Reference health
Subgame-Perfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations*
32/32 checkable references clean · checked 2026-07-24
Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.
7 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.
The 32 checked references that resolve
resolves10.2307/2951536
Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information
resolves10.3386/w15167
Subgame Perfect Implementation with Almost Perfect Information and the Hold-Up Problem
resolves10.1016/j.geb.2011.03.003
Implementation in adaptive better-response dynamics: Towards a general theory of bounded rationality in mechanisms
resolves10.2307/2297045
The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility
resolves10.1086/261404
The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration
resolves10.2307/2938354
Efficiency Despite Mutually Payoff-Relevant Private Information: The Finite Case
resolves10.1016/0022-0531(77)90140-5
The equivalence of strong positive association and strategy-proofness
resolves10.2307/1911706
Strategy Space Reduction in Maskin's Theorem: Sufficient Conditions for Nash Implementation
resolves10.1006/jeth.2001.2790
On the Interplay of Hidden Action and Hidden Information in Simple Bilateral Trading Problems
The 7 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedSubgame Perfect Implementation: A Laboratory Experiment
no DOI — not checkedSubjective Evaluation versus Public Evaluation
no DOI — not checkedBalanced-Budget Mechanisms for Adverse Selection Problems
no DOI — not checkedGame Theory
no DOI — not checkedSome (Crude) Foundations for Incomplete Contracts
no DOI — not checkedImplementation with Near-Complete Information: The Case of Subgame Perfection
no DOI — not checkedRobust Equilibria in Sequential Games under Almost Common Certainty of Payoffs
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