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A Quantitative Model of Banking Industry Dynamics

https://doi.org/10.1086/738381
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41/41 checkable references clean · checked 2026-08-21

Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.

17 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.

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no DOI — not checked———. 2025. “Replication Data for: ‘A Quantitative Model of Banking Industry Dynamics.’” Harvard Dataverse,https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/S2LGB4.
no DOI — not checkedCorbae, Dean, Pablo D’Erasmo, and Charles Smith. 2025. “A Quantitative Model of Bank Mergers.” Working paper.
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no DOI — not checkedRíos-Rull, José-Vıctor, Tamon Takamura, and Yaz Terajima. 2023. “Banking Dynamics, Market Discipline and Capital Regulations.” Working paper.
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