Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known
work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction,
withdrawal, or removal notice.
The 17 checked references that resolve
resolves10.2307/2554852Creating a Good Atmosphere: Minimum Participation for Tackling the 'Greenhouse Effect'
resolves10.1006/game.1996.0043Sequential Formation of Coalitions in Games with Externalities and Fixed Payoff Division
resolves10.1007/BF00877502A core-theoretic solution for the design of cooperative agreements on transfrontier pollution
resolves10.1007/BF01263279The core of an economy with multilateral environmental externalities
resolves10.1561/101.00000011Game Theoretic Research on the Design of International Environmental Agreements: Insights, Critical Remarks, and Future Challenges
The 10 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedBarrett S (1997) Towards a theory of international cooperation. In: Carraro C, Siniscalco D (eds) New directions in the economic theory of the environment. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
no DOI — not checkedBloch F (1997) Non-cooperative models of coalition formation in games with spillovers. In: Carraro C, Siniscalco D (eds) New directions in the economic theory of the environment. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
no DOI — not checkedBotteon M, Carraro C (1997) Strategies for environmental negotiations: issue linkage with heterogeneous countries. In: Folmer H, Hanley N (eds) Game Theory and the Global Environment. E. Elgar, Cheltenham
no DOI — not checkedCarraro C (ed) (1997) International environmental agreements: strategic policy issues. E. Elgar, Cheltenham
no DOI — not checkedCarraro C, Siniscalco D (1992) The international protection of the environment: voluntary agreements among sovereign countries. In: Dasgupta P, Maler KG, Vercelli A (eds) The economics of transnational commons. Clarendon Press, Oxford
no DOI — not checkedCarraro C, Siniscalco D (1995) Policy coordination for sustainability: commitments, transfers, and linked negotiations. In: Goldin I, Winters A (eds) The economics of sustainable development. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
no DOI — not checkedFinus M (2003) Stability and design of international environmental agreements: the case of global and transboundary pollution. In: Folmer H, Tietenberg T (eds) International yearbook of environmental and resource economics, 2002/3. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham
no DOI — not checkedRutz S (2001) Minimum participation rules and the effectiveness of multilateral environmental agreements, Working paper 01/22, Centre for Economic Research, SFIT, Zurich
no DOI — not checkedTulkens H (1998) Cooperation versus Free-riding in international environmental affairs: two approaches. In: Folmer H, Hanley N (eds) Game theory and the global environment, E. Elgar, Cheltenham. Also in Carraro C (ed) Governing the global environment, E. Elgar, Cheltenham, 2002
no DOI — not checkedYi SS (2003) Endogenous formation of economic coalitions. Asurveyofthepartitionfunctionapproach. In: Carraro C (eds) The endogenous formation of economic coalitions. E. Elgar, Cheltenham
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