Reference health
Understanding institutional change: Fast-moving and slow-moving institutions
27/27 checkable references clean · checked 2026-09-19
Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.
28 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.
The 27 checked references that resolve
resolves10.1257/aer.91.5.1369
The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation
resolves10.1162/003355300555042
Why Did the West Extend the Franchise? Democracy, Inequality, and Growth in Historical Perspective
resolves10.1007/BF01115064
Predatory, developmental, and other apparatuses: A comparative political economy perspective on the Third World state
resolves10.1086/261959
Cultural Beliefs and the Organization of Society: A Historical and Theoretical Reflection on Collectivist and Individualist Societies
resolves10.1017/S0022050700009451
Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England
resolves10.3386/w10176
How Do Electoral Rules Shape Party Structures, Government Coalitions, and Economic Policies?
resolves10.1111/j.1468-0351.1993.tb00077.x
Why China's economic reforms differ: the M‐form hierarchy and entry/expansion of the non‐state sector
resolves10.1007/BF02699764
Institutions for high-quality growth: What they are and how to acquire them
The 28 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedAcemoglu, D. 2002. “Why Not A Political, Coase Theorem? Social Conflict, Commitment and Politics.” National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. w9377.
no DOI — not checkedAcemoglu, D. and J. Robinson.Political Origins of Democracy and Dictatorship. Unpublished manuscript.
no DOI — not checkedBerglöf, E. 1990. “Capital Structure as a Mechanism of, Control: A Comparison of Financial Systems.” InThe Firm as a Nexus of Treaties. Masahiko Aoki, Bo Gustavsson, and Oliver Williamson. eds. London: Sage Publications.
no DOI — not checkedCai, H. and D. Treisman. “State Corroding Federalism: Interjurisdictional Competition and the Weakening of Central Authority.” UCLA Economics Online Paper No. 251. Los Angeles: University of California (forthcoming).
no DOI — not checkedDewatripont, M. and G. Roland. 1995. “The Design of Reform Packages under Uncertainty.”American Economic Review 85: 1207–23.
no DOI — not checkedDiamond, J. 1998.Guns, Germs and Steel. New York: Norton Publishing Press.
no DOI — not checkedDiermeier, D., H. Eraslan, and A. Merlo. In press. “A Structural Model of Government Formation”.Econometrica.
no DOI — not checkedFiner, S.E. 2001.A History of Government from the Earliest Times. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
no DOI — not checkedGerschenkron, A. 1962.Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective. New York: Praeger.
no DOI — not checkedGreif, A. 1993. “Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade: The Maghribi Traders’ Coalition.”American Economic Review 83, 3: 525–48.
no DOI — not checkedHough, J. 1988.Opening up the Soviet Economy. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution Press.
no DOI — not checkedKornai, J. 1995.Highways and Byways. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
no DOI — not checked— 1980.Economics of Shortage. Amsterdam: North-Holland Press.
no DOI — not checkedOlson, M. 1971.The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
no DOI — not checkedOlson, M. 1982.The Rise and Decline of Nations. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
no DOI — not checkedPersson, T. and G. Tabellini. 1999. “The Size and Scope of Government: Comparative Politics with Rational Politicians.”European Economic, Review, Marshall Lecture 699–736.
no DOI — not checkedPersson, T. Roland, and G. Tabellini 1997. “Separation of Powers and Political Accountability.”Quarterly Journal of Economics 112: 310–27.
no DOI — not checkedQian, Y. 2002. “How Reform Worked in China.” William Davidson Institute Working Paper No. 473. Ann Arbor, MI: William Davidson Institute.
no DOI — not checkedQian, Y., G. Roland, and C. Xu 1999. “Coordinating Changes in M-form and U-form Organizations.” William Davidson Institute Working Paper No. 284. Ann Arbor, MI: William, Davidson Institute.
no DOI — not checkedRoland, G. 1989.Economie politique du système soviétique. Paris: Editions de l’Harmattan.
no DOI — not checked— 1991. “The Political Economy of Transition in the Soviet Union.”European Economy 49: 197–216.
no DOI — not checked— 2000.Transition and Economics: Politics, Markets and Firms. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
no DOI — not checked— 2002. “Ten Years After … Transition and Economics.”IMF Staff Papers 48 (Special Issue): 29–52.
no DOI — not checkedSachs, J. and W. Woo 1994. “Structural Factors in the Economic Reforms of China, Eastern Europe, and the Former Soviet Union.”Economic Policy 18: 102–45.
no DOI — not checkedWeingast, B. 1995. “The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-Preserving Federalism and Economic Growth.”Journal of Economics, Law and Organization 11: 1–31.
no DOI — not checkedWeitzman, M. and C. Xu 1993. “Chinese Township and Village Enterprises as Vaguely Defined Cooperatives.”Journal of Comparative Economics 3, 1: 276–308.
no DOI — not checkedWilliamson, O. 1975.Markets and Hierarchies. New York: Free Press.
no DOI — not checked— 1985.The Economic Institutions of Capitalism. New York: Free Press.
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