Reference health
Seeing the forest through the trees: a meta-analysis of political budget cycles
2 of 54 checkable references need attention · checked 2026-08-09
At the dated check, the references listed below either did not resolve in Crossref or DataCite, or carried a retraction notice. Each one is shown with the registry record that put it there.
7 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.
References needing attention
does not resolve to a known work10.1017/S0003055400269712
does not resolve to a known work10.31389/eco.115
The 52 checked references that resolve
resolves10.1002/job.719
Best‐practice recommendations for estimating interaction effects using meta‐analysis
resolves10.1016/j.jpubeco.2014.01.003
Voting suffrage and the political budget cycle: Evidence from the London Metropolitan Boroughs 1902–1937
resolves10.1007/s11127-010-9644-3
Election results and opportunistic policies: A new test of the rational political business cycle model
resolves10.1016/j.euroecorev.2005.04.001
Fiscal transparency, political parties, and debt in OECD countries
resolves10.1111/j.1540-5907.2006.00200.x
Transparency, Political Polarization, and Political Budget Cycles in OECD Countries
resolves10.1017/S0022381608081073
Electoral Incentives and Budgetary Spending: Rethinking the Role of Political Institutions
resolves10.1016/j.jdeveco.2009.01.001
Electoral manipulation via voter-friendly spending: Theory and evidence
resolves10.1016/j.econlet.2013.07.015
Political expenditure cycles and election outcomes: Evidence from disaggregation of public expenditures by economic functions
resolves10.1146/annurev.polisci.5.112801.080924
E<scp>LECTORAL AND</scp>P<scp>ARTISAN</scp>C<scp>YCLES IN</scp>E<scp>CONOMIC</scp>P<scp>OLICIES AND</scp>O<scp>UTCOMES</scp>
resolves10.1017/S0022381610000101
International Scrutiny and Pre-Electoral Fiscal Manipulation in Developing Countries
resolves10.1016/j.worlddev.2012.07.001
Determinants of Horizontal Spillovers from FDI: Evidence from a Large Meta-Analysis
resolves10.1111/1467-856X.00062
Political Manipulation in a Majoritarian Democracy: Central Government Targeting of Public Funds to English Subnational Government, in Space and across Time
resolves10.1007/s11127-010-9749-8
Do elections affect the composition of fiscal policy in developed, established democracies?
resolves10.1016/j.jdeveco.2003.01.002
Political cycles in a developing economy: effect of elections in the Indian States
resolves10.1093/ajae/aat007
Conditional Election and Partisan Cycles in Government Support to the Agricultural Sector: An Empirical Analysis
resolves10.1023/A:1012895211073
Electoral and Partisan Cycles in Fiscal Policy: An Examination of Canadian Provinces
resolves10.1111/j.1468-2508.2007.00618.x
The Effects of Negative Political Campaigns: A Meta-Analytic Reassessment
resolves10.1002/jae.1057
On the effect of prior assumptions in Bayesian model averaging with applications to growth regression
resolves10.1111/1467-9361.00150
Do Changes in Democracy Affect the Political Budget Cycle? Evidence from Mexico
resolves10.1007/s10640-008-9205-0
Meta-Functional Benefit Transfer for Wetland Valuation: Making the Most of Small Samples
resolves10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2012.01.003
The drivers of interregional policy choices: Evidence from Italy
resolves10.1017/S0007123409990226
Political Cycles, Political Institutions and Public Expenditure in India, 1980–2000
resolves10.1007/s11127-010-9654-1
Opportunistic and partisan election cycles in Brazil: new evidence at the municipal level
resolves10.1037/1082-989X.13.1.31
Confidence intervals for the overall effect size in random-effects meta-analysis.
resolves10.1016/j.jpubeco.2005.09.009
Political budget cycles: Do they differ across countries and why?
resolves10.1016/j.electstud.2012.12.006
The embarrassment of riches? A meta-analysis of individual-level research on voter turnout
resolves10.1111/j.1467-6435.2009.00444.x
Checks and Balances on Political Budget Cycles: Cross‐Country Evidence
resolves10.1007/s11127-012-9923-2
Making rules credible: divided government and political budget cycles
resolves10.1007/s11127-011-9786-y
Determinants of the assignment of EU funds to Portuguese municipalities
resolves10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2008.09.003
Democracy, elections and allocation of public expenditures in developing countries
The 7 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedAlt, J. E., & Rose, S. (2009). Context-conditional political budget cycles. In C. Boix & S. C. Stokes (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of comparative politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
no DOI — not checkedBorenstein, M., Hedges, L. V., Higgins, J. P., & Rothstein, H. R. (2011). Introduction to meta-analysis. Chichester: Wiley.
no DOI — not checkedFranzese, R. J. J. (2000). Electoral and partisan manipulation of public debt in developed democracies, 1956–1990. In R. Strauch & J. V. Hagen (Eds.), Institutions (pp. 61–83). Dordrecht: Politics and Fiscal Policy, Kluwer Academic Press.
no DOI — not checkedImbeau, L. M., Pétry, F., & Lamari, M. (2001). Left-right party ideology and government policies: A meta-analysis. European Journal of Political Research, 40(1), 1–29.
no DOI — not checkedPersson, T., & Tabellini, G. E. (1990). Macroeconomic policy, credibility and politics (Vol. 38). London: Taylor & Francis.
no DOI — not checkedPersson, T., & Tabellini, G. E. (2005). The economic effects of constitutions. MIT press: Cambridge, MA.
no DOI — not checkedRogoff, K. S. (1990). Equilibrium political budget cycles. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research Cambridge.
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