Reference health
Consumer deliberation and quality signaling
24/24 checkable references clean · checked 2026-07-26
Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.
8 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.
The 24 checked references that resolve
resolves10.1287/mnsc.41.10.1608
Demand Signalling Under Unobservable Effort in Franchising: Linear and Nonlinear Price Contracts
resolves10.1287/mksc.1090.0486
Information Provision in a Vertically Differentiated Competitive Marketplace
resolves10.1287/mksc.14.4.442
Signaling Quality with a Money-Back Guarantee: The Role of Transaction Costs
resolves10.2307/2555667
Umbrella Branding as a Signal of New Product Quality: An Example of Signalling by Posting a Bond
The 8 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedBagwell, K., & Riordan, M. H. (1991). High and declining prices signal product quality. The American Economic Review, 81(1), 224–239.
no DOI — not checkedFudenberg, D., & Tirole, J. (1991). Game theory. Massachusetts: Cambridge.
no DOI — not checkedGuo, L. (2016). Contextual deliberation and procedure-dependent preference reversals. Working Paper, Chinese University of Hong Kong.
no DOI — not checkedGuo, L., & Hong, L. J. (2016). Rational anchoring in economic valuations. Working Paper, Chinese University of Hong Kong.
no DOI — not checkedKe, T. T., Shen, Z.-J. M, & Villas-Boas, J. M. (2015). Search for information on multiple products. Forthcoming, Management Science.
no DOI — not checkedKuksov, D., & Lin, Y.F. (2015). Signaling low margin through assortment. Forthcoming, Management Science.
no DOI — not checkedSchmalensee, R. (1982). Product differentiation advantages of pioneering brands. The American Economic Review, 72(3), 349–365.
no DOI — not checkedTirole, J. (1988). The theory of industrial organization. Massachusetts: Cambridge.
What this badge says. CiteStamped means the CHECKABLE references of this
work were clean at the dated check: each resolved to a known work in a public registry, and none
carried a retraction notice at that time. It says nothing about the quality, findings,
or importance of the work itself, and nothing about references deposited without a DOI.
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