Reference health
The choice of institutions to solve cooperation problems: a survey of experimental research
68/68 checkable references clean · checked 2026-07-24
Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.
4 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.
The 68 checked references that resolve
resolves10.1016/j.jpubeco.2012.08.003
Gun for hire: Delegated enforcement and peer punishment in public goods provision
resolves10.1086/452480
Irrigation and Cooperation: An Empirical Analysis of 48 Irrigation Communities in South India
resolves10.1016/j.jebo.2013.04.009
The subgroup problem: When can binding voting on extractions from a common pool resource overcome the tragedy of the commons?
resolves10.1016/j.jebo.2003.04.002
Compensating the cooperators: is sorting in the prisoner’s dilemma possible?
resolves10.1007/s10683-011-9272-x
The strategy versus the direct-response method: a first survey of experimental comparisons
resolves10.1016/j.jpubeco.2011.05.003
Playing with the good guys. A public good game with endogenous group formation
resolves10.1098/rspb.2014.2678
Payoff-based learning explains the decline in cooperation in public goods games
resolves10.1007/s10683-010-9257-1
Sustaining cooperation in laboratory public goods experiments: a selective survey of the literature
resolves10.1016/j.jebo.2018.12.029
Endogenous sanctioning institutions and migration patterns: Experimental evidence
resolves10.1093/restud/rdx031
The Demand for Bad Policy when Voters Underappreciate Equilibrium Effects
resolves10.1017/CBO9781107300361.014
Experimental Evidence on the Workings of Democratic Institutions
resolves10.1257/aer.100.5.2205
Institutions and Behavior: Experimental Evidence on the Effects of Democracy
resolves10.1111/ecca.12073
Participation and Commitment in Voluntary Coalitions to Provide Public Goods
resolves10.1016/j.euroecorev.2008.09.007
Who to punish? Individual decisions and majority rule in mitigating the free rider problem
resolves10.1016/j.euroecorev.2013.09.002
Minimum participation rules for the provision of public goods
resolves10.1016/j.jebo.2011.01.018
Matching technology and the choice of punishment institutions in a prisoner’s dilemma game
resolves10.1038/s41598-016-0001-8
Ultrastructural Characterization of the Lower Motor System in a Mouse Model of Krabbe Disease
resolves10.1016/j.jebo.2019.02.009
Group formation and cooperation in social dilemmas: A survey and meta-analytic evidence
resolves10.1016/j.joep.2012.10.004
Social learning increases the acceptance and the efficiency of punishment institutions in social dilemmas
resolves10.1111/j.1540-5907.2011.00531.x
An Experimental Investigation of Electoral Delegation and the Provision of Public Goods
resolves10.1177/0022002701045006004
Choice of Partners in Multiple Two-Person Prisoner's Dilemma Games
resolves10.1007/s10683-014-9405-0
State or nature? Endogenous formal versus informal sanctions in the voluntary provision of public goods
resolves10.1016/j.joep.2016.05.007
Is there a hidden cost of imposing a minimum contribution level for public good contributions?
resolves10.1016/j.jebo.2019.03.007
Institutional endogeneity and third-party punishment in social dilemmas
resolves10.1007/s10640-005-3359-9
Individual and Collective Choice and Voting in Common Pool Resource Problem with Heterogeneous Actors
resolves10.1093/restud/rdt022
Self-Organization for Collective Action: An Experimental Study of Voting on Sanction Regimes
resolves10.1111/sjoe.12321
Public Goods and Minimum Provision Levels: Does the Institutional Formation Affect Cooperation?*
resolves10.1007/s10640-014-9800-1
Endogenous Minimum Participation in International Environmental Agreements: An Experimental Analysis
resolves10.1093/oep/gpq023
The problem of maintaining compliance within stable coalitions: experimental evidence
resolves10.1111/j.1467-9779.2011.01516.x
<scp>Voting on Punishment Systems within a Heterogeneous Group</scp>
resolves10.1111/j.1468-0297.2005.01031.x
Voluntary Association in Public Goods Experiments: Reciprocity, Mimicry and Efficiency
resolves10.1073/pnas.1108243108
Dynamic social networks promote cooperation in experiments with humans
resolves10.1111/j.1467-937X.2010.00608.x
Choosing the Carrot or the Stick? Endogenous Institutional Choice in Social Dilemma Situations
resolves10.1016/S0165-1765(02)00288-4
On the effects of asymmetric and endogenous taxation in experimental public goods games
resolves10.1628/001522104774102815
An Experimental Test of the Public Goods Crowding Out Hypothesis when Taxation Is Endogenous
resolves10.1111/j.1467-9442.2006.00444.x
Achieving Compliance when Legal Sanctions are Non‐deterrent*
resolves10.1016/j.euroecorev.2017.01.007
Cooperation and authoritarian values: An experimental study in China
resolves10.1111/1468-0297.00497
Collective Choice in the Commons: Experimental Results on Proposed Allocation Rules and Votes
The 4 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedFehr, E., & Williams, T. (2017). Creating an efficient culture of cooperation. Working Paper No. 267, University of Zurich. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3062528 .
no DOI — not checkedFrey, B. (1998). Institutions and morale: The crowding-out effect. In A. Ben-Ner & L. Putterman (Eds.), Economics, values, and organization (pp. 460–473). New York: Cambridge University Press.
no DOI — not checkedGürdal, M., Özgür, G., & Mustafa, Y. (2019). Culture and prevalence of sanctioning institutions. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3415638 .
no DOI — not checkedRabin, M. (1993). Incorporating fairness into game theory and economics. American Economic Review, 83(5), 1281–1302.
What this badge says. CiteStamped means the CHECKABLE references of this
work were clean at the dated check: each resolved to a known work in a public registry, and none
carried a retraction notice at that time. It says nothing about the quality, findings,
or importance of the work itself, and nothing about references deposited without a DOI.
checked 2026-07-24 — re-checked daily as this page is visited; titles and statuses come from Crossref and DataCite and are not part of the signed record
Embed this badge
Both snippets point at the live badge image and link back to this page. The badge re-renders from the daily check, so an embed never goes stale by more than a day of visits.
<a href="https://citestamp.com/citestamped/10.1007/s10683-019-09629-8"><img src="https://citestamp.com/citestamped/10.1007/s10683-019-09629-8/badge.svg" alt="CiteStamped reference-health badge" width="460" height="64"></a>
[](https://citestamp.com/citestamped/10.1007/s10683-019-09629-8)