Reference health
Learning to be imperfect: The ultimatum game
80017-x/badge.svg){kind=icon}
17/17 checkable references clean · checked 2026-08-02
Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.
27 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.
The 17 checked references that resolve
resolves10.1016/0899-8256(91)90004-X
An “evolutionary” interpretation of Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil's experimental results on coordination
resolves10.2307/2118366
Considerations of Fairness and Strategy: Experimental Data from Sequential Games
resolves10.1007/BF01766400
Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
The 27 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checked10.1016/S0899-8256(05)80017-X_bib1
no DOI — not checked10.1016/S0899-8256(05)80017-X_bib2
no DOI — not checked10.1016/S0899-8256(05)80017-X_bib4
no DOI — not checked10.1016/S0899-8256(05)80017-X_bib5
no DOI — not checked10.1016/S0899-8256(05)80017-X_bib6
no DOI — not checkedAn Economist's Perspective on the Evolution of Norms
no DOI — not checked10.1016/S0899-8256(05)80017-X_bib8
no DOI — not checkedFocal points and Bargaining
no DOI — not checkedA Comparative Model of Bargaining: Theory and Evidence
no DOI — not checked10.1016/S0899-8256(05)80017-X_bib12
no DOI — not checkedLearning through reinforcement and replicator dynamics
no DOI — not checked10.1016/S0899-8256(05)80017-X_bib14
no DOI — not checkedAdaptive dynamics in coordination games
no DOI — not checked10.1016/S0899-8256(05)80017-X_bib17
no DOI — not checked10.1016/S0899-8256(05)80017-X_bib20
no DOI — not checkedRational Choice and the Framing of Decisions
no DOI — not checkedPublic goods: A survey of experimental research
no DOI — not checked10.1016/S0899-8256(05)80017-X_bib26
no DOI — not checkedAn Experimental Study of Sequential Bargaining
no DOI — not checkedBargaining Experiments
no DOI — not checked10.1016/S0899-8256(05)80017-X_bib30
no DOI — not checkedBargaining and Market Power in Jerusalem, Ljubljana, Pittsburgh, and Tokyo: An Experimental Study
no DOI — not checkedEvolutionary Foundations of Solution Concepts for Finite, Two-Player, Normal-Form Games
no DOI — not checkedDoes Evolution Eliminate Domianted Strategies?
no DOI — not checked10.1016/S0899-8256(05)80017-X_bib36
no DOI — not checkedExperimental Economics: Induced Value Theory
no DOI — not checked10.1016/S0899-8256(05)80017-X_bib42
What this badge says. CiteStamped means the CHECKABLE references of this
work were clean at the dated check: each resolved to a known work in a public registry, and none
carried a retraction notice at that time. It says nothing about the quality, findings,
or importance of the work itself, and nothing about references deposited without a DOI.
checked 2026-08-02 — re-checked daily as this page is visited; titles and statuses come from Crossref and DataCite and are not part of the signed record
Embed this badge
Both snippets point at the live badge image and link back to this page. The badge re-renders from the daily check, so an embed never goes stale by more than a day of visits.
<a href="https://citestamp.com/citestamped/10.1016/s0899-8256(05)80017-x"><img src="https://citestamp.com/citestamped/10.1016/s0899-8256(05)80017-x/badge.svg" alt="CiteStamped reference-health badge" width="460" height="64"></a>
[80017-x/badge.svg)](https://citestamp.com/citestamped/10.1016/s0899-8256(05)80017-x)