Reference health
Independent central banks, regime type, and fiscal performance: the case of post-communist countries
51/51 checkable references clean · checked 2026-08-09
Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.
27 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.
The 51 checked references that resolve
resolves10.2307/2082709
Divided Government, Fiscal Institutions, and Budget Deficits: Evidence from the States
resolves10.2202/1935-1690.1417
Fiscal Discipline and the Cost of Public Debt Service: Some Estimates for OECD Countries
resolves10.1016/0304-4076(94)01642-D
Another look at the instrumental variable estimation of error-components models
resolves10.1016/S0304-4076(98)00009-8
Initial conditions and moment restrictions in dynamic panel data models
resolves10.1017/S0020818310000111
Exchange Rate Regimes and Independent Central Banks: A Correlated Choice of Imperfectly Credible Institutions
resolves10.2307/2586015
Mobile Capital, Domestic Institutions, and Electorally Induced Monetary and Fiscal Policy
resolves10.1093/wber/6.3.353
Measuring the Independence of Central Banks and Its Effect on Policy Outcomes
resolves10.1016/S0304-3932(01)00107-6
Central bank reform, liberalization and inflation in transition economies—an international perspective
resolves10.1093/oxfordjournals.oep.a028659
Assessing central bank independence in developing countries: do actions speak louder than words?
resolves10.1177/0010414000033003002
Democracy and Macroeconomic Performance in Underdeveloped Countries
resolves10.1111/j.0092-5853.2004.00088.x
Executive Authority, the Personal Vote, and Budget Discipline in Latin American and Caribbean Countries
resolves10.1007/s11127-008-9301-2
Fiscal institutions, fiscal policy and sovereign risk premia in EMU
resolves10.2307/440340
Bicameralism and Budget Deficits: The Effect of Parliamentary Structure on Government Spending
resolves10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2008.07.003
Is there any link between legal central bank independence and inflation? Evidence from Latin America and the Caribbean
resolves10.1017/S0020818303573040
Democratic Governance and Multinational Corporations: Political Regimes and Inflows of Foreign Direct Investment
resolves10.1162/002081802760403766
Checks and Balances, Private Information, and the Credibility of Monetary Commitments
resolves10.1017/S0020818303571077
Reversal of Fortunes: Democratic Institutions and Foreign Direct Investment Inflows to Developing Countries
resolves10.1016/S0939-3625(01)00033-4
Central bank independence and economic performance in eastern Europe
resolves10.1093/cep/byg025
Budget Deficits and Inflation: The Roles of Central Bank Independence and Financial Market Development
resolves10.1017/S0022050700009451
Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England
resolves10.2307/2937850
Why a Stubborn Conservative would Run a Deficit: Policy with Time- Inconsistent Preferences
resolves10.1093/pan/mpm002
Efficient Estimation of Time-Invariant and Rarely Changing Variables in Finite Sample Panel Analyses with Unit Fixed Effects
resolves10.1093/oxfordjournals.oep.a028658
Budget deficits, monetization, and centralbank independence in developing countries
resolves10.1017/S0003055409990220
When Left Is Right: Party Ideology and Policy in Post-Communist Europe
The 27 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedAlesina, A. (1988). Macroeconomics and politics. In S. Fischer (Ed.), NBER macroeconomic annual. Cambridge: MIT Press.
no DOI — not checkedAlesina, A., & Tabellini, G. (1990). Voting on the budget deficit. American Economic Review, 80, 37–49.
no DOI — not checkedBeck, N., & Katz, J. N. (2004). Time-series-cross-section issues: dynamics. Political Methodology WP. Available at: http://www.nyu.edu/classes/nbeck/q2/beckkatz.pdf . Accessed February 1, 2010
no DOI — not checkedBlinder, A. (1998). Central banking in theory and practice. Cambridge: MIT Press.
no DOI — not checkedBodea, C., & Popova, K. (2004). Central banks and exchange rates: commitments and inflationary performance in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association 62nd Annual National Conference, Chicago, IL.
no DOI — not checkedBrune, N. (2009). Building credibility in global financial markets: financial liberalization and the International Monetary Fund. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association 67th Annual National Conference, Chicago, IL.
no DOI — not checkedCukierman, A. (1998). Central bank strategy, credibility and independence. Cambridge: MIT Press.
no DOI — not checkedDahl, R. A. (1971). Polyarchy. New Haven: Yale University Press.
no DOI — not checkedde Haan, J., & Sturm, J. E. (1992). The case for central bank independence. Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review, 182, 305–327.
no DOI — not checkedDiamond, L. (1999). Developing democracy: toward consolidation. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
no DOI — not checkedEijffinger, S. C. W., & van Keulen, M. (1995). Central bank independence in another eleven countries. Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review, 192, 39–83.
no DOI — not checkedEuropean Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) (2006). Transition report.
no DOI — not checkedFreedom House (2008). Sum of political rights and civil liberty ratings.
no DOI — not checkedFreedom House (20009). Freedom of the press.
no DOI — not checkedGrilli, V., Masciandaro, D., & Tabellini, G. (1991). Political and monetary institutions and public financial policies in the industrial countries. In T. Persson & G. Tabellini (Eds.), Monetary and fiscal policy (Vol. 2). Cambridge: MIT Press.
no DOI — not checkedJácome, L. I., & Vázquez, F. (2005). Any link between legal central bank independence and inflation? Evidence from Latin America and the Caribbean (IMF working paper 05/75). Washington: International Monetary Fund.
no DOI — not checkedJonsson, G. (1995). Institutions and macroeconomic outcomes—the empirical evidence. Swedish Economic Policy Review, 2, 181–212.
no DOI — not checkedLohmann, S. (1992). Optimal commitment in monetary policy: credibility versus flexibility. American Economic Review, 82, 273–286.
no DOI — not checkedMarshall, M. G., & Jaggers, K. (2002). Polity IV data set users’ manual.
no DOI — not checkedPopova, K. (2000). Independent central banks versus currency boards: credible commitments and inflationary performance (Unpublished manuscript). University of Rochester.
no DOI — not checkedRoodman, D. (2007). How to do xtabond2: an introduction to “difference” and “system” GMM in Stata”. Center for Global Development WP 103. Available at: http://www.cgdev.org/content/publications/detail/11619 .
no DOI — not checkedShi, M., & Svensson, J. (2002). Political business cycles in developed and developing countries (WP IIES). Stockholm University.
no DOI — not checkedSinger, D., & Mukherjee, B. (2008). Monetary institutions, partisanship, and inflation targeting. International Organization, 62, 323–358.
no DOI — not checkedThe World Bank (2002). World development indicators.
no DOI — not checkedVon Hagen, J. (2002). Budgetary institutions for sustainable public finances. In M. Buti, J. Von Hagen & C. Martinez-Mongay (Eds.), The behavior of fiscal authorities. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
no DOI — not checkedVon Hagen, J., Hughes Hallet, A., & Strauch, R. (2002). Quality and success of budgetary consolidations. In M. Buti, J. Von Hagen & C. Martinez-Mongay (Eds.), The behavior of fiscal authorities. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
no DOI — not checkedWooldridge, J. (2002). Econometric analysis of cross section and panel data. Cambridge: MIT Press.
What this badge says. CiteStamped means the CHECKABLE references of this
work were clean at the dated check: each resolved to a known work in a public registry, and none
carried a retraction notice at that time. It says nothing about the quality, findings,
or importance of the work itself, and nothing about references deposited without a DOI.
checked 2026-08-09 — re-checked daily as this page is visited; titles and statuses come from Crossref and DataCite and are not part of the signed record
Embed this badge
Both snippets point at the live badge image and link back to this page. The badge re-renders from the daily check, so an embed never goes stale by more than a day of visits.
<a href="https://citestamp.com/citestamped/10.1007/s11127-011-9843-6"><img src="https://citestamp.com/citestamped/10.1007/s11127-011-9843-6/badge.svg" alt="CiteStamped reference-health badge" width="460" height="64"></a>
[](https://citestamp.com/citestamped/10.1007/s11127-011-9843-6)