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Corporate restructuring in a collusive oligopoly

https://doi.org/10.1016/0167-7187(94)00458-e
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11/11 checkable references clean · checked 2026-08-09

Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.

13 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.

The 11 checked references that resolve
resolves10.1016/0022-0531(86)90025-6
Extremal equilibria of oligopolistic supergames
resolves10.1016/S0014-2921(87)80011-9
A price-setting supergame between two heterogeneous firms
resolves10.2307/2297742
When Are Nash Equilibria Independent of the Distribution of Agents' Characteristics?
resolves10.1016/0167-7187(84)90026-2
Horizontal mergers and collusive behavior
resolves10.2307/2555507
Incentives to Form Coalitions with Bertrand Competition
resolves10.2307/2555424
Asset Ownership and Market Structure in Oligopoly
resolves10.2307/2296617
A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames
resolves10.2307/2527033
The Determination of Price and Output Quotas in a Heterogeneous Cartel
resolves10.2307/1885620
Losses from Horizontal Merger: The Effects of an Exogenous Change in Industry Structure on Cournot-Nash Equilibrium
resolves10.1177/0003603X8402900403
A practical guide to merger analysis
resolves10.1086/258853
A Theory of Oligopoly
The 13 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedThe effects of product differentiation on collusive pricing
no DOI — not checkedBeneficial concentration
no DOI — not checked10.1016/0167-7187(94)00458-E_BIB8
no DOI — not checkedHorizontal mergers: An equilibrium analysis
no DOI — not checkedIncreasing profits of a subset of firms in oligopoly models with strategic substitutes
no DOI — not checkedHorizontal mergers: Law, policy, and economics
no DOI — not checkedHorizontal mergers: The 50-percent benchmark
no DOI — not checkedOligopoly and the incentive for horizontal merger
no DOI — not checkedCompetitive advantage and collusive optima
no DOI — not checked10.1016/0167-7187(94)00458-E_BIB21
no DOI — not checkedCollusive equilibrium with heterogeneous firms
no DOI — not checkedHorizontal mergers: Comment
no DOI — not checkedEconomies as an antitrust defense: The welfare tradeoffs
What this badge says. CiteStamped means the CHECKABLE references of this work were clean at the dated check: each resolved to a known work in a public registry, and none carried a retraction notice at that time. It says nothing about the quality, findings, or importance of the work itself, and nothing about references deposited without a DOI.

checked 2026-08-09 — re-checked daily as this page is visited; titles and statuses come from Crossref and DataCite and are not part of the signed record

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