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The Assignment of Workers to Jobs in an Economy with Coordination Frictions

https://doi.org/10.1086/444551
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22/22 checkable references clean · checked 2026-08-27

Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.

11 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.

The 22 checked references that resolve
resolves10.1111/1468-0262.00020
High Wage Workers and High Wage Firms
resolves10.1016/S0165-1765(02)00178-7
Matching with multiple applications
resolves10.1086/260084
A Theory of Marriage: Part I
resolves10.1111/1468-0297.00435
Long‐Term Partnership Formation: Marriage and Employment
resolves10.1086/322835
Pricing and Matching with Frictions
resolves10.2307/2297862
Does Unmeasured Ability Explain Inter-Industry Wage Differentials
resolves10.2307/2937931
Sources of Intra-Industry Wage Dispersion: How Much Do Employers Matter?
resolves10.1007/BF01737554
Games with randomly disturbed payoffs: A new rationale for mixed-strategy equilibrium points
resolves10.2307/2937925
Job Queues and Wages
resolves10.1006/redy.1999.0089
Bidding for Labor
resolves10.2307/1907742
Assignment Problems and the Location of Economic Activities
resolves10.2307/1911072
Efficiency Wages and the Inter-Industry Wage Structure
resolves10.1006/game.1998.0658
Equivalence of Auctions and Posted Prices
resolves10.1086/262077
Competitive Search Equilibrium
resolves10.2307/2937911
Equilibrium Wage Dispersion and Interindustry Wage Differentials
resolves10.2307/2937800
The Coordination Problem in Decentralized Markets: An Experiment
resolves10.2307/2938374
Ex Ante Price Offers in Matching Games Non-Steady States
resolves10.2307/1914276
Comparative Advantage and the Distributions of Earnings and Abilities
resolves10.2307/2527197
Search and the Efficient Assignment of Workers to Jobs
resolves10.1006/jeth.2000.2713
Frictional Assignment. I. Efficiency
resolves10.1111/1467-937X.00213
A Directed Search Model of Inequality with Heterogeneous Skills and Skill?Biased Technology
resolves10.1111/1468-0262.00112
Assortative Matching and Search
The 11 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedConf. Ser. Public Policy 46 (June): 327–37
no DOI — not checkedWorking Paper no. 8434 (August), NBER
no DOI — not checkedAdvances in Applied Microeconomics
no DOI — not checkedTopel
no DOI — not checkedOliviera Sotomayor
no DOI — not checkedrf27
no DOI — not checkedrf29
no DOI — not checkedJob Auctions
no DOI — not checkedWorking Paper no. 8501 (October), NBER
no DOI — not checkedManuscript, Dept. Econ., Univ.
no DOI — not checkedNonstationary Search
What this badge says. CiteStamped means the CHECKABLE references of this work were clean at the dated check: each resolved to a known work in a public registry, and none carried a retraction notice at that time. It says nothing about the quality, findings, or importance of the work itself, and nothing about references deposited without a DOI.

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