243
The Tragedy of the Commons
resolves10.1016/0147-5967(80)90024-4
Collectives, communes, and incentives
resolves10.1086/466903
The Nature and Function of the Patent System
resolves10.2307/1883165
Market Structure and Innovation
resolves10.1515/9781400864140
Cooperative Microeconomics
resolves10.2307/2951537
Serial Cost Sharing
resolves10.1006/jeth.1994.1061
Average Cost Pricing versus Serial Cost Sharing: An Axiomatic Comparison
resolves10.1017/S0265052500000649
A Public Ownership Resolution of the Tragedy of the Commons
resolves10.1016/S0167-7187(88)80003-1
Oligopolistic competition for market share via voluntary excess supply
resolves10.1145/98457.98764
Making greed work in networks: a game-theoretic analysis of gateway service disciplines
resolves10.1287/mnsc.8.3.325
Incentives, Decentralized Control, the Assignment of Joint Costs and Internal Pricing
resolves10.1006/game.1996.0037
On the Uniqueness of Equilibrium in Cournot Oligopoly and Other Games
The 7 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedCase, J.H., 1979, Economics and the Competitive Process, ch.2 (New York University Press, New York).
no DOI — not checkedDasgupta, P. and G. Heal, 1979, Economics theory and exhaustible resources (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge).
no DOI — not checkedOstrom, E., 1991, Governing the Commons (Cambridge University Press, New York).
no DOI — not checkedPosner, R.A., 1992, Economic Analysis of Law, ch. 3, 4th Ed. (Little, Brown and Company, Boston).
no DOI — not checkedRiley, J.G., 1991, Asymmetric Contests, Mimeo, UCLA.
no DOI — not checkedTullock, G., 1980, Efficient rent seeking, in: J. Buchanan, R. Tollison and G. Tullock, eds., Toward a Theory of the Rent Seeking Society (Texas A&M Press).
no DOI — not checkedWatts, A., 1996b, Uniqueness of Equilibrium in Cost Sharing Games, Mimeo, Vanderbilt University.
What this badge says. CiteStamped means the CHECKABLE references of this work were clean at the dated check: each resolved to a known work in a public registry, and none carried a retraction notice at that time. It says nothing about the quality, findings, or importance of the work itself, and nothing about references deposited without a DOI.

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