Reference health

Primary Elections and the Provision of Public Goods

https://doi.org/10.1086/694788
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40/40 checkable references clean · checked 2026-08-28

Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.

13 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.

The 40 checked references that resolve
resolves10.1111/j.1540-5907.2008.00316.x
Candidate and Party Strategies in Two‐Stage Elections Beginning with a Primary
resolves10.1017/S0003055403000819
Bargaining in Bicameral Legislatures: When and Why Does Malapportionment Matter?
resolves10.1016/0304-3932(89)90047-0
Is public expenditure productive?
resolves10.1111/j.1540-5907.2008.00344.x
Piling On: Multilevel Government and the Fiscal Common‐Pool
resolves10.1017/CBO9780511808524
Imperfect Union
resolves10.1086/595764
Fiscal Consequences of Electoral Institutions
resolves10.1007/s11127-008-9389-4
The economic effects of constitutions: replicating—and extending—Persson and Tabellini
resolves10.2307/1061723
Bicameral Legislatures and Fiscal Policy
resolves10.1016/S0014-2921(98)00093-2
Party governance and ideological bias
resolves10.1111/j.1468-2508.2006.00443.x
Primary Elections and Candidate Strength in Latin America
resolves10.1093/jleo/ewp019
Party Organization and Electoral Competition
resolves10.2307/2585484
Cohesion in Legislatures and the Vote of Confidence Procedure
resolves10.2307/2082513
Redistributive Politics and Economic Efficiency
resolves10.2307/2960152
The Determinants of Success of Special Interests in Redistributive Politics
resolves10.1257/pol.3.3.144
Electoral Rules and Politicians' Behavior: A Micro Test
resolves10.1017/S0022381609990247
Distributive Politics with Primaries
resolves10.1093/jleo/6.special_issue.79
Political Institutions and Fiscal Policy: Evidence from the U.S. Historical Record
resolves10.1561/100.00006043
Nomination Processes and Policy Outcomes
resolves10.3162/036298004X201096
Bicameral Winning Coalitions and Equilibrium Federal Legislatures
resolves10.1017/S0022381608090221
Why Primaries in Latin American Presidential Elections?
resolves10.1177/019251218600700107
Electoral Structures and Pork Barrel Politics
resolves10.1177/0010414090022004004
Comparative Pork Barrel Politics
resolves10.1007/BF00116710
Balanced-budget redistribution as the outcome of political competition
resolves10.1257/aer.91.1.225
The Provision of Public Goods Under Alternative Electoral Incentives
resolves10.1162/0033553041382175
Why did the Elites Extend the Suffrage? Democracy and the Scope of Government, with an Application to Britain's "Age of Reform"
resolves10.1162/154247605775012888
A Drawback of Electoral Competition
resolves10.1111/1467-937X.00207
Distributive Politics and the Costs of Centralization
resolves10.2307/2586384
Presidential Pork: Executive Veto Power and Distributive Politics
resolves10.2307/2669261
Proposal Rights, Veto Rights, and Political Bargaining
resolves10.1162/003355302753650346
Electoral Systems and Public Spending
resolves10.1007/s00355-006-0087-1
Two-stage electoral competition in two-party contests: persistent divergence of party positions
resolves10.1086/317686
Comparative Politics and Public Finance
resolves10.1016/S0014-2921(98)00131-7
The size and scope of government:
resolves10.7551/mitpress/2591.001.0001
The Economic Effects of Constitutions
resolves10.1257/000282804322970689
Constitutional Rules and Fiscal Policy Outcomes
resolves10.1257/089533004773563449
Constitutions and Economic Policy
resolves10.1111/j.1540-5907.2010.00435.x
Party Strength, the Personal Vote, and Government Spending
resolves10.1177/0951629810382805
Why primaries? The party’s tradeoff between policy and valence
resolves10.2307/3088395
Plurality Rule, Proportional Representation, and the German Bundestag: How Incentives to Pork-Barrel Differ across Electoral Systems
resolves10.1007/s10683-014-9423-y
Institution design and public good provision: an experimental study of the vote of confidence procedure
The 13 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedParty and Policy Making: Further New Perspectives on the History of Congress
no DOI — not checkedrf5
no DOI — not checkedProbability Models of Collective Decision Making.
no DOI — not checkedUnpublished manuscript
no DOI — not checkedOxford Handbook of Political Economy.
no DOI — not checkedPrimary Elections
no DOI — not checkedrf37
no DOI — not checkedUnpublished manuscript
no DOI — not checkedUnpublished manuscript
no DOI — not checkedThe Demise of the American Convention System
no DOI — not checkedKantor
no DOI — not checkedThe Defining Moment: The Great Depression and the American Economy in the Twentieth Century.
no DOI — not checkedAmerican Direct Primary
What this badge says. CiteStamped means the CHECKABLE references of this work were clean at the dated check: each resolved to a known work in a public registry, and none carried a retraction notice at that time. It says nothing about the quality, findings, or importance of the work itself, and nothing about references deposited without a DOI.

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