Reference health

Judicial decisionmaking and litigation expenditure

https://doi.org/10.1016/0144-8188(88)90001-4
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22/22 checkable references clean · checked 2026-07-26

Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.

5 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.

The 22 checked references that resolve
resolves10.2307/2555448
Litigation and Settlement under Imperfect Information
resolves10.2307/1191439
An Economic Analysis of Alternative Fee Shifting Systems
resolves10.1086/261312
Multimarket Oligopoly: Strategic Substitutes and Complements
resolves10.1086/467632
Can Litigation Improve the Law without the Help of Judges?
resolves10.1086/467699
Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: A Testable Model of Strategic Behavior
resolves10.2307/3053023
Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change
resolves10.1086/467600
An Economic Theory of the Evolution of Common Law
resolves10.1086/467499
The Economics of Legal Conflicts
resolves10.1086/466704
An Economic Analysis of the Courts
resolves10.1086/466868
Legal Precedent: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis
resolves10.1086/467713
A Note on Private versus Social Incentives to Sue in a Costly Legal System
resolves10.2307/3003655
Strategic Behavior in Suit, Settlement, and Trial
resolves10.1086/467503
An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration
resolves10.1086/467563
The Common Law Process and the Selection of Efficient Rules
resolves10.1086/467771
Reexamining the Selection Hypothesis: Learning from Wittman's Mistakes
resolves10.1086/467732
The Selection of Disputes for Litigation
resolves10.2307/2555481
Settlement, Litigation, and the Allocation of Litigation Costs
resolves10.1086/467562
Why Is the Common Law Efficient?
resolves10.2307/2555555
Efficient Awards and Standards of Proof in Judicial Proceedings
resolves10.1086/467692
Suit, Settlement, and Trial: A Theoretical Analysis under Alternative Methods for the Allocation of Legal Costs
resolves10.1086/467704
The Social versus the Private Incentive to Bring Suit in a Costly Legal System
resolves10.1086/467770
Is the Selection of Cases for Trial Biased?
The 5 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checked10.1016/0144-8188(88)90001-4_BIB1
no DOI — not checkedThe Fat-Cat Effect, the Puppy-Dog Ployand the Lean and Hungry Look
no DOI — not checkedEssays in the Economics of Litigation
no DOI — not checked10.1016/0144-8188(88)90001-4_BIB17
no DOI — not checkedSettlements in Private Antitrust Litigation
What this badge says. CiteStamped means the CHECKABLE references of this work were clean at the dated check: each resolved to a known work in a public registry, and none carried a retraction notice at that time. It says nothing about the quality, findings, or importance of the work itself, and nothing about references deposited without a DOI.

checked 2026-07-26 — re-checked daily as this page is visited; titles and statuses come from Crossref and DataCite and are not part of the signed record

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