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Can the Pivotal mechanism induce truth-telling? An experimental study

https://doi.org/10.1023/a:1017542406848
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18/18 checkable references clean · checked 2026-07-25

Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.

3 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.

The 18 checked references that resolve
resolves10.1023/A:1005025416722
Experiments With the Pivot Process for Providing Public Goods
resolves10.1007/BF00210366
On the Margolis ?thought experiment,? and the applicability of demand-revealing mechanisms to large-group decisions
resolves10.1007/BF01726210
Multipart pricing of public goods
resolves10.1007/BF01718089
Experimenting with public goods pricing
resolves10.2307/1911219
Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods
resolves10.2307/1914085
Incentives in Teams
resolves10.1016/0047-2727(75)90001-8
Incentives and public inputs
resolves10.2307/2297050
Straightforward Individual Incentive Compatibility in Large Economies
resolves10.2307/1912821
A Differential Approach to Dominant Strategy Mechanisms
resolves10.1016/0304-4068(82)90004-0
Nash and dominant strategy implementation in economic environments
resolves10.1007/BF00124630
A thought experiment on demand-revealing mechanisms
resolves10.1016/0022-0531(83)90080-7
Asymptotic efficiency of the pivotal mechanism with general project space
resolves10.1016/0022-0531(82)90058-8
Asymptotic efficiency of the demand revealing mechanism
resolves10.1007/BF01718088
Pricing public goods
resolves10.1086/260505
A New and Superior Process for Making Social Choices
resolves10.1007/BF00141071
An experiment in the demand-revealing process
resolves10.2307/1913651
A Note on the Characterization of Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences
resolves10.2307/1912822
On the Nonexistence of a Dominant Strategy Mechanism for Making Optimal Public Decisions
The 3 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedGroves, T. and Ledyard, J. (1987). Incentive compatibility since 1972. In Groves, T., Radner, R. and Reiter, S. (Eds.), Information, incentives and economic mechanisms, 48-111. University of Minnesota Press.
no DOI — not checkedSmith, V.L. (1976). Experimental economics: Induced value theory. American Economic Review 66: 274-279.
no DOI — not checkedWiner, B.J., Brown, D.R. and Michels, K.M. (1991). Statistical principles in experimental design. Third ed., McGraw-Hill.
What this badge says. CiteStamped means the CHECKABLE references of this work were clean at the dated check: each resolved to a known work in a public registry, and none carried a retraction notice at that time. It says nothing about the quality, findings, or importance of the work itself, and nothing about references deposited without a DOI.

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