Reference health

Attraction versus Persuasion: Information Provision in Search Markets

https://doi.org/10.1086/720984
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22/22 checkable references clean · checked 2026-08-28

Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.

2 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.

The 22 checked references that resolve
resolves10.1093/jeea/jvx017
Ordered Consumer Search
resolves10.1111/j.1468-0297.2011.02469.x
Paying for Prominence
resolves10.1016/j.geb.2019.10.002
Competitive information disclosure by multiple senders
resolves10.1086/699211
Competitive Information Disclosure in Search Markets
resolves10.1257/mic.20130080
Grading Standards and Education Quality
resolves10.3982/ECTA14837
Consumer Search and Price Competition
resolves10.1257/pandp.20191101
Optimal Information Design for Search Goods
resolves10.1086/704574
Information Design in the Holdup Problem
resolves10.1086/677253
Competing for Consumer Inattention
resolves10.1016/0022-0531(71)90013-5
A model of price adjustment
resolves10.1016/j.ijindorg.2018.03.009
Price-directed consumer search
resolves10.1111/1756-2171.12411
Consumer search and optimal information
resolves10.1111/j.1756-2171.2012.00180.x
A search cost model of obfuscation
resolves10.1016/j.ijindorg.2018.09.001
A model of directed consumer search
resolves10.1257/aer.101.6.2590
Bayesian Persuasion
resolves10.1287/moor.2020.1119
Interactive Information Design
resolves10.1016/0022-0531(74)90061-1
The theory of search
resolves10.1257/aer.20170620
Ultimatum Bargaining with Rational Inattention
resolves10.1257/aer.20160145
Buyer-Optimal Learning and Monopoly Pricing
resolves10.2307/1910412
Optimal Search for the Best Alternative
resolves10.2307/1885694
True Monopolistic Competition as a Result of Imperfect Information
resolves10.1016/j.jet.2021.105330
Efficient demands in a multi-product monopoly
The 2 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedProbability and Measure
no DOI — not checkedrf22
What this badge says. CiteStamped means the CHECKABLE references of this work were clean at the dated check: each resolved to a known work in a public registry, and none carried a retraction notice at that time. It says nothing about the quality, findings, or importance of the work itself, and nothing about references deposited without a DOI.

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