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Private costs and public benefits: unraveling the effects of altruism and noisy behavior

https://doi.org/10.1016/s0047-2727(00)00160-2
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6/6 checkable references clean · checked 2026-08-03

Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.

11 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.

The 6 checked references that resolve
resolves10.1016/S0047-2727(98)00035-8
A theoretical analysis of altruism and decision error in public goods games
resolves10.1257/aer.90.1.166
ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition
resolves10.1162/003355399556151
A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
resolves10.1016/0167-2681(94)00073-N
Anonymity and the voluntary provision of public goods
resolves10.1006/game.1995.1023
Quantal Response Equilibria for Normal Form Games
resolves10.1016/S0176-2680(97)00044-X
Quantal response models in step-level public good games
The 11 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedCooperation in public goods: kindness or confusion?
no DOI — not checked10.1016/S0047-2727(00)00160-2_BIB4
no DOI — not checkedAndreoni, J., Vesterlund, L., 1999. Which is the fair sex? Gender differences in altruism, Quarterly Journal of Economics, forthcoming.
no DOI — not checked10.1016/S0047-2727(00)00160-2_BIB7
no DOI — not checked10.1016/S0047-2727(00)00160-2_BIB8
no DOI — not checkedChewning, E.G., Coller, M., Laury, S.K., 2000. Voluntary contributions to a multiple threshold public good. In: Isaac, R.M. (Ed.), Research in Experimental Economics (in press)
no DOI — not checked10.1016/S0047-2727(00)00160-2_BIB11
no DOI — not checkedTheoretical explanations of treatment effects in voluntary contributions games
no DOI — not checkedPublic goods: a survey of experimental research
no DOI — not checkedAnomalous behavior in linear public goods experiments: how much and why?
no DOI — not checked10.1016/S0047-2727(00)00160-2_BIB20
What this badge says. CiteStamped means the CHECKABLE references of this work were clean at the dated check: each resolved to a known work in a public registry, and none carried a retraction notice at that time. It says nothing about the quality, findings, or importance of the work itself, and nothing about references deposited without a DOI.

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