Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known
work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction,
withdrawal, or removal notice.
The 16 checked references that resolve
resolves10.2307/1928059An Empirical Analysis of Moral Hazard and Experience Rating
resolves10.1086/261929Adverse Selection, Commitment, and Renegotiation: Extension to and Evidence from Insurance Markets
resolves10.2307/2555423The Performance of Long-Term Contracts: Further Evidence from Coal Markets
resolves10.2307/2555628Incentives, Learning, and Compensation: A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation of Managerial Labor Contracts
resolves10.1086/261930Evidence on Adverse Selection: Equilibrium Signaling and Cross-Subsidization in the Insurance Market
resolves10.2307/1885326Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information
resolves10.2307/2527333Multitask Agency and Contract Choice: An Empirical Exploration
The 23 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkede.g., the analysis of the Quebec regulatory reform by Dionne and Vanasse
no DOI — not checkedas well as Sec. IV below. Finally, investigating the dynamics of the relationship provides a very strong test (see Chiappori and Heckman
no DOI — not checkedfor early references
no DOI — not checked`Adverse Selection in the Credit Card Market.'' Manuscript
no DOI — not checked`Asymmetric Information in Health Insurance: Evidence from the National Health Expenditure Survey.'' Manuscript
no DOI — not checked`An Empirical Examination of Information Barriers to Trade in Insurance.'' Manuscript
no DOI — not checked`Insurance under Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection: The Case of Pure Competition.'' Manuscript
no DOI — not checked`Théorie des contrats et économétrie de l'assurance: Quelques pistes de recherche.'' Working Paper no. 94-01
no DOI — not checked`Econometric Models of Insurance under Asymmetric Information.'' In Handbook of Insurance, edited by Georges Dionne
no DOI — not checkedMoral Hazard, and the Demand for Physician Services.'' Manuscript.
no DOI — not checked`Testing for Moral Hazard Using Dynamic Data.'' Manuscript
no DOI — not checked`Testing for Asymmetric Information in Canadian Automobile Insurance.'' In Contributions to Insurance Economics, edited by Georges Dionne
no DOI — not checked`Pareto Improving Asymmetric Information in a Dynamic Insurance Market.'' Discussion Paper no. 266
no DOI — not checked``The Timid and the Reckless: Risk Preference, Precautions and Overinsurance.'' Manuscript
no DOI — not checked`The Informational Content of Household Decisions, with an Application to Insurance under Adverse Selection.'' Discussion Paper no. 9701
no DOI — not checked`Une évaluation empirique de la nouvelle tarification de l'assurance automobile au Québec.'' Manuscript
no DOI — not checkedp_41
no DOI — not checked`Estimating the Effect of Alcohol on Driver Risk Using Only Fatal Accident Statistics.'' Manuscript
no DOI — not checkedThe Economics of Contracts: A Primer
no DOI — not checked`Is There Adverse Selection on the Credit Market?'' Manuscript
no DOI — not checkedVilleneuve, Bertrand. ``Essais en économie de l'assurance.'' Ph.D. dissertation, Département et Laboratoire d'E´conomie Théorique etAppliquée, 1996.
no DOI — not checkedp_54
no DOI — not checkedLouvain-la-Neuve: Centre Operations Res. and Econometrics
checked 2026-09-21 — re-checked daily as this page is visited;
titles and statuses come from Crossref and DataCite and are not part of the signed record
Both snippets point at the live badge image and link back to this page. The
badge re-renders from the daily check, so an embed never goes stale by more than a day of visits.