Reference health
Enjoying the Quiet Life? Corporate Governance and Managerial Preferences
30/30 checkable references clean · checked 2026-09-22
Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.
15 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.
The 30 checked references that resolve
resolves10.3386/w7335
Empire-Builders and Shirkers: Investment, Firm Performance, and Managerial Incentives
resolves10.1016/0304-405X(94)00823-J
Poison or placebo? Evidence on the deterrence and wealth effects of modern antitakeover measures
resolves10.1086/260549
Managerial Objectives in Regulated Industries: Expense-Preference Behavior in Banking
resolves10.1111/0022-1082.00116
Capital Structure and Corporate Control: The Effect of Antitakeover Statutes on Firm Leverage
resolves10.2307/796347
Second Generation State Takeover Statutes and Shareholder Wealth: An Empirical Study
resolves10.1016/0304-405X(89)90047-0
The effects of management buyouts on operating performance and value
resolves10.1016/0304-405X(89)90085-8
The wealth effects of second-generation state takeover legislation
resolves10.1016/0304-405X(90)90025-U
The effects of leveraged buyouts on productivity and related aspects of firm behavior
resolves10.1111/0022-1082.00250
Taking Stock: Equity‐Based Compensation and the Evolution of Managerial Ownership
resolves10.1086/467140
The Effects of Antitakeover Amendments on Takeover Activity: Some Direct Evidence
resolves10.2307/2555457
State Regulation of Takeovers and Shareholder Wealth: The Case of New York's 1985 Takeover Statutes
The 15 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedValue and Growth
no DOI — not checkedCorporate Governance and Executive Pay: Evidence from Takeover Legislation
no DOI — not checkedWashington: Brookings Inst.
no DOI — not checkedrf8
no DOI — not checkedCorporate Takeovers: Causes and Consequences, edited by Alan J. Auerbach.
no DOI — not checkedJob Creation and Destruction
no DOI — not checkedThe Economic Structure of Corporate Law
no DOI — not checkedFinancial Markets and Corporate Strategy
no DOI — not checkedCorporate Takeovers and Productivity
no DOI — not checkedrf30
no DOI — not checkedrf32
no DOI — not checkedrf37
no DOI — not checkedCorporate Takeovers: Causes and Consequences, edited by Alan J. Auerbach.
no DOI — not checkedrf42
no DOI — not checkedThe Economics of Discretionary Behavior: Managerial Objectives in a Theory of the Firm
What this badge says. CiteStamped means the CHECKABLE references of this
work were clean at the dated check: each resolved to a known work in a public registry, and none
carried a retraction notice at that time. It says nothing about the quality, findings,
or importance of the work itself, and nothing about references deposited without a DOI.
checked 2026-09-22 — re-checked daily as this page is visited; titles and statuses come from Crossref and DataCite and are not part of the signed record
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