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Endogenous Minimum Participation in International Environmental Treaties

https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-009-9264-x
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17/17 checkable references clean · checked 2026-07-26

Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.

10 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.

The 17 checked references that resolve
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Self-Enforcing International Environmental Agreements
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Creating a Good Atmosphere: Minimum Participation for Tackling the 'Greenhouse Effect'
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Sequential Formation of Coalitions in Games with Externalities and Fixed Payoff Division
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The Endogenous Formation of Economic Coalitions
resolves10.1016/0047-2727(93)90037-T
Strategies for the international protection of the environment
resolves10.1016/S0014-2921(97)00118-9
International Institutions and Environmental Policy
resolves10.1007/BF00877502
A core-theoretic solution for the design of cooperative agreements on transfrontier pollution
resolves10.1007/BF01263279
The core of an economy with multilateral environmental externalities
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On the Stability of Collusive Price Leadership
resolves10.1111/j.1467-9779.2006.00262.x
<scp>Stable International Environmental Agreements: An Analytical Approach</scp>
resolves10.1561/101.00000011
Game Theoretic Research on the Design of International Environmental Agreements: Insights, Critical Remarks, and Future Challenges
resolves10.1006/jeth.1996.2236
Equilibrium Binding Agreements
resolves10.1006/game.1998.0648
A Theory of Endogenous Coalition Structures
resolves10.1093/oep/gpl002
Self-enforcing international environmental agreements revisited
resolves10.1006/game.1997.0567
Stable Coalition Structures with Externalities
The 10 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedBarrett S (1997) Towards a theory of international cooperation. In: Carraro C, Siniscalco D (eds) New directions in the economic theory of the environment. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
no DOI — not checkedBloch F (1997) Non-cooperative models of coalition formation in games with spillovers. In: Carraro C, Siniscalco D (eds) New directions in the economic theory of the environment. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
no DOI — not checkedBotteon M, Carraro C (1997) Strategies for environmental negotiations: issue linkage with heterogeneous countries. In: Folmer H, Hanley N (eds) Game Theory and the Global Environment. E. Elgar, Cheltenham
no DOI — not checkedCarraro C (ed) (1997) International environmental agreements: strategic policy issues. E. Elgar, Cheltenham
no DOI — not checkedCarraro C, Siniscalco D (1992) The international protection of the environment: voluntary agreements among sovereign countries. In: Dasgupta P, Maler KG, Vercelli A (eds) The economics of transnational commons. Clarendon Press, Oxford
no DOI — not checkedCarraro C, Siniscalco D (1995) Policy coordination for sustainability: commitments, transfers, and linked negotiations. In: Goldin I, Winters A (eds) The economics of sustainable development. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
no DOI — not checkedFinus M (2003) Stability and design of international environmental agreements: the case of global and transboundary pollution. In: Folmer H, Tietenberg T (eds) International yearbook of environmental and resource economics, 2002/3. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham
no DOI — not checkedRutz S (2001) Minimum participation rules and the effectiveness of multilateral environmental agreements, Working paper 01/22, Centre for Economic Research, SFIT, Zurich
no DOI — not checkedTulkens H (1998) Cooperation versus Free-riding in international environmental affairs: two approaches. In: Folmer H, Hanley N (eds) Game theory and the global environment, E. Elgar, Cheltenham. Also in Carraro C (ed) Governing the global environment, E. Elgar, Cheltenham, 2002
no DOI — not checkedYi SS (2003) Endogenous formation of economic coalitions. Asurveyofthepartitionfunctionapproach. In: Carraro C (eds) The endogenous formation of economic coalitions. E. Elgar, Cheltenham
What this badge says. CiteStamped means the CHECKABLE references of this work were clean at the dated check: each resolved to a known work in a public registry, and none carried a retraction notice at that time. It says nothing about the quality, findings, or importance of the work itself, and nothing about references deposited without a DOI.

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