Reference health

Timely shirking: time-dependent monitoring and its effects on legislative behavior in the U.S. Senate

https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-010-9649-y
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63/63 checkable references clean · checked 2026-08-04

Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.

17 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.

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