Reference health

Non-discriminating renegotiation in a competitive insurance market

https://doi.org/10.1016/0014-2921(95)00049-6
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12/12 checkable references clean · checked 2026-07-26

Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.

7 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.

The 12 checked references that resolve
resolves10.2307/135433
Organizations in Economic Analysis
resolves10.2307/2297589
The Existence of Equilibrium in Discontinuous Economic Games, II: Applications
resolves10.1086/261929
Adverse Selection, Commitment, and Renegotiation: Extension to and Evidence from Insurance Markets
resolves10.2307/3003335
Adverse Selection, Dissembling, and Competitive Equilibrium
resolves10.2307/1912117
Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information
resolves10.1006/jeth.1995.1034
Coalition Proof Equilibrium in an Adverse Selection Insurance Economy
resolves10.1007/BF01212918
A coalition proof equilibrium for a private information credit economy
resolves10.2307/3003294
The Rat Race and Internal Labor Markets
resolves10.3386/w4357
Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Screening Device
resolves10.2307/1885326
Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information
resolves10.1016/0047-2727(78)90055-5
Product differentiation and performance in insurance markets
resolves10.2307/2296899
Monopoly, Non-Linear Pricing and Imperfect Information: The Insurance Market
The 7 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedInsurance monopoly and renegotiation
no DOI — not checkedEquilibrium in insurance markets with asymmetric information and adverse selection
no DOI — not checkedPerfectly contestable monopoly and adverse selection
no DOI — not checkedContributions to the theory of market screening
no DOI — not checkedThe coalition-proof core in adverse selection economies
no DOI — not checkedOpportunism in multilateral vertical contracting: Nondiscrimination, exclusivity, and uniformity
no DOI — not checkedThe core of private information economies
What this badge says. CiteStamped means the CHECKABLE references of this work were clean at the dated check: each resolved to a known work in a public registry, and none carried a retraction notice at that time. It says nothing about the quality, findings, or importance of the work itself, and nothing about references deposited without a DOI.

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