Reference health
Incentives for Anticompetitive Behavior by Public Enterprises
39/39 checkable references clean · checked 2026-07-25
Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.
28 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.
The 39 checked references that resolve
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Ownership and Performance in Competitive Environments: A Comparison of the Performance of Private, Mixed, and State-Owned Enterprises
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Service Quality, Competition, and Regulatory Policies in the Postal Sector
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THE PUBLIC FIRM AS AN INSTRUMENT FOR REGULATING AN OLIGOPOLISTIC MARKETT
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resolves10.1093/oxfordjournals.oep.a041896
ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES OF A PUBLIC ENTERPRISE IN OLIGOPOLY
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resolves10.1016/0147-5967(92)90133-R
Competition policy vs horizontal merger with public, entrepreneurial, and labor-managed firms
resolves10.1016/S0167-7187(98)00005-8
The incentive for non-price discrimination by an input monopolist
resolves10.1111/1467-8586.00024
Welfare effects of pricing in anticipation of Laspeyres price‐cap regulation: an example
resolves10.1023/A:1008191911289
Killing the Goose That May Have Laid the Golden Egg: Only the Data Know Whether Sabotage Pays
resolves10.2307/1912637
Limit Pricing and Entry under Incomplete Information: An Equilibrium Analysis
resolves10.1086/466705
Pricing in Public and Private Enterprises: Electric Utilities in the United States
resolves10.1023/A:1008079822715
A Regulated Firm's Incentive to Discriminate: A Reevaluation and Extension of Weisman's Result
resolves10.1016/S0167-6245(98)00012-2
Raising rivals' costs: The entry of an upstream monopolist into downstream markets
resolves10.1002/(SICI)1520-6688(199723)16:4<541::AID-PAM2>3.0.CO;2-G
The future of the nonprofit sector: Its entwining with private enterprise and government
resolves10.1007/BF01070808
Regulation and the vertically integrated firm: The case of RBOC entry into interlata long distance
The 28 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedAreeda, Phillip, and Herbert Hovenkamp (1999) Antitrust Law: An Analysis of Antitrust Principles and their Application. Boston, MA: Aspen Law and Business.
no DOI — not checkedBaseman, Kenneth (1981) ‘Open Entry and Cross-Subsidization in Regulated Markets’, in Gary Fromm, ed., Studies in Public Regulation. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, pp. 329¶360.
no DOI — not checkedBaumol, William (1959) Business Behavior, Value and Growth. New York: The MacMillan Company.
no DOI — not checkedBaumol, William, and David Bradford (1970) ‘Optimal Departures from Marginal Cost Pricing’, American Economic Review, 60, 265¶283.
no DOI — not checkedBrick, Michael (1999) ‘Private Mailbox Services Call New Postal Rules Unfair’. New York Times, July 6, p. C2.
no DOI — not checkedBrock, William (1983) ‘Pricing, Predation, and Entry Barriers in Regulated Industries’, in David Evans, ed., Breaking Up Bell. New York: North-Holland, pp. 191¶229.
no DOI — not checkedGeddes, R. Richard (1994) ‘Agency Costs and Governance in the United States Postal Service’, in J. Gregory Sidak, ed., Governing the Postal Service. Washington, D.C.: The AEI Press, pp. 114¶140.
no DOI — not checkedGeddes, R. Richard (2002) Saving the Mail: How to Solve the Problems of the U.S. Postal Service. Washington, D.C.: AEI Press.
no DOI — not checkedHansmann, Henry (1996) The Ownership of Enterprise. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
no DOI — not checkedLott, John (1999) Are Predatory Commitments Credible? Who Should the Courts Believe? Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
no DOI — not checkedMacAvoy, Paul, and George McIsaac (1995) ‘The Current File on the Case for Privatization of the Federal Government Enterprises’, The Hume Papers on Public Policy, 3, 121¶147.
no DOI — not checkedMandy, David, and David Sappington (2001) Incentives for Sabotage in Vertically-Related Industries. University of Missouri mimeo.
no DOI — not checkedNewbery, David (1999) Privatization, Restructuring, and Regulation of Network Utilities. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
no DOI — not checkedNiskanen, William (1971) Bureaucracy and Representative Government. Chicago, IL: Aldine-Atherton Publishers.
no DOI — not checkedOrdover, Janusz, and Garth Saloner (1989) ‘Predation, Monopolization, and Antitrust’, in Richard Schmalensee and Robert Willig, eds., Handbook of Industrial Organization, Volume I. Amsterdam: Elsevier Science Publishers, pp. 537¶596.
no DOI — not checkedOster, Sharon (1995) ‘The Failure of Postal Reform’, The Hume Papers on Public Policy
3, 109¶120.
no DOI — not checkedPosner, Richard (1971) ‘Taxation by Regulation’, Bell Journal of Economics, 2, 22¶50.
no DOI — not checkedRees, Ray (1984) ‘A Positive Theory of the Public Enterprise’, in Maurice Marchand, Pierre Pestieau, and Henry Tulkens, eds., The Performance of Public Enterprises: Concepts and Measurement. Amsterdam: North-Holland, pp. 179¶191.
no DOI — not checkedRose-Ackerman, Susan (1996) ‘Altruism, Nonprofits, and Economic Theory’, Journal of Economic Literature, 34, 701¶728.
no DOI — not checkedSalop, Steven (1979) ‘Strategic Entry Deterrence’, American Economic Review, 69, 335¶338.
no DOI — not checkedSalop, Steven, and David Scheffman (1983) ‘Raising Rivals’ Costs’, American Economic Review, 73, 267¶271.
no DOI — not checkedSalop, Steven, David Scheffman, and Warren Schwartz (1984) ‘A Bidding Analysis of Special Interest Regulation: Raising Rivals’ Costs in a Rent Seeking Society’, in Robert Rogowsky, and Bruce Yandle, eds., The Political Economy of Regulation: Private Interests in the Regulatory Process. Washington, D.C.: Federal Trade Commission, pp. 102¶127.
no DOI — not checkedSappington, David, and J. Gregory Sidak (2001) Incentives for Anticompetitive Behavior by Public Enterprises, University of Florida mimeo.
no DOI — not checkedShort, R. P. (1984) ‘The Role of Public Enterprises: An International Statistical Comparison’, in Robert Floyd, Clive Gray, and R. P. Short, eds., Public Enterprises in Mixed Economies: Some Macroeconomic Aspects. Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund, pp. 110¶196.
no DOI — not checkedSidak, J. Gregory, and Daniel Spulber (1996) Protecting Competition from the Postal Monopoly. AEI Press.
no DOI — not checkedStigler, George (1971) ‘The Theory of Regulation’, Bell Journal of Economics, 2, 3¶21.
no DOI — not checkedTirole, Jean (1988) The Theory of Industrial Organization. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
no DOI — not checkedWorld Bank (1995) Bureaucrats in Business: The Economics and Politics of Government Ownership. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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