Reference health
Intergovernmental fiscal transfers as pork barrel
34/34 checkable references clean · checked 2026-08-09
Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.
5 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.
The 34 checked references that resolve
resolves10.1007/s11127-010-9644-3
Election results and opportunistic policies: A new test of the rational political business cycle model
resolves10.1111/j.1467-9442.2006.00470.x
Party Control of State Government and the Distribution of Public Expenditures*
resolves10.1023/A:1004958402161
Opinion polls and political business cycles: Theory and evidence for the United States
resolves10.1016/S0014-2921(00)00078-7
Election goals and income redistribution: Recent evidence from Albania
resolves10.2307/2110818
Some Problems in Studying the Effects of Resource Allocation in Congressional Elections
resolves10.1016/S0014-4983(03)00029-9
Can the New Deal’s three Rs be rehabilitated? A program-by-program, county-by-county analysis
resolves10.1016/S0047-2727(01)00148-7
Intergovernmental grants as a tactical instrument: empirical evidence from Swedish municipalities
resolves10.1007/s11127-006-7730-3
Government's response to Hurricane Katrina: A public choice analysis
resolves10.1016/j.jpubeco.2007.06.014
The effects of partisan alignment on the allocation of intergovernmental transfers. Differences-in-differences estimates for Spain
resolves10.1007/s11127-007-9208-3
The political economy of intergovernmental grants: Evidence from a maturing democracy
resolves10.1006/exeh.1998.0695
The Political Economy of New Deal Spending Revisited, Again: With and without Nevada
resolves10.1016/j.jue.2008.12.005
Second generation fiscal federalism: The implications of fiscal incentives
The 5 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedBoadway, R., & Shah, A. (2006). Intergovernmental fiscal transfers. Washington: World Bank.
no DOI — not checkedDowns, A. (1957). An economic theory of democracy. New York: Harper Collins.
no DOI — not checkedPaldam, M. (2004). Are vote and popularity functions economically correct? In C. K. Rowley & F. Schneider (Eds.), The encyclopedia of Public Choice (pp. 49–59). Netherlands: Kluwer Academic.
no DOI — not checkedSilva Costa, J. (2008). Local governments in Portugal. Urban Public Economics Review, 9, 55–74.
no DOI — not checkedStigler, G. J. (1973). General economic conditions and national elections. American Economic Review, 63(2), 160–167.
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