Reference health

Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have

https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405x(84)90023-0
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1 of 17 checkable references need attention · checked 2026-08-03

At the dated check, the references listed below either did not resolve in Crossref or DataCite, or carried a retraction notice. Each one is shown with the registry record that put it there.

8 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.

References needing attention

does not resolve to a known work10.2307/2327113
The 16 checked references that resolve
resolves10.2307/1879431
The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism
resolves10.2307/3003330
Imperfect Information, Dividend Policy, and "The Bird in the Hand" Fallacy
resolves10.2307/2297419
Innovation and Communication: Signalling with Partial Disclosure
resolves10.2307/2330297
Optimal Investment Financing Decisions and the Value of Confidentiality
resolves10.2307/2327206
Information Production, Market Signalling, and the Theory of Financial Intermediation
resolves10.1016/0304-405X(84)90022-9
Convertible debt issuance, capital structure change and financing-related information
resolves10.1016/0304-405X(76)90020-9
The option pricing model and the risk factor of stock
resolves10.2307/2297195
An Introduction to the Theory of Rational Expectations Under Asymmetric Information
resolves10.2307/2327007
The Allocational Role of Takeover Bids in Situations of Asymmetric Information
resolves10.2307/2327114
Tests for Price Effects of New Issues of Seasoned Securities
resolves10.1016/0304-405X(76)90026-X
Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure
resolves10.2307/2326770
Informational Asymmetries, Financial Structure, and Financial Intermediation
resolves10.1016/0304-405X(77)90015-0
Determinants of corporate borrowing
resolves10.2307/2326473
Some Notes on Financial Incentive-Signalling Models, Activity Choice and Risk Preferences
resolves10.2307/3003485
The Determination of Financial Structure: The Incentive-Signalling Approach
resolves10.1016/0304-405X(79)90011-4
On financial contracting
The 8 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checked10.1016/0304-405X(84)90023-0_BIB2
no DOI — not checkedThe failure of financial contracts and the relevance of financial policy
no DOI — not checked10.1016/0304-405X(84)90023-0_BIB15
no DOI — not checked10.1016/0304-405X(84)90023-0_BIB17
no DOI — not checked10.1016/0304-405X(84)90023-0_BIB18
no DOI — not checked10.1016/0304-405X(84)90023-0_BIB20
no DOI — not checked10.1016/0304-405X(84)90023-0_BIB21
no DOI — not checkedCredit rationing in markets with imperfect information, Part I
What this badge says. CiteStamped means the CHECKABLE references of this work were clean at the dated check: each resolved to a known work in a public registry, and none carried a retraction notice at that time. It says nothing about the quality, findings, or importance of the work itself, and nothing about references deposited without a DOI.

checked 2026-08-03 — re-checked daily as this page is visited; titles and statuses come from Crossref and DataCite and are not part of the signed record

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