Reference health
Pure strategy equilibria in symmetric two-player zero-sum games
20/20 checkable references clean · checked 2026-08-09
Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.
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The 20 checked references that resolve
resolves10.1016/j.jebo.2005.12.002
Evolutionary stability and Nash equilibrium in finite populations, with an application to price competition
resolves10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2003.09.002
Evolutionary equilibrium in Tullock contests: spite and overdissipation
resolves10.1016/j.jebo.2009.08.011
On the equivalence of Nash and evolutionary equilibrium in finite populations
resolves10.1007/s00199-005-0027-9
Fending off one means fending off all: evolutionary stability in quasi-submodular aggregative games
resolves10.1016/S0022-5193(88)80085-7
Evolutionarily stable strategies for a finite population and a variable contest size
resolves10.1016/S0165-4896(99)00030-X
A finite population ESS and a long run equilibrium in an n players coordination game
The 5 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedBrown GW, von Neumann J (1950) Solutions of games by differential equations. In: Kuhn HW, Tucker AW (eds) Contributions to the theory of games (Annals of Mathematics Studies no. 24). Princeton University Press, Princeton, pp 81–87
no DOI — not checkedDuersch P, Oechssler J, Schipper BC (2011) Unbeatable imitation mimeo. University of Heidelberg and the University of California, Davis
no DOI — not checkedGale D, Kuhn HW, Tucker AW (1950) On symmetric games. In: Kuhn HW, Tucker AW (eds) Contributions to the theory of games. Annals of Mathematics Studies, Princeton University Press, Princeton, pp 81–87
no DOI — not checkedMatros A, Temzelides T, Duffy J (2009) Competitive behavior in market games: evidence and theory, mimeo. University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh
no DOI — not checkedSchipper BC (2003) Submodularity and the evolution of Walrasian behavior. Int J Game Theory 32: 471–477
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