Reference health
CEO turnover in insider-dominated boards: The Italian case
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1 of 24 checkable references need attention · checked 2026-07-25
At the dated check, the references listed below either did not resolve in Crossref or DataCite, or carried a retraction notice. Each one is shown with the registry record that put it there.
15 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.
References needing attention
does not resolve to a known work10.2307/2329497
The 23 checked references that resolve
resolves10.3386/w6951
Stock Pyramids, Cross-Ownership, and the Dual Class Equity: The Creation and Agency Costs of Seperating Control from Cash Flow Rights
resolves10.1016/0165-4101(85)90027-8
Executive compensation, management turnover, and firm performance
resolves10.1016/0304-405X(94)00807-D
Firm performance, corporate governance, and top executive turnover in Japan
resolves10.1086/261944
Top Executive Rewards and Firm Performance: A Comparison of Japan and the United States
resolves10.1016/S0378-4266(99)00128-4
Ownership, managerial control and the governance of companies listed on the Brussels stock exchange
resolves10.1016/S0304-405X(02)00071-5
Governance with poor investor protection: evidence from top executive turnover in Italy
resolves10.1093/rfs/7.1.125
The Value of the Voting Right: A Study of the Milan Stock Exchange Experience
The 15 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedBanca d’Italia, 1998. Relazione Annuale, Rome
no DOI — not checkedBarca, F., 1996. On corporate governance in Italy: Issues, facts and agenda. Fondazione E.N.I. Enrico Mattei, working paper no. 10-96
no DOI — not checkedBianchi, M., Enriques, L., 1999. Has the 1998 reform of Italian listed company law fostered institutional investor activism? Mimeo., CONSOB, Rome
no DOI — not checkedBianco, M., Gola, C., Signorini, L.F., 1996. Dealing with separation between ownership and control: State, family, coalitions and pyramidal groups in Italian corporate governance. Fondazione Mattei, working paper no. 5-96
no DOI — not checkedInterlocking directorates across listed companies in Italy: The case of banks
no DOI — not checked10.1016/S0378-4266(02)00244-3_BIB9
no DOI — not checkedCalepino dell’Azionista, 1987–1997. Mediobanca S.p.A., Milan
no DOI — not checkedCONSOB, 2001. Annual Report, Rome
no DOI — not checkedII Governo dell’Impresa: II Ruolo dei C.d.A. nelle aziende Italiane
no DOI — not checked10.1016/S0378-4266(02)00244-3_BIB20
no DOI — not checkedFinancial systems and corporate governance: A review of the international evidence
no DOI — not checkedR&S, 1994. Mediobanca S.p.A., Milan
no DOI — not checkedSole 24 Ore (II), 1987–1998. Rome
no DOI — not checkedStanghellini, L., 1999. Family and government-owned firms in Italy. Columbia Law School Project on Corporate Governance, Mimeo., June
no DOI — not checkedTaccuino dell’Azionista, 1987–1997. Edizioni Sole 24 Ore, Milan
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