Reference health

Corporate Takeovers**Surveying the vast area of corporate takeovers is a daunting task, and we have undoubtedly missed many interesting contributions. We apologize to those who feel their research has been left out or improperly characterized, and welcome reactions and comments. Some of the material in Section 3 is also found in Eckbo (2008).

https://doi.org/10.1016/b978-0-444-53265-7.50007-x
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An Empirical Test of the Redistribution Effect in Pure Exchange Mergers
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Takeover Bids, The Free-Rider Problem, and the Theory of the Corporation
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Corporate Cash Reserves and Acquisitions
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Decoupling CEO Wealth and Firm Performance: The Case of Acquiring CEOs
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What's In It for Me? CEOs Whose Firms Are Acquired
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On the Use of Poison Pills and Defensive Payouts by Takeover Targets*
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CORPORATE BANKRUPTCY AND CONGLOMERATE MERGER
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Share Tendering Strategies and the Success of Hostile Takeover Bids
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T<scp>o</scp> T<scp>he</scp> R<scp>aider</scp> G<scp>oes</scp> T<scp>he</scp> S<scp>urplus</scp>? A R<scp>eexamination</scp><scp>of</scp> t<scp>he</scp> F<scp>ree</scp>‐R<scp>ider</scp> P<scp>roblem</scp>
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The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems
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Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure
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Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives
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The market for corporate control
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Speculation spreads and the market pricing of proposed acquisitions
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Glamour, value, and the form of takeover
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Corporate Ownership Around the World
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Asset Efficiency and Reallocation Decisions of Bankrupt Firms
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Poison pill securities
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Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control
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Wealth creation versus wealth redistributions in pure stock-for-stock mergers1We are grateful to Tom Arnold, Sanjai Bhagat, James Bicksler, David Blackwell, Ekkehart Boehmer, Ted Bos, Robert Brokaw, Bill Carleton, Bob Comment, Chris Cornwell, Mary Dehner, Bob Eisenbeis, Jimmy Hilliard, Randy Howard, Steve Jones, Ed Kane, Josef Lakonishok, Larry Lang, Bill Lewellen, Marc Lipson, Paul Malatesta, Jeff Netter, Cathy Niden, Volker Pollmann, Annette Poulsen, Jay Ritter, Richard Ruback, Louis Scott, Joe Sinkey, Bill Schwert (the editor), Ralph Walkling (the referee), Ron Warren, J. Fred Weston, Karen Wruck, and seminar participants at the University of Arizona, the University of Delaware, the University of Illinois, the University of Georgia, the University of Miami, Seattle University, the 1995 European Finance Association, the 1996 Financial Management Association, and the 1996 American Finance Association meetings for their helpful comments and recommendations. We also gratefully acknowledge the financial support provided for this project by the University of Georgia Research Foundation. Finally, Steve Henry, Rick McKinney, David Quillian, and Ryan Vaughn provided vital assistance with data collection and assisted with data input.1
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Corporate Performance, Corporate Takeovers, and Management Turnover
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Corporate Governance and Acquirer Returns
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Takeover Motives during the Conglomerate Merger Wave
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Can event studies detect anticompetitive mergers?
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Board Monitoring and Antitakeover Amendments
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An Empirical Analysis of Illegal Insider Trading
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The decline of takeovers and disciplinary managerial turnover
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Managers' voting rights and corporate control
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Targeted Repurchases and Common Stock Returns
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An empirical analysis of the interfirm equity investment process
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Do Bad Bidders Become Good Targets?
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How Do Diversity of Opinion and Information Asymmetry Affect Acquirer Returns?
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Wealth Destruction on a Massive Scale? A Study of Acquiring‐Firm Returns in the Recent Merger Wave
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Firm size and the gains from acquisitions
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Let's make a deal! How shareholder control impacts merger payoffs
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The dynamics of mergers and acquisitions
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Comparing acquisitions and divestitures
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Chapter 38 Executive compensation
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The Capital Structure Puzzle
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Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have
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Determinants of contractual relations between shareholders and bondholders: investment opportunities and restrictive covenants
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The rise in takeover premiums
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Collars and Renegotiation in Mergers and Acquisitions
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Termination fees in mergers and acquisitions
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Predicting takeover targets
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Gains in bank mergers: Evidence from the bond markets
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The Federal Trade Commission
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Do Substantial Horizontal Mergers Generate Significant Price Effects? Evidence From The Banking Industry
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Glamour, value and the post-acquisition performance of acquiring firms
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The Market for Mergers and the Boundaries of the Firm
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Market Valuation and Merger Waves
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Investment Banking and Securities Issuance
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The effect of poison pill securities on shareholder wealth
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Evidence on the capitalized value of merger activity for acquiring firms
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Financing decisions and bidder gains
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Patterns of abnormal returns and the competitive effects of horizontal mergers
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Hostility in Takeovers: In the Eyes of the Beholder?
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Tobin's Q and the Gains from Takeovers
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Board composition, ownership structure, and hostile takeovers
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Stock market driven acquisitions
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The Limits of Arbitrage
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Liquidation Values and Debt Capacity: A Market Equilibrium Approach
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Takeovers in the '60s and the '80s: Evidence and implications
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Management entrenchment
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Large Shareholders and Corporate Control
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Greenmail, White Knights, and Shareholders' Interest
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Airline Mergers and Competition: An Integration of Stock and Product Price Effects
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Deregulation, contestability, and airline acquisitions
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The Combined Effects of Free Cash Flow and Financial Slack on Bidder and Target Stock Returns
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