Reference health
The effect of board size and composition on European bank performance
1 of 74 checkable references need attention · checked 2026-07-25
At the dated check, the references listed below either did not resolve in Crossref or DataCite, or carried a retraction notice. Each one is shown with the registry record that put it there.
49 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.
References needing attention
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The 73 checked references that resolve
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