Reference health

The effects of board and auditor independence on earnings quality: evidence from Italy

https://doi.org/10.1007/s10997-013-9285-2
CiteStamped reference-health badge
48/48 checkable references clean · checked 2026-08-03

Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.

13 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.

The 48 checked references that resolve
resolves10.1177/0148558X0902400305
Investor Sentiment, Accruals Anomaly, and Accruals Management
resolves10.1007/s10997-011-9168-3
Corporate boards, audit committees and voluntary disclosure: evidence from Italian Listed Companies
resolves10.1016/j.racreg.2012.05.003
Is non-audit services a suitable proxy for auditor independence in the post-SOX period?
resolves10.2308/accr.2003.78.3.611
Do Nonaudit Services Compromise Auditor Independence? Further Evidence
resolves10.1016/j.jacceco.2004.04.001
Earnings quality in UK private firms: comparative loss recognition timeliness
resolves10.1016/S1061-9518(99)00005-1
Perceptions of auditor independence: U.K. evidence
resolves10.1111/j.1911-3846.1998.tb00547.x
The Effect of Audit Quality on Earnings Management*
resolves10.1023/A:1009692703952
Discussion of “Are Accruals during Initial Public Offerings Opportunistic?”
resolves10.1506/CHWK-GMQ0-MLKE-K03V
Board Characteristics and Audit Fees*
resolves10.1016/j.jacceco.2010.09.001
Understanding earnings quality: A review of the proxies, their determinants and their consequences
resolves10.1016/S0165-4101(98)00020-2
The relation between earnings and cash flows
resolves10.1111/j.1911-3846.1996.tb00489.x
Causes and Consequences of Earnings Manipulation: An Analysis of Firms Subject to Enforcement Actions by the SEC*
resolves10.1016/0165-4101(94)90008-6
Debt covenant violation and manipulation of accruals
resolves10.2308/accr.2001.76.3.375
The Reversal of Abnormal Accruals and the Market Valuation of Earnings Surprises
resolves10.1007/s10997-008-9044-y
The effects of board size and ‘busy’ directors on the market value of Italian companies
resolves10.1086/467037
Separation of Ownership and Control
resolves10.1007/s11142-009-9111-x
Management’s tone change, post earnings announcement drift and accruals
resolves10.1007/s11142-006-9014-z
Disclosure of fees paid to auditors and the market valuation of earnings surprises
resolves10.2308/accr.2002.77.s-1.71
The Relation between Auditors' Fees for Nonaudit Services and Earnings Management
resolves10.1111/j.1467-8683.2007.00654.x
The Effect of the Board Composition and its Monitoring Committees on Earnings Management: evidence from Spain
resolves10.2308/accr.2006.81.4.873
The Effects of Joint Provision and Disclosure of Nonaudit Services on Audit Committee Members' Decisions and Investors' Preferences
resolves10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2009.07.001
Audit and non-audit fees and capital market perceptions of auditor independence
resolves10.1016/j.jacceco.2005.01.002
The economic implications of corporate financial reporting
resolves10.1057/jdg.2010.17
Disclosure of non-audit services in annual reports and auditor independence: Evidence from Italy
resolves10.1111/j.1467-629X.2007.00226.x
Auditor independence, executive pay and firm performance
resolves10.1111/j.1540-6261.1993.tb04022.x
The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems
resolves10.1016/0304-405X(76)90026-X
Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure
resolves10.2307/2491047
Earnings Management During Import Relief Investigations
resolves10.1016/S0165-4101(02)00059-9
Audit committee, board of director characteristics, and earnings management
resolves10.2308/aud.2005.24.2.111
Does the Provision of Nonaudit Services Affect Investor Perceptions of Auditor Independence?
resolves10.1086/250042
Law and Finance
resolves10.1111/j.1475-679X.2004.t01-1-00143.x
Fees Paid to Audit Firms, Accrual Choices, and Corporate Governance
resolves10.1007/s10997-009-9091-z
The relation between board size and firm performance in firms with a history of poor operating performance
resolves10.1111/j.1911-3846.1999.tb00603.x
The Difference between Earnings and Operating Cash Flow as an Indicator of Financial Reporting Fraud*
resolves10.1016/S0304-405X(03)00121-1
Earnings management and investor protection: an international comparison
resolves10.2307/2491270
Fundamental Information Analysis
resolves10.1080/00014788.2006.9730005
Earnings management within Europe: the effects of member state audit environment, audit firm quality and international capital markets
resolves10.1016/j.intacc.2011.04.007
Board Monitoring and Earnings Management Pre- and Post-IFRS
resolves10.1016/S0929-1199(03)00025-7
Board composition and earnings management in Canada
resolves10.1080/00014788.2000.9728949
Detecting earnings management using cross-sectional abnormal accruals models
resolves10.1111/j.0306-686X.2005.00630.x
Board Monitoring and Earnings Management: Do Outside Directors Influence Abnormal Accruals?
resolves10.1177/0148558X11401212
Corporate Governance and Earnings Management in Family-Controlled Companies
resolves10.1111/j.1099-1123.2009.00397.x
Auditor Independence and the Provision of Non‐Audit Services: Perceptions by German Investors
resolves10.1506/6AE8-75YW-8NVW-V8GK
Nonaudit Services and Earnings Conservatism: Is Auditor Independence Impaired?*
resolves10.1080/00014788.2005.9729663
Earnings management of distressed firms during debt renegotiation
resolves10.1016/j.aos.2009.01.004
Financial crisis and the silence of the auditors
resolves10.1016/S0278-4254(00)00016-8
Identifying unexpected accruals: a comparison of current approaches
resolves10.1016/0165-4101(94)00393-J
Managerial ownership, accounting choices, and informativeness of earnings
The 13 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedBI. (2006). Borsa Italiana (Italian Stock Exchange), Codice di Autodisciplina (Corporate Governance Code). Milano: Borsa Italiana.
no DOI — not checkedCatturi, G., & Riccaboni, A. (Eds.). (1996). Management control and national culture. Padova: Cedam.
no DOI — not checkedCohen, D. A., & Zarowin, P. (2007). Earnings management over the business cycle. New York, NY: Working Paper, New York University, Stern School of Business.
no DOI — not checkedDechow, P. M., Sloan, R. G., & Sweeney, A. P. (1995). Detecting earnings management. The Accounting Review, 70(2), 193–225.
no DOI — not checkedDey, R. M., Robin, A., & Tessoni, D. (2012). Advisory services rise again at large audit firms. The CPA Journal, 82(8), 58–67.
no DOI — not checkedEC. (2004). Communication on preventing and combating corporate and financial malpractice. Bruxelles: European Commission. http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/auditing/index_en.htm .
no DOI — not checkedEC. (2010). Audit policy: Lessons from the crisis, green paper. Bruxelles: European Commission. http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/auditing/index_en.htm .
no DOI — not checkedIFAC. (2010). Handbook of the code of ethics for professional accountants. New York: International Federation of Accountants. www.ifac.org .
no DOI — not checkedLe Vourc’h, J., & Morand, P. (2011). Study on the effects of the implementation of the acquis on statutory audits of annual and consolidated accounts including the consequences on the audit market. Final report, Bruxelles: European Commission. http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/auditing/reform/index_en.htm .
no DOI — not checkedLee, T. (1993). Corporate audit theory. London: Chapman & Hall.
no DOI — not checkedSEC. (2000). Final rule: revision of the commission’s auditor independence requirements. Securities and Exchange Commission 17 CFR Parts 210 and 240. www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-7919.htm .
no DOI — not checkedSloan, R. G. (1996). Do stock prices fully reflect information in accruals and cash flows about future earnings? The Accounting Review, 71(3), 289–315.
no DOI — not checkedWatts, R. L., & Zimmerman, J. L. (1990). Positive accounting theory: A ten year perspective. The Accounting Review, 65(1), 131–156.
What this badge says. CiteStamped means the CHECKABLE references of this work were clean at the dated check: each resolved to a known work in a public registry, and none carried a retraction notice at that time. It says nothing about the quality, findings, or importance of the work itself, and nothing about references deposited without a DOI.

checked 2026-08-03 — re-checked daily as this page is visited; titles and statuses come from Crossref and DataCite and are not part of the signed record

Embed this badge

Both snippets point at the live badge image and link back to this page. The badge re-renders from the daily check, so an embed never goes stale by more than a day of visits.

<a href="https://citestamp.com/citestamped/10.1007/s10997-013-9285-2"><img src="https://citestamp.com/citestamped/10.1007/s10997-013-9285-2/badge.svg" alt="CiteStamped reference-health badge" width="460" height="64"></a>
[![CiteStamped reference-health badge](https://citestamp.com/citestamped/10.1007/s10997-013-9285-2/badge.svg)](https://citestamp.com/citestamped/10.1007/s10997-013-9285-2)