Reference health

The choice among bank debt, non-bank private debt, and public debt: evidence from new corporate borrowings

https://doi.org/10.1016/s0304-405x(03)00140-5
CiteStamped reference-health badge
5 of 34 checkable references need attention · checked 2026-08-03

At the dated check, the references listed below either did not resolve in Crossref or DataCite, or carried a retraction notice. Each one is shown with the registry record that put it there.

7 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.

References needing attention

does not resolve to a known work10.2307/2329421
does not resolve to a known work10.2307/2329441
does not resolve to a known work10.2307/2328467
does not resolve to a known work10.2307/2329541
does not resolve to a known work10.1093/rfs/16.1.209
The 29 checked references that resolve
resolves10.1016/0304-405X(88)90071-2
An investigation of cost differences between public sales and private placements of debt
resolves10.2307/2327206
Information Production, Market Signalling, and the Theory of Financial Intermediation
resolves10.1093/rfs/13.1.155
How Do Firms Choose Their Lenders? An Empirical Investigation
resolves10.1111/0022-1082.00037
Does Corporate Lending by Banks and Finance Companies Differ? Evidence on Specialization in Private Debt Contracting
resolves10.1093/rfs/7.3.475
Reputation, Renegotiation, and the Choice between Bank Loans and Publicly Traded Debt
resolves10.2307/2297430
Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring
resolves10.1086/261775
Monitoring and Reputation: The Choice between Bank Loans and Directly Placed Debt
resolves10.1016/0304-3932(85)90051-0
What's different about banks?
resolves10.1016/S0304-405X(00)00045-3
Speed of issuance and the adequacy of disclosure in the 144A high-yield debt market
resolves10.2307/2328856
A Theory of Workouts and the Effects of Reorganization Law
resolves10.2139/ssrn.47269
Junk Bonds, Bank Debt, and Financing Corporate Growth
resolves10.1016/0304-405X(90)90059-9
Troubled debt restructurings
resolves10.1016/S0304-405X(01)00044-7
The theory and practice of corporate finance: evidence from the field
resolves10.2307/2329539
The Determinants of the Maturity of Corporate Debt Issues
resolves10.1111/1540-6261.00464
Do Banks Provide Financial Slack?
resolves10.2307/2676195
The Debt-Equity Choice
resolves10.1016/0304-405X(87)90003-1
Some evidence on the uniqueness of bank loans
resolves10.1111/j.1745-6622.2000.tb00041.x
Are Banks Still Special? New Evidence on Their Role in the Corporate Capital‐Raising Process
resolves10.2307/2331316
An Empirical Analysis of the Determinants of Corporate Debt Ownership Structure
resolves10.1016/0304-405X(96)00881-1
Timing, investment opportunities, managerial discretion, and the security issue decision
resolves10.1016/S0304-405X(98)00059-2
Information asymmetry, monitoring, and the placement structure of corporate debt1We thank David Brown, Mark Carey, Stephane Chretien, Michael Cliff, Hemang Desai, Bob Dittmar, Charles Hadlock, Paisan Limratanamongkol, Karl Lins, Vojislav Maksimovic, Beverly Marshall, David Mauer, Erlend Nier, Russ Robins, Vic Sarna, Richard Shockley, Anjan Thakor, Joaquin Trigueros, Robert Weigand, Marc Zenner, and seminar participants at Texas A&M, Tulane, the 1996 FMA meetings, the 1997 WFA meetings, and the 1998 EFMA meetings for helpful comments. We are especially grateful to David Blackwell (the referee), and Clifford Smith (the editor) for suggestions that have improved the paper substantially.1
resolves10.2307/2326770
Informational Asymmetries, Financial Structure, and Financial Intermediation
resolves10.1016/0304-405X(89)90098-6
Further evidence on the bank lending process and the capital-market response to bank loan agreements
resolves10.1016/0304-405X(86)90049-8
Valuation effects of security offerings and the issuance process
resolves10.2307/2327916
The Capital Structure Puzzle
resolves10.2307/2328944
Insiders and Outsiders: The Choice between Informed and Arm's-Length Debt
resolves10.2307/2329346
Covenants and Collateral as Incentives to Monitor
resolves10.1016/0304-405X(90)90011-N
Managerial discretion and optimal financing policies
resolves10.1093/rfs/10.4.1203
Why Is Bank Debt Senior? A Theory of Asymmetry and Claim Priority Based on Influence Costs
The 7 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checked10.1016/S0304-405X(03)00140-5_BIB1
no DOI — not checkedBoard of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 2000. Flow of Funds Accounts of the United States. Washington, DC.
no DOI — not checkedFinancial intermediary-coalitions
no DOI — not checkedThe economics of the private placement markets
no DOI — not checkedKwan, S.H., Carleton, W.T., 1995. The role of private placement debt issues in corporate finance. Working paper, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
no DOI — not checkedDeterminants of corporate borrowing
no DOI — not checkedDynamic capital structure under managerial entrenchment
What this badge says. CiteStamped means the CHECKABLE references of this work were clean at the dated check: each resolved to a known work in a public registry, and none carried a retraction notice at that time. It says nothing about the quality, findings, or importance of the work itself, and nothing about references deposited without a DOI.

checked 2026-08-03 — re-checked daily as this page is visited; titles and statuses come from Crossref and DataCite and are not part of the signed record

Embed this badge

Both snippets point at the live badge image and link back to this page. The badge re-renders from the daily check, so an embed never goes stale by more than a day of visits.

<a href="https://citestamp.com/citestamped/10.1016/s0304-405x(03)00140-5"><img src="https://citestamp.com/citestamped/10.1016/s0304-405x(03)00140-5/badge.svg" alt="CiteStamped reference-health badge" width="460" height="64"></a>
[![CiteStamped reference-health badge](https://citestamp.com/citestamped/10.1016/s0304-405x(03)00140-5/badge.svg)](https://citestamp.com/citestamped/10.1016/s0304-405x(03)00140-5)